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luxuriant, sublime, forbidding, denuded: images of the Amazon arrest the beholder. Yet the Amazon enthralls us through more 
than its physical wonders. Its power is a social product, forged by 
people and institutions that have made material and symbolic in-
vestments in the region.1 This book examines an array of media-
tors in Brazil and the United States that delineated the nature of 
the Amazon during the twentieth century. Focused on the era of 
the Second World War, this study explores how conflicts raging 
within and over the Brazilian Amazon came to shape landscapes 
and lifeways in the region. It offers an analysis of the political and 
environmental history of the Brazilian Amazon as much as a re-
flection on shifting cultural representations of its nature.
The Brazilian Amazon, which comprises between 70 and 80 
percent of the total area of the Basin, has long been knotted in dis-
putes over labor, resources, and meaning. As forester Roy Nash 
aptly stated in The Conquest of Brazil (1926): “Many things the 
tropical forest has meant to as many men. To the Indian, abun-
dant home. To the convict turned adrift by the early Portuguese, 
abominable hell.”2 More broadly, we might argue, for peasant- 
extractivists and traders, the forest has presented the battleground 
or backdrop for struggles over sustenance and power. For outside 
promoters, proper use of the tropical forest promises to rescue 
societies from doom or disenchantment. For skeptics, the jungle 
defies remediation. Mirroring the broader Western oscillation be-
tween triumph and despair in imagining human capacity to trans-
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form nature, such visions in the tropics invariably enlist hierarchies of 
race and nation.3 The Amazon’s vast geographic expanse, dense forests, 
and fitful integration into global markets have triggered and prolonged 
such conflicts and controversies.
During the twentieth century, the Amazon came to be summoned 
by a large number and range of contestants in the Northern and South-
ern Hemispheres.4 The expansion of state power, population growth, and 
rising demand for raw materials redefined notions of economic need 
and national security. Industrialization fueled the expansion of cities and 
mass markets, while new technologies fired urban elites’ faith in the ca-
pacity to vanquish space, distance, and time. Agricultural mechaniza-
tion and land commodification displaced millions of rural smallholders. 
Policymakers and professional sectors identified or recast socioenviron-
mental problems in national or global terms, pitching solutions in the 
language of science and public planning. Mass media beamed news and 
images to far- flung consumers, and broader swaths of the population de-
manded the rights of citizenship. Amidst wrenching societal transforma-
tions, competing human designs on the Amazon proliferated.
As a hinterland, the Amazon challenged the competence of the Brazil-
ian state to achieve governability and national integration. As a border-
land, it crystallized geopolitical concerns with territorial defense. As a 
resource- rich land, the Amazon became increasingly entwined with pat-
terns of capital investment in Brazil and trends in global consumption. 
As a promised land, it beckoned economic migrants, drought refugees, 
and adventurers. As a homeland, Amazonian landscapes comprised sites 
of concerted human intervention, founts of historical reference and en-
vironmental knowledge, and loci of conflicts over resources and power.5 
As a tropical lowland, the Amazon was marked as much by distinct eco-
systems as invidious canards about race, place, and national character.
Indeed, the varied delimitations of the Brazilian Amazon, reflective 
of disparate biogeographic and political- administrative criteria, illustrate 
the multiple perspectives of institutional and disciplinary fields.6 The 
hydrographic basin of the Brazilian Amazon encompasses the geographic 
region drained by the Amazon River and its tributaries. The Amazonian 
biome comprises a set of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems that include 
tropical forests, floodplain forests, grasslands, savannas, mangroves, and 
palm forests. The “classic” Amazon is a geographic and political division 
comprising the six states of the northern region—Pará, Amazonas, Ro-
raima, Rondônia, Acre, and Amapá—where tropical rain forest predomi-
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nates. The “Legal Amazon,” a federally created administrative unit dating 
to 1953, has extended the geographic boundaries of “classic” Amazonia 
by more than one- third through the incorporation of western Maranhão 
and the northern portions of Mato Grosso and Goiás (today the state of 
Tocantins)7 (see map Intro.1).
This book approaches the field of political ecology in the Amazon as 
a study in conflicts over the use, rights, and definition of territory and 
resources among distinct social groups.8 While recognizing the funda-
mental material basis to such struggles, the book also explores the sym-
bolic and affective relationships that groups maintain with the biophysi-
cal environment.9 Building on the concept of a “commodity ecumene,” 
which anthropologist Arjun Appadurai defines as the “transcultural net-
work of relationships linking producers, distributors, and consumers of 
a particular commodity or set of commodities,” this study highlights how 
landscapes, politics, and things are constituted through such flows, pro-
cesses, and interconnections.10 Midway between the turn- of- the- century 
rubber boom and the contemporary environmental fracas, the wartime 
history of the Brazilian Amazon reveals the multiple mediations and net-
works that served to constitute the diverse region.
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of Jungle explorers and historians: Stories and methods
Jungle explorers revel in recounting their arduous journeys, so I follow 
in their footsteps in enumerating the difficulties of writing a history of 
the Amazon. My tale is devoid of hair- raising brushes with piranhas, ana-
condas, stingrays, malarial mosquitoes, and treacherous rapids that com-
prise the standard fare of such accounts. Rather, as a historian, the great-
est challenges that I encountered stemmed from social conditions in the 
Amazon, which pose particular problems for historical record- keeping 
and research, and consolidation of a historiographical canon.11 In places 
where state power and capital falter, impunity flourishes, and humidity 
rules, archival material often ends up being poorly preserved and spotty 
(in both senses of the word).
Yet the Amazon has always fit uncomfortably into Brazilian historiog-
raphy for epistemological reasons as well. Peripheral to the eastern slave- 
plantations that propelled colonial integration into Atlantic markets 
and to the import- substitution industrialization that fuelled economic 
growth in twentieth- century Brazil, the Amazon seemingly confounds 
the grand narratives of empire and the nation- state—the muses of His-
tory. Nor has the study of frontiers and borders coalesced as a specialized 
field in Brazilian historiography to situate the history of the Amazon in 
the process of nation- state formation.12 In any event, the Amazon’s long-
standing integration into the global economy, the spatial fragmentation 
of its populations due to territorial size and dispersal of resources, and 
the variegated patchwork that characterize its social history complicate 
its conceptualization as “a frontier,” if the latter is perceived as moder-
nity erupting uniformly onto an uncharted hinterland.13 In addition, the 
decades- long concentration of Brazil’s doctoral programs in the nation’s 
southern industrial core consolidated a formidable historiography cover-
ing the São Paulo- Rio de Janeiro axis, and drained academic talent from 
the north as well; and the prohibitive airfares from southern Brazil to the 
Amazon further dissuaded those unblessed with research grants from 
foreign universities, foundations, and governments.
Amid the so- called nature- culture divide grounding Western ontolo-
gies, the Amazon’s academic banishment to the former realm has further 
deterred, or detoured, historiographical exploration.14 It is not for noth-
ing that the natural sciences and the social sciences—particularly geog-
raphy and anthropology, with their disciplinary origins in the colonialist 
study of the “organic” rootedness and “primitive” mores of rural popula-
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tions—have long claimed, and given rise to, the study of the Amazon.15 
Geographically distant from the centers of political power, economically 
“underdeveloped,” and environmentally challenging to outsiders, the na-
ture of the Amazon was declaimed a problem by scientific experts, policy-
makers, and international advocates, rather than a matter for historical 
inquiry.
Since historians, like jungle explorers, tend to overstate the origi-
nality of their discoveries, a number of qualifications are in order for 
the wary reader. Native sons of the Brazilian Amazon, notably Arthur 
Cezar Ferreira Reis, Leandro Tocantins, and Samuel Benchimol, were 
pioneering and prolific chroniclers of the region’s rich history.16 More-
over, Brazilian historiography’s early emphasis on boom and bust cycles 
in national economic development spurred robust scholarship on the 
Amazon’s legendary turn- of- the- century bonanza.17 In a similar fashion, 
research on the region’s boomlet during the Second World War has flour-
ished over the last decade.18 And our understanding of recent Amazo-
nian history has been immeasurably enhanced by the groundbreaking 
work of geographers Bertha Becker and Susanna Hecht and sociologists 
Marianne Schmink and Charles Wood focusing on government policies, 
investment from the nation’s core economic regions, and highway con-
struction in the processes of regional formation and integration into the 
nation- state.19
Rather than an integrated analysis of the multiple networks and pro-
cesses that mutually construct natures and societies, however, much of 
the existing scholarship on the Amazon has tended to depart from and 
isolate such poles. Environmental histories of Amazonian biota can ob-
scure the role of labor, social conflict, and representation in the making 
of nature; or that nature is knowable through the mediation of the sci-
ences, networks of instruments, and the intervention of professions and 
disciplines.20 Social science texts examining the impact of public policies 
in the Amazon can conceal how the realms of discourse and the content 
of objects also serve to construct societies. And discourse- centered ana-
lyses can overlook that although rhetoric, representation, and semiotics 
impact things and social contexts, they are not worlds unto themselves.21 
Thus, whereas scholarship on the Amazon has tended to focus on modes 
of production and systems of land use, (geo)politics and public policies, 
or cultural representations, I intertwine these analytical strands to ex-
plore the multilevel processes of region making. My conceptualization 
of the Brazilian Amazon is informed by geographer David Harvey’s in-
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sight that places are constructed and experienced as material, ecologi-
cal artifacts and intricate networks of social relations; are the focus of 
discursive activity, filled with symbolic and representational meanings; 
and are the distinctive product of institutionalized social and political- 
economic power.22 I employ intersecting local, regional, national, and 
global scales to assess the multiple processes involved in the social pro-
duction of space.23
Practitioners of environmental history, a field traditionally situated at 
the intersection of natural history and intellectual and cultural history, 
have examined the role of the environment in shaping human behavior, 
in shifting human relations with the nonhuman natural world, and in 
questions of sustainability. Others have explored the material and discur-
sive production of nature, and the political processes that have shaped en-
vironmentalism.24 My analysis of the Amazon’s history heeds sociologist 
of science Bruno Latour’s directive that nature and society should not 
serve as explanatory terms but rather as something that requires a con-
joined explanation. Since “nature” cannot be separated from its social rep-
resentations, and “society” itself has to be made out of nonhuman, non-
social resources, Latour urges a historical- minded focus on the mediators 
and networks, composed of associations of humans and nonhumans, 
that create natures and societies.25 In tracking the Amazon’s intermedi-
aries, I examine the region’s laboring classes both as key instruments in 
the production of nature, through modification of its material base, and 
as shapers and subjects of public policies and debate.26 But I also ana-
lyze other collectivities in Brazil and the United States— sanitarians and 
mosquitoes, doctors and pathogens, engineers and automobiles, jour-
nalists and newspapers, filmmakers and movies, botanists and rubber 
trees, chemists and synthetics, migrants and drought profiteers, ecolo-
gists and deforestation—that forged the Amazon during World War II 
and its aftermath. Thus, my lens shifts from the political and professional 
strongholds and media outlets in Washington and Rio de Janeiro to the 
boardrooms and laboratories of the large rubber goods manufacturers; 
from the highways of the United States to the parched backlands and 
war- wrecked economies of the Brazilian northeast; from the hardscrabble 
rubber properties, boom towns, and frontier health posts in the Amazon 
to the contemporary struggles of tappers and environmental organiza-
tions. The making of nature, as much as politics, emerges as a contested 
process that must be understood outside of conventional geographic and 
historiographical boundaries.
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In exploring the “productive friction of global connections” that have 
framed the history of the Brazilian Amazon, this study ambles across con-
tinents rather than within them.27 Although transnational analysis along 
a north- south axis may seem untoward given the physical dimensions 
of the Amazon Basin, which spills into eight different South American 
countries and one overseas territory, the decision stems from the par-
ticular story that I wish to tell: one that interlinks the histories of the 
United States—the place where I live, teach, and much of my readership 
resides—and Brazil, my country of study. Some may feel that my trans-
national take on the Amazon is redolent of colonialist literary produc-
tion, marketed as it was for domestic consumption.28 Or perhaps others 
will see a response to Eric Wolf ’s salutary injunction to uncover “the 
conjoint participation of Western and non- Western people in this world-
wide process” of history—although I prefer less ideologically loaded, and 
inaccurate, labels to conceptualize the respective histories of the United 
States and Brazil.29 My focus also reflects the challenge of conducting 
multiarchival, binational research in collections teeming with the docu-
mentation characteristic of twentieth- century bureaucracies. Ultimately, 
if all regions are made up of networks of social linkages and understand-
ings that transcend bounded notions of place, any transnational method 
can only go so far or deep in narrating the historical past. Of greater 
importance is that a transnational optic need not jettison region- and 
nation- based analyses of the historical formations of race, space, class, 
culture, politics, or nature; nor need specialization in any historical sub-
field restrict practitioners to a singular methodology or research agenda.
Through a composite of synchronic snapshots, multisited in nature 
and often thick in descriptive content, this book focuses on an array 
of war- era mediators involved in the making of the Amazon, bearing 
in mind that “what are called environments, that is relations between 
people and nature, get made and remade not so much in the plans but 
in the process.”30 Chapter 1 examines the coterie of white-collar profes-
sionals, military officials, intellectuals, and traditional oligarchs in Brazil 
who endeavored to remake populations and landscapes in the Amazon 
during the first Vargas regime (1930–45). Chapter 2 traces the origins and 
objectives of U.S. government investment in the wartime Amazon, pre-
cipitated by the nation’s loss of 92 percent of its rubber supply following 
the Japanese invasion of the Malayan peninsula in early 1942. Chapter 3 
explores how Brazilian and U.S. policymakers sought to transform the 
local terms and meanings of forest labor, recasting the Amazon as an ar-
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senal for hemispheric defense and a laboratory for social uplift. Chapter 4 
analyzes the socioenvironmental factors that led tens of thousands to mi-
grate from northeastern Brazil to the Amazon during the war. Chapter 5 
assesses the varied wartime outcomes and historical legacies in and for 
the Amazon region. The epilogue, tacking from the 1970s through the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development of 1992, 
charts the Amazon’s political reappearance as global ecological sanctu-
ary, highlighting both historical links and counterpoints to the war era.
While introductions to contemporary accounts of the Amazon often 
begin by rattling off a list of superlatives that seemingly provide readers 
with definitive answers, this one closes with them to pose fundamen-
tal questions. At 2,700,000 square miles, the Amazon Basin is three- 
quarters the size of the continental United States, and a million square 
miles larger than all of Europe exclusive of Russia. Covering two- fifths 
of South America and three- fifths of Brazil, the Amazon Basin contains 
one- fifth of the planet’s available fresh water, one- third of its evergreen 
broad- leaved forest resources, and one- tenth of its living species. The 
Amazon River, the longest in the world (at 4,255 miles) and the most 
voluminous, has some 1,100 tributaries, seven of which are over 1,000 
miles long. And the Amazon’s forests, with rainfall averages of 2,300 
millimeters (7.5 feet) per year, represent, along with the adjacent Ori-
noco and Guyanas, over half the world’s surviving tropical rain forests.31 
Shall we now ask: Who has brought such inventories to light? Why have 
the realities that they represent carried diverse social meanings? How has 
their significance evolved over time?
ChApTER 1
Border and progreSS
The Amazon and the Estado Novo
In 1941, U.S. historian Hubert Herring noted the Amazon’s ca-pacity to stir nationalist sentiment in Brazil. While residents of 
the more industrial states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio 
Grande do Sul looked upon the rest of Brazil with condescen-
sion, he affirmed, they exhibited “indulgent imperial pride in the 
uncharted Amazon empire.”1 Three years later, geographer Earl 
Parker Hanson made a similar observation. Whereas elites once 
shunned discussion of the Amazon because it conjured images 
of a nation consisting largely of “vast jungled wildernesses, filled 
with poisonous insects and unpleasantly savage Indians,” many 
had since decided that “there is the future South America.”2
Such “pride” in the Amazon’s “future” had been nurtured. In-
deed, the nationalization of the Amazon “question” represents one 
of the dramatic transformations in twentieth- century Brazilian 
politics. Its origins can be traced to the first government of Getúlio 
Vargas (1930–45), and particularly to the authoritarian period of 
the Estado Novo (1937–45), when the rehabilitation of Amazonia 
morphed from a localized oligarchic longing into a state- backed 
crusade. While the economic nationalism of the Vargas regime 
has been extensively explored, this chapter examines the efforts 
of state officials and elites to promote the regional development 
of the Amazon.3
As economists have noted, in a country with one area that is 
rich and prosperous and another poor and stagnant, the periph-
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eral region is only likely to attract public investment during periods of ex-
traordinary prosperity, inflationary excess, or when the promotion of such 
growth assumes paramount national importance.4 In 1937, the southern 
states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul accounted for 
more than half of Brazilian agricultural and industrial production; cof-
fee comprised 70 percent of Brazil’s exports, two- thirds of which came 
from São Paulo.5 Moreover, residents of southern Brazil tended to view 
the Amazon as a Green Hell, or merely harbored general indifference to 
extraregional concerns in a continental nation.6 This chapter analyzes the 
confluence of factors that redirected public policies and state investment 
toward the Amazon during the Estado Novo. Rising national and global 
demand for rubber offered new bidders for Amazonian latex. Geopolitical 
doctrines legitimized the military’s quest to colonize the Amazon and tap 
its natural resources. And the Vargas dictatorship, disbanding the legisla-
ture, banning political opposition, and blaring official propaganda, upheld 
the development of the Amazon as a nationalist imperative. (Perhaps it is 
no coincidence that another full- blown, state- driven program to develop 
the Amazon would recur decades later in Brazil under military rule.)
Yet if nature, regions, and nations are produced from the power- laden 
struggles involving discrete human and nonhuman mediators, the task 
here too is to examine their protagonists during the Vargas era.7 The Ama-
zon’s social meanings were delineated by forest biota, whose distribution, 
extraction, and circulation are discussed more fully in subsequent chap-
ters. Among human mediators, the Amazon’s new- found resonance dur-
ing the Estado Novo reflected its embodiment of multiple aspirations in a 
society undergoing tumultuous change. Industrialists in southern Brazil 
favored access to cheap raw materials, tariffs, and subsidies, while Ama-
zonian producers and traders clamored for higher prices for forest com-
modities.8 Military officials strove to secure national borders and patriotic 
loyalties, while oligarchs defended local fiefdoms and prerogatives. Sani-
tarians groomed robust workers to sustain national development, while 
forest peasants resolved to use their bodies as they saw fit. Intellectuals 
searched for Brazil’s organic roots, while technocrats heralded its future.9 
And poor forest dwellers repudiated the lifestyle overhauls and social 
stigmatization intrinsic to developmentalist projects.10 Amidst such ca-
cophony, however, standard refrains sounded. Policymakers and profes-
sionals trumpeted the potential of science, technology, and state planning 
to remake nature and society in the Amazon. And elite pronouncements 
compartmentalized the Amazonian region and the purported cultural lag 
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of its populations, even as the centralization of state power and the expan-
sion of industrial capitalism deepened national integration.11
“taking a chance” on the amazon
“Amazonia will be quite a game, but it will be worth it,” Vargas’s Foreign 
Minister Oswaldo Aranha reportedly stated. “What is needed is the au-
dacity and imagination of new people accustomed to taking a chance, 
that is, to win and lose.”12 Indeed, the region’s prospective developers 
confronted numerous challenges. Socioeconomic, environmental, demo-
graphic, and epidemiological factors in the Amazon hindered the flow of 
capital, the rule of law, the control of labor, the extension of social ser-
vices, and popular identification with the nation- state. An area of roughly 
1,845,500 square miles, the Brazilian Amazon comprised 54 percent of 
national territory in 1942. Yet its population of between one and a half 
and two million, an average density of one inhabitant per square kilo-
meter, represented less than 5 percent of the national total.13 Geopolitical 
thinkers admonished that the Amazon’s sparse and dispersed population 
imperiled national security when colonial powers ogled tropical lands for 
raw materials and population resettlement, and neighboring countries 
schemed.14 With scattered rural dwellers combing forests and rivers for 
tradable commodities and means of subsistence, Amazonian employers 
howled of a labor “shortage” that crimped exports and agricultural sur-
pluses, stalled transport and public works, and inflated urban salaries.15 
And Brazilian statesmen bemoaned their inability to harness the Ama-
zon’s vast natural resources.
The Amazon’s economic stability and long- term growth, moreover, 
seemed forever hostage to cycles of commodity booms and busts, sea-
sonal harvesting of forest products, mobility of labor, and dependency 
on imports of food and consumer goods. As Agnello Bittencourt noted 
in his survey of the state of Amazonas (1925):
The economic life of Amazonas is based on the extraction of forest 
products, chiefly rubber and Brazil nuts. The commercial and finan-
cial activity of the State is always dependent on the prices of these 
commodities, which are, for their part, at the mercy of speculative 
schemes and other unforeseeable circumstances.
When rubber prices dropped, workers abandoned the properties, com-
mercial firms collapsed, and public finances contracted. But when they 
rebounded, “everything comes to life again: ships that had been docked 
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load up with merchandise and passengers; businesses hire new employ-
ees; imports increase as do customs receipts; and new buildings and 
other urban improvements crop up in Manaus, where life pulsates in the 
streets, the theaters, the schools, and the business firms.”16
The region’s stark socioeconomic and racial stratification further 
clouded the Vargas regime’s vision of development with social justice. Ob-
servers spoke of two classes in the Amazon. An urban elite of largely Por-
tuguese, Middle Eastern, and Sephardic Jewish descent possessed trade 
goods, ships, docks, warehouses, and processing mills; in the country-
side, (absentee) landlords claimed the most accessible territories along 
the rivers in vast, uncultivated holdings that extended far beyond legal 
property lines.17 The other class consisted of peasants, whose fight with 
the forest environment was “very direct and very severe.” Tied by debt to 
landlords and merchants, they relied on subsistence and the extraction 
of scattered natural resources to acquire commercial goods under highly 
unfavorable terms of exchange. This class also included small farmers 
relegated to far- off, meandering channels (igarapés) and burdened by 
usurious terms of credit, punitive taxes, and lack of formal land title.18 
In the Amazon’s urban centers, the underclass aggregated throngs of 
domestic servants, stevedores, washerwomen, prostitutes, vendors, beg-
gars, and jacks- of- all- trades.19 The poor were largely nonwhite, made up 
of caboclos of indigenous and mestizo origin, and northeastern migrants 
and their descendants; the 1940 census classified more than 50 percent 
of the Amazon’s population as pardo, or “brown.”20
Insalubrious conditions, deriving principally from poverty and lack 
of infrastructure, perpetuated a vicious cycle in the region.21 Malaria, 
dysentery, typhoid, tuberculosis, yaws, leprosy, leishmaniasis, filariasis, 
venereal disease, and nutritional deficiencies afflicted residents, felled 
migrants, and repelled investors. Western medical care, best in Belém 
and Manaus—the capitals of Pará and Amazonas with respective popu-
lations of 250,000 and 90,000—eluded most locales; populations scat-
tered over vast territories with slow forms of transportation relied on 
botanical medicines and an irregular supply of overpriced, and often 
adulterated, drugs.22 In Amazon towns, the common practice of drinking 
from polluted rivers, due to the lack of running water and the challenge 
of building wells where the water table was too high, served to transmit 
intestinal parasites; shallow wells often became contaminated by latrines 
or provided breeding grounds for mosquitoes.23
While rivers served as the conduits for trade, settlement, and com-
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munication in the Amazon (see figure 1.1), seasonal variations in water 
levels and the presence of rapids on numerous waterways increased the 
hardships of transport and the cost of production and consumer goods.24 
On the main artery of the Amazon, ocean- going ships drawing twenty 
feet can reach the city of Manaus. But tributaries east of the Madeira 
river are interrupted by rapids within 200 miles of the main trunk; those 
to its west, such as the rubber- rich Purus and Juruá rivers, accommo-
date larger boats in upriver regions only during the rainy season from 
November- December to April- May.25 Thus, a 2,395- mile trip from Ma-
naus to Cruzeiro do Sul, near the Peruvian border, of thirty days in high 
river might take up to three months in the dry season, as upriver captains, 
consigned to flat- bottom boats, motor launches, and canoes, dodged 
sandbars.26 Moreover, lack of scheduled transport, overcrowded vessels, 
fuel shortages, and frequent stops for firewood chronically delayed travel, 
while commercial shipping monopolies inflated costs and offered spotty 
provisions.27 For the third- class passengers crammed in hammocks on 
the bottom decks of the larger steamboats, transport entailed sharing 
space with livestock, which in the absence of ice were carried alive and 
killed on board as needed, producing a “choice collection of smells.”28
figure 1.1 Aerial view of Amazon region, c. 1943. Source: National Archives.
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For nationalists, the “conquest” of the Amazon stood yet as a taunt to 
Brazilian character. In the Northern Hemisphere, environmental deter-
minist theories condemned hot climates for ingraining indolence and 
inflaming passion over reason. Alternatively, detractors who attributed 
tropical “backwardness” to race, religion, or culture insisted that only 
“men from the Mississippi would make things hum along the Amazon 
and the Paraná”; or yearned that “when the great valleys of the Amazon 
and Congo are occupied by a white population more food will be pro-
duced than in all the rest of the inhabited world.”29 Small wonder, with 
national character on trial, that anthropologist Gilberto Freyre extolled 
the Brazilian military’s initiatives to promote colonization of the hinter-
land as confirmation of “the capacity of mestiço populations (as is ours, 
in its majority) to accomplish in tropical lands superior achievements.”30
The Vargas government’s project for the Amazon entailed the rational-
ization of the rubber trade and the expansion of commercial agriculture, 
subsidized migration, improvements in sanitation, public health, and 
transportation, and militarization of the hinterland.31 Upholding Enlight-
enment beliefs in the perfectibility of peoples and places through sci-
ence, Brazil’s expanding professional sectors and bureaucratic apparatus 
vowed that out of vast jungle would emerge orderly landscapes, market- 
oriented producers, and hearty patriots.32 Through public discourse and 
political spectacle the regime stoked popular interest and national pride 
in the Amazon’s potential.
remaking amazonia: a centuries- long State ambition
Four centuries after Europeans first descended the Amazon river, Brazil-
ian state officials still struggled to exert control over the basin’s human 
and natural resources. In 1542, Francisco de Orellana, a conquistador of 
Peru searching for the fabled lands of El Dorado, had led the first band 
of Europeans down the great river, which they named “Amazonas” fol-
lowing a purported attack by indigenous female warriors reminiscent 
of classical legend.33 Although Spain claimed the Amazon under the 
Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, which divided New World dominions be-
tween the Iberian monarchies, over the next centuries the Portuguese 
moved to control the estuary of the river and to extend their dominion 
over the basin. Lisbon’s success was facilitated by geographic advantage: 
the Portuguese gained access to the region through the Amazon River’s 
mouth and Atlantic seaborne trade, whereas Spaniards had to confront 
the rugged Andean mountains and dense jungle before reaching navi-
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gable rivers. Based on claims of prior occupation, achieved principally 
through the establishment of forts and missions, the Portuguese ac-
quired formal rights to Amazonian territory from Spain under the Treaty 
of Madrid of 1750. The new colonial boundaries of the Iberian kingdoms 
in the Amazon— delineated according to patterns of European occupa-
tion, geographic features, and waterways—were established by the Treaty 
of San Ildefonso of 1777.34
During the colonial period, Amazonian populations and resources 
were linked to global trade through the export of drogas do sertão, an as-
sortment of botanicals collected in the wild by indigenous peoples and 
prized by Europeans as condiments and curatives.35 The most lucrative 
New World plantation crops, however, such as sugar, cotton, tobacco, 
cacao, and coffee, grew better in drier and more temperate climates, 
while Amazonia’s poor soils, seasonal flooding, lush vegetation, and ag-
gressive pathogens generally confounded Europeans. Chronic shortage 
of capital precluded large- scale importation of African slaves, leaving 
settlers overwhelmingly reliant on indigenous labor.36
John Hemming has estimated the population of lowland Amazonia at 
between four and five million in 1500—of whom three million were in 
present- day Brazil. Comprising over four hundred different peoples, ab-
original societies in the Amazon were marked by extensive settlements 
and fairly sedentary lifestyles. They cultivated manioc, a tuber high in 
carbohydrates, on the terra firme, where most of the land is of low fertility 
and deficient in animal life. They also relied on animal capture, fishing, 
and agriculture on the várzea, the alluvial forest that is annually renewed 
by rich silt from the Andes (and which comprises only roughly 2 per-
cent of the entire Amazon basin). Cultivation on the várzea—although 
tricky due to the unpredictable flooding of crops, and compromised by 
the reduction in protein supplies during the high- water season when 
fish swim inland, birds fly north, and egg- laying turtles disappear—was 
practicable with large labor reserves.37 But in 1743, when French scien-
tist Charles- Marie de La Condamine sailed (unauthorized) down the 
Amazon, he found hundreds of miles of uninhabited stretches along its 
banks. Epidemics, warfare, and enslavement had decimated the indige-
nous populations during the intervening years.38 Moreover, the introduc-
tion of European goods and the extraction of forest products for export 
upended traditional native subsistence patterns. Reorienting the Ama-
zonian economy toward systematic commercialization of natural re-
sources, European colonialism and Atlantic trade engendered new har-
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vesting strategies, residential patterns, and forms of spatial distribution 
for native populations.39
Portuguese officials, like countless subsequent outsiders, dreamed of 
making better use of people and places in the Amazon.40 The “Law of Lib-
erties” of 1755, issued by Portuguese Secretary of State Sebastião José de 
Carvalho e Mello (better known as the Marquis of Pombal), abolished in-
digenous slavery and stripped missionaries of temporal power over native 
communities, which were placed under the tutelage of a (white) director. 
Seeking to forge a racially integrated and European- style peasantry in the 
Amazon, Pombal’s reforms barred legal discrimination against Indians 
and peoples of mixed race and rewarded marital unions between Luso- 
Brazilian men and indigenous women in an attempt to promote long- 
term settlement.41 Yet Pombal’s efforts to overhaul the Amazon foun-
dered. Under the Directorate (1758–98), indigenous peoples continued 
to be mobilized to collect drogas do sertão; to paddle canoes and trans-
port cargoes; to work on the construction of forts, public works, and in 
shipyards; and to perform labor for settlers for derisory compensation or 
under outright duress.42 Whereas an estimated thirty thousand Indians 
lived under direct colonial control in the Amazon at the start of the Di-
rectorate, forty years later the population had plummeted to nineteen 
thousand because of disease, overwork, and flight.43
Following Independence, economic and racial tensions in the Amazon 
Valley exploded in the Cabanagem revolt of 1835. Originating in Belém as 
an intra- elite dispute, the rebellion soon turned into a mass rural uprising 
marked by guerrilla warfare and horrific violence. A half decade of fighting 
claimed the lives of some thirty thousand people—one- fifth of the Brazil-
ian Amazon’s population at the time. And the ensuing geographic disper-
sal of populations dedicated to mixed subsistence and extractive activities 
further exacerbated the labor shortage in the province of Pará.44 Official 
efforts to colonize the Amazon during the Brazilian Empire (1822–89)—
including the creation of military colonies at São João do Araguaia (1850) 
and Óbidos (1854), as well as state- sponsored and privately administered 
settlements for northeastern migrants—largely failed.45
Between 1850 and 1910, the Amazon’s domination of raw rubber pro-
duction deepened regional integration into the global economy. Crude 
rubber is obtained from latex, a milky emulsion that occurs in the roots, 
stems, branches, and fruit of a wide variety of trees, vines, and plants; 
when treated properly, the tiny globules of the rubber hydrocarbon that 
float in the viscous liquid can be coagulated and solidified into crude 
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natural rubber.46 The premiere source of crude rubber is Hevea brasilien-
sis, a tree native to the Amazon, particularly its southwestern zones, 
where millions dot vast expanses of the forest, although typically no more 
than three or four Hevea grow per acre.47 Subsequent to Charles Good-
year’s discovery of vulcanization in 1839, which mixed in sulfur and ap-
plied heat to ensure rubber’s resistance to fluctuations in temperature, 
the material came to be widely used in manufacturing and construc-
tion.48 Consumer demand skyrocketed with the introduction of the low- 
wheeled Rover safety cycle in Eng land in 1885; John Dunlop’s patenting 
of the pneumatic bicycle tire in 1888; and the proliferation of tens of 
thousands of bicycles worldwide over the ensuing decade.49 In 1890, the 
Amazon commanded 90 percent of global production of rubber and re-
mained the single largest producer over the next two decades, reaching 
a historic annual peak of 42,000 tons in 1912.50 Indeed, during the first 
decade of the twentieth century, rubber climbed to second place in Bra-
zil’s overseas commodity trade, comprising 40 percent of the total value 
of national exports by 1910 (only 1 percent lower than coffee), and greatly 
increasing the influx of foreign exchange throughout the country.51 More-
over, unlike the plantation economies of the circum- Caribbean, Brazilian 
nationals (or recent immigrants) controlled the means of production in 
the Amazon, although European and U.S. import- export houses domi-
nated the international trade in raw rubber during the boom.52
Between 1870 and 1910, the population of the Brazilian Amazon qua-
drupled from 323,000 to 1,217,000. Rapid growth resulted primarily 
from the mass influx of migrants from northeastern Brazil seeking eco-
nomic opportunity and refuge from catastrophic drought.53 Manaus, 
whose population rose from 3,000 in 1867 to 50,000 in 1900, became 
one of the first cities in Brazil to have electric lighting and telephone 
service.54 And Belém, founded in 1616 near the mouth of the Amazon, 
thrived as a commercial and administrative center: the capital of Pará 
had a population of over ninety thousand in 1900 (one of Brazil’s largest 
cities at the time) and boasted electric lighting, trolleys, public works, and 
small- scale industry.55
The Amazon rubber boom was all the more remarkable given its primi-
tive mode of production. Bosses advanced merchandise and credit to 
workers who tapped latex from scattered wild trees, and who exchanged 
cured rubber for goods, and less often for cash, under highly unfavorable 
terms. Moreover, most Hevea grew upriver some 2,000 to 2,500 miles 
from the Atlantic Ocean, far from commercial centers in Brazil and over-
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seas consumption sites, and with trade hobbled by slow and irregular 
river transport.56 Investors eschewed the creation of rubber plantations 
due to heavy capital outlay, the absence of properly surveyed or registered 
land, the challenge of regimenting labor, and the five- year lag between 
planting and production. Subsequent discovery of the South American 
leaf blight (Dothidella ulei), a fungus that ravaged rubber trees planted in 
close proximity in the Western Hemisphere, only gave additional pause.
The reign of Amazonian rubber proved fleeting. Commissioned by the 
Royal Botanic Gardens, Eng lishman Henry Wickham smuggled 70,000 
seeds of Hevea brasiliensis from the lower Tapajós River to London in 
1876.57 Upon germination, the British transplanted the seedlings to Cey-
lon, Malaya, and other regions of Southeast Asia, where they were culti-
vated on plantations.58 In 1910, wild rubber from the Americas and Africa 
collectively accounted for 90 percent of global production, and Asian 
plantations for 10 percent, but the proportion was thoroughly inverted 
over the next decade. Indeed, from a mere 65,000 acres in 1905, Asian 
rubber cultivation expanded to nearly eight million acres by 1930, and 
cost one- quarter the price of wild rubber. By 1932, Amazonia produced 
less than 1 percent of global rubber.59
Although Asian rubber production was spared the South American 
leaf blight fungus, its success owed also to heavy capital investment and 
state subsidies; extensive scientific research; accessibility of rubber trees 
on plantations and family farms with facility of transport; and cheap, 
regimented labor. (The Amazonian tapper’s average yearly production of 
1200 to 1500 kilograms of rubber represented slightly less than one quar-
ter of the Asian worker’s annual yield.) Plantation rubber also contained 
less than 2 percent of impurities and was exported in sheets, whereas 
Brazil’s finest grade of rubber had 16 to 20 percent of impurities and 
arrived in the form of 30–40 kilogram balls, which required additional 
time and expenses for cutting, washing, and purging.60
As the price of wild rubber plummeted, boom towns in the Ama-
zon became ghost towns. In Óbidos, Pará, for example, the population 
fell from thirty thousand inhabitants in 1907 to about three thousand 
in 1920.61 And in 1929, a visitor to Lábrea, Amazonas, which had once 
prospered from the rubber trade on the Acre and upper Purus rivers, de-
scribed a hamlet “in complete ruin, desolate, forlorn, and abandoned.”62 
With the Amazon’s economic decline, outsiders also came to depict the 
region as more formidable, or forgettable.63 If in The Land of To- morrow 
(1906), J. Orton Kerbey, a former U.S. consul in Belém, hailed the Ama-
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zon region as “the California of South America,” twenty years later for-
ester Roy Nash declaimed, “most of the Amazon forest enters no more 
into the life of our globe than would forests on the silvery satellite.”64
Yet what appeared to most interwar observers as the Amazon’s coda 
would prove mere interlude amidst the convulsive rhythms of the twen-
tieth century. Between 1880 and 1914, sweeping technological innova-
tions such as the radio, telephone, cinema, automobile, and assembly line 
created new ways to think about and experience time and space.65 Neo- 
Malthusian theories warned that urban overcrowding and depletion of 
raw materials would trigger ecoscarcity and public calamity.66 The United 
States and European powers staked out colonial possessions to secure ac-
cess to natural resources and waterways, while the trauma of global trade 
disruptions during World War I haunted the postwar governments and 
militaries of the Great Powers.67 In Brazil, political leaders, army officials, 
and industrialists contemplated the challenges of modernizing produc-
tion, mining natural resources, and reaching far- flung populations, while 
the quest for sustenance or social mobility kept poor populations on the 
move.
the march to the west and the presidential Visit to manaus
On October 10, 1940, thousands lined the main thoroughfare of Manaus 
to welcome Getúlio Vargas, “the savior of Amazonia.”68 At the junction of 
the Amazon and Negro rivers, some one thousand miles from the Atlan-
tic coast, Manaus served as the political and financial capital of the state 
of Amazonas (see figure 1.2). The city long bedazzled weary visitors with 
its electric- lit domiciles, tramcars and automobiles, public buildings 
and squares, and its Belle- Époque opera house adorned with Venetian 
glass chandeliers, marble pillars, and fine paintings.69 “It seems almost 
incredible that after so many miles of water,” wrote a traveler in 1928, 
“that the gallant and captivating sight of Manaus appears to us smiling 
and cheerful, as if a mysterious miracle, greeting us with kindness and 
hospitality.”70 But the city had suffered hard times for decades, while 
its poor population had swelled during the interwar years from 75,000 
to 96,400, mainly due to emigration from the stricken seringais (rub-
ber properties).71 Many of the downtrodden undoubtedly waited on the 
boulevard that day to catch a glimpse of the president.
Manaus contained a number of small industrial establishments dedi-
cated to food and beverages, manufacture of rubber goods, and process-
ing of leather and animal skins. But the city remained in 1940 princi-
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pally a commercial entrepot for trade with the vast interior. Oceangoing 
vessels brought in manufactured goods and foodstuffs for Manaus and 
the hinterland, such as sugar, wheat flour, coffee, potatoes, beans, jerked 
beef, lard, and dairy products. On their return trips, the steamships 
sailed with forest products assembled in town from the launches, rafts, 
and small steamboats that collected the commodities on the upper tribu-
taries of the Amazon River (see figure 1.3). In October 1940, rubber led 
the state of Amazonas’s exports, dwarfing Brazil nuts, pirarucu fish, and 
lumber (see table 1.1). Tappers extracted the finest latex (borracha fina) 
along four principal rivers.
With Europe convulsed by war in September 1939, a global scramble 
for rubber seemed poised to swing the pendulum in favor of the Amazo-
nian trade. Rumors buzzed at the headquarters of the Associação Com-
ercial do Amazonas (Trade Association of Amazonas- ACA), which congre-
gated representatives from the state’s tight- knit mercantile class involved 
in the marketing of forest products and the forwarding of credit and mer-
chandise to producers.72 “Heretofore, when rubber arrived in Manaus, 
the buyers deliberated for some time before attempting to buy it,” Ameri-
figure 1.2 Image of Manaus, capital of the state of Amazonas, early 1940s. The Teatro 
Amazonas, the famed opera house inaugurated in 1896, is the domed building on the 
left. Source: National Archives.
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can vice consul Hubert Maness would note. “Today this situation is quite 
different. Rubber is immediately sold upon arrival from the interior. The 
rise in price has given the buyers more confidence and enthusiasm.”73 
Indeed, the visit of the president to Manaus in October 1940 hinted that 
perhaps this latest boom in the Amazon might be different after all.
In his oration in Manaus on October 10, 1940, officially dubbed the 
Speech of the Amazon River, Vargas outlined his government’s intent to 
remake nature and society in the Amazon. “Conquering the land, domi-
nating the water, and subjugating the forest have been our tasks” for 
centuries, Vargas noted. “What Nature offers is a magnificent gift that 
demands care and cultivation by the hand of man.” Deeming vast, un-
populated space the greatest enemy to progress in the Amazon, he 
pledged state support for colonization, “rationalization” of production, 
and improved transport. “Nothing will deter us from this undertaking 
which is, in the twentieth century, the greatest task for civilized man: 
to conquer and dominate the valleys of the great equatorial torrents, 
figure 1.3 Rubber being loaded for export from Manaus. Source: National Archives.
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transforming its blind force and extraordinary fertility into disciplined 
energy.”74
Since late 1937, the regime had promoted the March to the West, a 
state- directed development program for central Brazil and the Amazon 
underwritten by a host of newly minted government agencies. The Min-
istry of Agriculture’s Department of Land and Colonization (Divisão de 
Terras e Colonização), created in 1938, oversaw the distribution of 20- to 
50- hectare plots on public lands, and the extension of credit and technical 
assistance to smallholders.75 The Instituto Agronômico do Norte (IAN), 
founded in Belém in 1939, conducted research on Amazonian flora and 
soils, crop diversification, and cultivation of high- yield, fungus- resistant 
rubber trees. The Serviço de Estudos de Grandes Endemias (SEGE), estab-
lished in 1940, was entrusted with undertaking epidemiological surveys 
in the Amazon Valley to lay the groundwork for a broad public health 
campaign.
In addition, the state- controlled Serviço de Navegação e Administra-
ção dos Portos do Pará (SNApp), a shipping line and dockyards, replaced 
the teetering, foreign- owned Amazon River Steam Navigation Company 
table 1.1.
rubber production along rivers of amazonas and acre in 1940
RIvERS IN STATE Of AMAzONAS
RUBBER IN KILOGRAMS IN 
OCTOBER 1940
Lower and Upper Juruá 222,181
Lower and Upper Purus 219,729
Madeira, Aripuanã 142,547





RIvERS IN TERRITORy Of ACRE
pROdUCTION Of RUBBER IN 
KILOGRAMS IN OCTOBER 1940
Purus and Acre 197,192
Juruá  22,199
Source: Revista da Associação Comercial do Amazonas 288 (December 1940): 5.
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Limited and Port of Pará in 1940.76 The Vargas government had nation-
alized the North American–controlled Madeira- Mamoré Railroad, which 
linked Porto Velho to Guajará- Mirim on the Bolivian border, nearly a de-
cade earlier. In 1940, Vargas also authorized the state- owned Lloyd Brasi-
leiro shipping line to issue 4,000 tickets per year to families from north-
eastern Brazil (nordestinos) to work on the rubber properties of Amazonas 
and Acre. Resettlement fell under the administrative purview of the De-
partamento Nacional de Imigração (dNI).77
To what extent Vargas’s Amazonian policies sealed a so- called oligar-
chic pact, or whether state formation is irreducible to class- based agen-
das, represent contentious historiographical issues.78 Since assuming 
power, Vargas had courted elites in the northern states to offset political 
opposition from São Paulo during his provisional government (1930–34). 
Yet many junior military officers and progressive reformers who backed 
Vargas deplored Brazil’s deep regional and economic disparities, champi-
oning social welfare policies.79 While these political tensions will be ana-
lyzed over the course of this study, for now, we might explore why policy-
makers and professionals during the Estado Novo came to insist that the 
Amazon was ready for takeoff.
the Brazilian amazon in a Shifting historical context
The Vargas regime’s project to rehabilitate Amazonia resembled the blue-
print of the Plano de Defesa da Borracha of 1912. The government of 
Hermes da Fonseca (1910–14), fumbling to forestall eclipse by the Asian 
rubber trade, had proposed revamping Amazonia’s transportation sys-
tem through river dredging and construction of narrow- gauge railways 
to bypass rapids; the creation of experimental stations for rubber and 
agricultural cultivation; the establishment of mobile dispensaries and 
quinine posts for the rural population; the reduction of export taxes for 
rubber- producing states; and subsidized immigration.80 But with capital 
scarce in the Amazon, weak domestic demand for rubber, and the north-
ern states’ political marginality under the republican federalist system 
(1889–1930), the program foundered. The Brazilian Congress denied 
additional funding in 1914, and the ascendancy of Asian rubber on the 
international market dashed prospects for a quick rebound.81
On the eve of World War II, rubber still constituted only 1 percent 
of Brazil’s total exports, but domestic demand had risen with the na-
tional increase in motor vehicles. In 1900, Brazil had imported merely 
four automobiles (along with their chauffeurs), but by 1939 there were 
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122,000 cars (and 202,800 motor vehicles). And although automobiles 
remained a status symbol for a privileged minority, they had begun to 
change the pace of life in Brazil’s larger cities, and even smaller towns, 
through the widening or paving of streets, and new opportunities for 
commerce and leisure.82 Over the decade of the 1930s, production in 
the automotive sector increased by nearly 50 percent, and road exten-
sion doubled from 75,689 to 160,590 miles—to the delight of army offi-
cials bristling at Brazil’s dilapidated rail transportation network geared 
toward rural production.83 Between 1938 and 1941, multinational tire 
companies such as Goodyear, Firestone, and Pirelli set up factories in 
São Paulo—which controlled 90.4 percent of the manufacture of heavy 
rubber goods in Brazil at the time—nearly doubling internal consump-
tion of raw  rubber.84
Amazonian rubber, however, failed to satisfy rising domestic use. 
Since the 1920s, Brazilian legislation had granted low interest loans 
and federal tax exemption to rubber goods manufacturers who used 
domestic latex, but Amazonian producers had little incentive to favor 
local industries over export markets. In 1938, more than 80 percent of 
Amazonia’s sixteen million kilos of rubber was exported, prompting re-
newed calls from industrialists and army officials for government regu-
lation of the trade, particularly after the outbreak of the European war 
in 1939.85 In Amazônia Econômica: Problema Brasileiro (1941), José Ama-
ndo Mendes cited rising demand for manufactured rubber goods in 
Brazil and the River Plate as challenges for “strong nations that desire 
self- sufficiency.”86 That same year, the Conselho Federal do Comércio 
Exterior (Federal Council of Foreign Trade) studied measures to improve 
transportation, credit, tax structure, and labor recruitment for the Ama-
zon rubber trade.87
The Vargas regime also maneuvered to exploit the mounting rivalry 
between Germany and the United States over access to Brazilian mar-
kets and raw materials. While a 1935 treaty between the United States 
and Brazil had emphasized reciprocal trade, Germany offered the cash- 
strapped Vargas regime a barter system that allowed for the exchange 
of raw materials for industrial goods. Between 1935 and 1937, German 
exports to Brazil surpassed those from the United States; and while Bra-
zilian exports to the United States over the next two years more than 
doubled those to Germany, the trade varied considerably by commodity. 
For example, in 1938, 77 percent of Brazil’s total rubber exports went to 
the Reich, constituting 7.2 percent of Germany’s total supply.88
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With the outbreak of war in Europe, U.S. strategists pushed for the 
acquisition of Western Hemisphere raw materials to ensure American 
military and economic capability, to preclude purchase by the Axis, and 
to stabilize the export- dependent economies of Latin America. Brazil 
was particularly targeted because of its abundant resource endowment, 
including iron ore, quartz, chrome, manganese, nickel, bauxite, tung-
sten, oil seeds, fibers, and rubber. As journalist Mario Guedes presciently 
noted in 1940, Brazil could only stand to benefit from U.S. rubber depen-
dency, the “Achilles Heel” of its industrial production.89 Moreover, Bra-
zil’s political influence in South America and large population of Ger-
man descent nudged Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy toward the use 
of foreign aid to cement hemisphere alliance against the Axis.90 In a 1939 
mission to Washington, foreign minister Oswaldo Aranha secured nearly 
$20 million in loans for Brazil to pay off arrears; credit from the Export- 
Import Bank to finance purchases in the United States; and promises of 
technical aid for the modernization and diversification of agriculture (in-
cluding rubber) and mineral exploration. In return, the Brazilian govern-
ment pledged to regulate the German compensation trade, relax foreign 
exchange controls, and expand raw rubber production.91 The following 
year, plant scientists from the U.S. Department of Agriculture initiated 
collaborative research at the Instituto Agronômico do Norte to clone and 
cultivate blight- free Hevea trees.92
The Vargas regime also leveraged northern Brazil’s newfound geo-
political importance for hemispheric defense. Long- distance aviation had 
placed Brazil’s northeastern “bulge” only eight hours from West Africa, 
and although Germany had no plans to create an Axis bridgehead in the 
Western Hemisphere, U.S. military defense and foreign policy from late 
1938 to December 1941 labored to prevent a potential invasion of South 
America. While Vargas rejected the U.S. proposal to station American 
troops in the northeast (leery of antagonizing the Axis and of long- term 
U.S. intentions), the regime did accept American air and naval support, 
hoping to modernize the nation’s armed forces.93 Under a secret contract, 
the United States Army commissioned Pan American Airways in 1940 
with constructing two chains of airfields—a string of some fifty- five—
leading from North America to northeastern Brazil. The so- called Airport 
Development Program cost over $90 million, more than half of which 
was spent on fields in northern and northeastern Brazil. Landing fields 
or seaplane facilities were built or enlarged in Amapá and Belém in the 
Amazon, and at São Luís, Camocim, Fortaleza, Natal, Maceió, and Recife 
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in the northeast, allowing for the transshipment of U.S. aircraft ferried 
between the Caribbean basin and the northeastern bulge.94 More broadly, 
geopolitical rumblings of the 1930s and 1940s allowed Brazilian nation-
alists to dramatize the importance of defending Amazonian territory.95
Political centralization, industrial growth, and geopolitical rivalries 
deepened Brazilian state intervention in the hinterland prior to Pearl 
Harbor. Yet efforts to remake nature and society in the Amazon issued 
from discrete sets of mediators in Brazil. The heterogeneous group in-
cluded Amazonian elites, junior military officers, intellectuals, plant 
scientists, doctors, industrialists, engineers, journalists, and geogra-
phers. Hailing from the bastions of the oligarchy to the newly created 
bureaucracies and professionalized sectors of the Vargas era, they upheld 
in varying degrees the dictates of their social class and professional guild, 
the agendas of civilian sectors shaping public policies, and the general 
interests of the state.96 An analysis of their knowledge claims and policy 
directives reveals a repudiation of environmental determinism alongside 
condemnation of Amazonian landscapes and lifestyles.
amazonian elites: the “authenticity” of regional knowledge
Although scholars have viewed the Amazon as a region invented by (geo-
graphic) outsiders, it is very much the product of insiders as well.97 With 
minimal sway over Brazil’s political economy, Amazonian elites strove 
to remake their region through, and due to, national integration.98 Since 
the bust of the rubber trade, they had repackaged local to- dos as national 
travesties, demanding both federal assistance and deference to regional 
know- how. As Governor Lauro Sodré of Pará stated in 1917: “With our 
life having reached the point of near complete misery, only one medium 
would be truly opportune and practical at this time: the assistance of the 
Federal Government.”99 The perennial wish list included federal sub-
sidies for rubber plantations, labor migration, agricultural colonies, edu-
cation, and public health.100
Spotlighting the forest’s value and vulnerability was standard fare for 
elites in the 1930s to court outside support. One pitch stressed the grow-
ing importance of rubber for Brazil’s transportation sector and military 
defense.101 Close behind were admonitions of potential foreign usurpa-
tion—foreshadowing the “Amazonia is ours” slogan popularized during 
the 1970s. As Aurélio Pinheiro lamented, an unfortified Amazon pre-
sented “a danger for our sovereignty, for our integrity, for the life of the 
nation, because sooner or later the covetousness of stronger nations will 
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extend its reach to this abandoned, isolated, defenseless region wedged 
between the borders of five nations.”102 In lobbying for federally subsi-
dized colonization in the Amazon, Hanibal Porto, ACA’s political liaison 
in Rio de Janeiro, likewise underscored the “national danger of depopu-
lated regions.”103
Amazonian elites’ bragging rights melded the unrequited patriotism 
of frontiersmen with insider knowledge of the forest’s cultural ecology. 
Lambasting their “unpatriotic abandonment” by the central government, 
they sought to shame the commanders of state in Rio de Janeiro by ques-
tioning where Brazil’s true defenders resided.104 Whether boasting to the 
president of the “feat of Brazilianess [brasilidade] that we are undertaking 
in this stretch of our nation,” or proposing to erect a monument in Ma-
naus to honor the rubber tapper, “the obscure hero who expanded Brazil-
ian dominions,” Amazonian merchants, politicians, and intellectuals re-
minded compatriots near and far that braving the forest and settling the 
hinterland represented the consummate act of nationalism.105
Truth claims also pivoted on the knowledge of Amazonian nature bred 
by local experience. Raymundo Moraes, for example, slammed foreign 
writers (and the occasional Brazilian snob) for their tendency to “exag-
gerate and fantasize [about] our nature, and to misrepresent fauna, flora, 
water, and land.”106 In a related tack, a Porto Velho newspaper charged 
that although much had been written about the Amazon and its “mul-
tiple problems,” such diagnoses “have been the product of hoity- toity 
reporters who are horrified by mosquitoes and who cannot bear [their 
skin] turning yellow from the prophylactic [anti- malarial] atabrine.”107 
And rebutting theories of environmental and racial determinism, Auré-
lio Pinheiro noted in À margem do Amazonas that the Amazon long ago 
welcomed immigrants from Iberia and the Mediterranean whose descen-
dants now thrived in the region.108 The defense of place also clearly went 
hand- in- glove with that of local hierarchies. The Amazon may have been 
no tropical miasma, but state congressman Francisco Galvão of Amazo-
nas reproached forest dwellers for aspiring to “nothing more than having 
the land, water, and trees furnish them with enviable prodigality.”109 In 
sum, Amazonian elites understood that claims to environmental knowl-
edge and political legitimacy were indissociable.
In 1943, Gilberto Freyre, a paladin of (northeastern) regionalism, 
stated: “Brazil should never commit the travesty of imposing an imperial 
uniformity, in a Philippic manner, or become integrated in a system of 
continental uniformity or in a single, rigid, absolute national culture that 
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sacrifices its regional differences.”110 Yet Freyre’s defense of “regional” 
cultures may be better understood as a political tool by Brazilian elites 
on the nation’s periphery to secure federal assistance while safeguarding 
local privilege.111 Indeed, as Pierre Bourdieu has noted, the celebration of 
regional culture serves as a “performative discourse” that seeks to legit-
imize new definitions of boundaries and make the unknown delimited 
and acknowledged, rather than the dominant definition that, recognized 
and legitimate, ignores it.112
The cultural politics of Álvaro Maia, the federally appointed governor 
(interventor) in the state of Amazonas during the Estado Novo, exempli-
fies this strategic positioning of regional elites vis- à- vis Brazil’s central 
government (see figure 1.4). Born in 1893 to a rubber boss (seringalista) 
from Humaitá, Maia obtained a law degree in Rio de Janeiro. Returning 
to Amazonas, Maia joined a circle of intellectuals whose interwar literary 
production highlighted the state’s history, cultural ecology, and political 
marginalization.113 Yet notwithstanding, or because of, such local pride, 
Maia would later serve as the primary executor of the Vargas regime’s 
integrationist project in the Amazon.114 The Estado Novo, in turn, show-
figure 1.4 Álvaro Maia, the federally appointed governor of Amazonas from 1937 to 1945, 
seated on right, surrounded by members of the press corps. Source: National Archives.
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cased Amazonian regionalism. Between March 1941 and October 1945, 
Cultura Política, the official Rio- based mouthpiece of the regime, pub-
lished various articles on the rehabilitation of Amazonia, including a 
number penned by Amazonian intellectuals on regional culture.115 In 
this sense, it is more appropriate to view region and nation in Brazil as 
mutually constructed through historical processes whose architects re-
sided at the periphery as much as at the center.
guardians of frontiers: the Brazilian military and amazonian geopolitics
At the time of World War II, the 60,000- man Brazilian army was pri-
marily concentrated in the south of the country, reflecting the historic 
distrust toward Argentina as a regional rival as well as fear of subversive 
activities among German immigrant communities.116 Over the course 
of the second half of the twentieth century, however, the defense of the 
Amazon would increasingly legitimize the role of the armed forces in 
Brazilian society—an ideological shift foreshadowed during the Vargas 
era.117 Although Brazil’s dominion of the basin had been guaranteed 
since the seventeenth century by control over the waterways and the sea-
borne trade at the mouth of the Amazon River, during the Vargas era the 
army warned of European and Japanese neo- Malthusian geopolitical de-
signs, Spanish American military build- ups, and North American imperi-
alism. A border dispute between Peru and Colombia (1932–33), the status 
of Dutch and French colonies in Guyana following the Nazi invasion of 
France and the Netherlands (1940), and skirmishes between Ecuador and 
Peru (1941) further highlighted the tenuousness of national sovereignty 
in the Amazon.118 Shifting conceptions of national defense served to ex-
tend the Brazilian military’s reach into the Amazon; or viewed another 
way, the forest had given soldiers their marching orders.
The military foray into the Amazon under Vargas advanced on vari-
ous fronts. One literal marker was the delimitation of Brazil’s northern 
borders in a physical and symbolic bounding of the nation- state.119 Com-
mander Braz Dias de Aguiar headed the Comissão Brasileira Demarca-
dora de Limites that demarcated the 593- kilometer border with Suri-
name between 1930 and 1938; as well as the 1,606- kilometer border with 
British Guyana; the 1,644- kilometer boundary with Colombia (1930–37); 
and the 2,199- kilometer border with Venezuela, which was begun in 
1930, suspended four years later, and reinitiated in 1939.120 Concomi-
tantly, the military undertook demographic surveys of the borderlands 
regions.121
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The militarization of borderlands, state- directed colonization, and fe-
deralization of Amazonian territory—projects all dear to the Brazilian 
army—likewise came to fruition under the Estado Novo. While General 
Pedro Aurélio Goes Monteiro’s proposal to carve out federal territories 
from the large Amazonian states failed to pass in the Constituent Assem-
bly of 1933–34, his dream would come true one decade later in September 
1943 with the wartime creation of Amapá, severed from Pará (and border-
ing French Guiana); of Rio Branco, excised from Amazonas (bordering 
Venezuela); and of Guaporé, from northwestern Mato Grosso and a small 
portion of Amazonas (bordering Bolivia).122 Acre had been a federal terri-
tory since annexation from Bolivia under the Treaty of Petrópolis of 1903. 
Colonization within 150 kilometers of the border necessitated authoriza-
tion from the National Security Council, while the Ministry of War was 
entrusted with the creation of military colonies in the borderlands.123
The Brazilian military depicted the Amazon as endangered terri-
tory.124 It was hardly reassuring to Brazilian army officers, for example, 
that the Amazon’s population was not only sparse but huddled close to 
the riverbanks—Pará’s inhabitants congregated within a two- mile strip 
on each side of the main rivers and their tributaries—or that the east- 
to- west flow of the river system bedeviled commercial links with the in-
dustrializing south.125 Although prominent European geopolitical theo-
rists did not apply their ideas about population pressure, space, and the 
state to South America, Malthusian panics gripping the North Atlantic 
offered the Brazilian army a rallying cry. Thus, in a 1938 report to the 
National Security Council, border inspector Colonel Manoel Alexandrino 
Ferreira da Cunha warned that Brazil’s historic riverine dominion of the 
Amazon was now threatened by the airplane, which allowed for poten-
tial penetration of remote regions by parachute troops, and by a Peru-
vian road- building project that linked Lima to colonization areas on the 
Huallaga River, with a projected extension to the waterways of the Uca-
yali.126 Although da Cunha deemed an imminent invasion unlikely, he 
advocated the creation of Brazilian military and civilian colonies in the 
Amazon linked by land, air, and river.127 In a similar vein, Lieutenant 
Aluízio Ferreira denounced “foreign infiltration” in the Guaporé valley 
by merchants of Arab, Jewish, Greek, and Bolivian origin, and warned of 
Bolivia’s demographic and military preponderance in the border town of 
Guayaramerín.128 Like the insider snapshots of Amazonian elites, geo-
political discourse was a form of landscape portraiture whose artists, too, 
recognized that the most influential patrons resided in Brazil’s metropo-
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lises. Ferreira, for example, took up the cause of frontier colonization and 
defense with the press and the Sociedade de Amigos de Alberto Torres, a 
Rio- based organization concerned with national issues. (Vargas rewarded 
Ferreira for his pluck: in 1943, he was named governor of the newly cre-
ated federal territory of Guaporé, the present- day state of Rondônia.)
A principal strand of Brazilian geopolitical thought of the 1930s her-
alded the expansion of the nation’s sphere of influence over the Amazon 
Basin, the Pacific, and the Caribbean.129 Endorsing state- directed colo-
nization of the hinterland, for example, the director of the dNI, Péricles 
Melo Carvalho, affirmed that in an era where countries waged war to ob-
tain “living space” [Lebensraum], only “strong nations” would survive by 
“resisting attempts at their [territorial] disintegration.”130 Likewise, army 
captain Mario Travassos’s Projeção Continental do Brasil (1931) touted the 
nation’s ineluctable rise to grandeza, or superpower status, based on west-
ward expansion. In a bid for continental supremacy over Argentina, Tra-
vassos urged national development along an east- west axis—one along 
the Amazon River and a second across Mato Grosso aimed at the resource- 
rich heartland of Bolivia. Travassos’s ideological eclecticism—melding 
Rudolf Kjellen’s theory of the porousness of territorial boundaries with 
Halford Mackinder’s creed that control of the continental “heartland” 
held the key to military superiority—championed not only Brazilian do-
minion over Amazonia but of Bolivia as well. In sum, Travassos articu-
lated, and foreshadowed, Brazil’s push for hegemony in South America.131
Geopolitical theories emanated mainly from military officials and a 
handful of geographers during the Vargas era, but their mantras perme-
ated the media and public policy discussions, breathing new life into old 
ideas. The nation’s political elite had long labored to “civilize” the back-
lands, as evinced by the suppression of nineteenth- century regional re-
volts and the Canudos and Contestado millenarian communities.132 Or 
as Estado Novo ideologue Azevedo Amaral opined in explicitly racial-
ized terms, in a national territory marked by “irregularity in the distri-
bution of geographic zones of miscegenation, it is unquestionable that 
the values of the white race adhere in elevated forms of social organiza-
tion and the achievement of greater dominion over the forces of nature 
through the extension of fields of knowledge.”133 In this sense, Vargas- era 
geopolitical ideas, like nineteenth- century scientific racism or Cold War 
counterinsurgency ideology, offered authoritarian modernizers in Brazil 
a compelling, if not altogether new, language to legitimize the state’s con-
centration of power and exercise of social control.134
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healing amazonia
Among the reformers of the Amazon, physicians and sanitarians ranked 
prominently as well. In a strict scientific purview, they strove to mar-
shal medical and epidemiological knowledge to combat transmissible 
diseases and improve the quality of life and productivity of the region’s 
inhabitants. For example, the Belém- based Instituto de Patologia Experi-
mental do Norte (IpEN), established in 1936, boasted a hospital and re-
search laboratory, and a staff of pathologists, entomologists, and zoolo-
gists who conducted extensive research on malaria, leishmaniasis, and 
trypanosomiasis in Pará.135 Yet in scrutinizing the lifestyles of the poor 
and their relationship with the natural environment, health officials in 
the Amazon also operated as formulators of public policy and arbiters 
of national character. More broadly, in identifying pathogens and treat-
ments, health care professionals sought to remold social perceptions of 
nature and politics.
Since the Republic, a cadre of physicians, army officials, politicians, 
and intellectuals had called for the coordination of public health policies 
in Brazil. While early projects had concentrated on urban areas and port 
cities, during the decade of 1910–20 sanitaristas took part in backland ex-
peditions to study health and social conditions.136 Sanitation campaigns 
in Amazonia mirrored such patterns. Between 1910 and 1911, Oswaldo 
Cruz eradicated yellow fever in Belém by eliminating the Aedes aegypti 
and their larvae, and by quarantining infected patients during the period 
of potential transmission by the mosquito. Two years later, Cruz devised 
a program for the Superintendência de Defesa da Borracha focused on 
a malaria control program targeting its human hosts (rather than mos-
quito control and eradication), advocating widespread use of quinine and 
bed nets, and the creation of mobile sanitation posts to administer and 
standardize doses of quinine to rubber tappers.137 Amazonian physicians 
also participated in these early public health campaigns. In 1918, a medi-
cal school was founded in Belém. Two distinguished doctors from Pará 
who studied at the Instituto Oswaldo Cruz—Antonio Periassu and Jayme 
Aben- Athar—became specialists in the fields of malaria and leprosy, re-
spectively. In the 1920s, the Serviço de Profilaxia Rural, directed by Aben- 
Athar in Pará and Samuel Ochoa in Amazonas, undertook initial efforts 
at rural sanitation.138
Following the establishment of the Ministry of Health and Educa-
tion in 1930, the Vargas regime increasingly coordinated public health 
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services in Brazil, particularly in combatting rural epidemic diseases.139 
In 1937, João de Barros Barreto, the director of the Ministry’s National 
Health Department, created eight regional health precincts and twelve 
national services dedicated to specific diseases and/or public health areas, 
and moved to replace medical doctors with sanitarians as directors of 
public health campaigns.140
A pioneer in epidemiology in the Amazon during this period was 
Evandro Chagas. Born in 1905 to renowned parasitologist Carlos Chagas, 
Evandro served as a medical doctor, biologist, and director of the labo-
ratory of the Instituto Oswaldo Cruz—all before he turned thirty- five. 
Evandro Chagas helped found IpEN (which also boasted on its staff para-
sitologist Leonidas Deane, a native son of Pará and professor of micro-
biology), and conducted malaria surveys in the Amazon for the projected 
sanitation campaigns of the Serviço de Estudos de Grandes Endemias.141 
Chagas traveled in international circles—visiting the Rockefeller Foun-
dation’s International Health Division in New York, presenting his work 
at international congresses, and keeping abreast of global research on 
malaria.142 He also drew upon the first- hand knowledge of the medical 
community in Brazil. Indeed, it was his father who had noted that ma-
laria was so endemic in the Amazon that rubber tappers considered only 
its acute feverish state as illness and thus often refused to take quinine, 
and that spleen enlargement in children, reflective of repeated infec-
tion from the disease, was so commonplace as to be considered merely a 
“swollen belly.”143 After Evandro Chagas’s untimely death in November 
1940, minister of health Barreto pressed the Instituto Oswaldo Cruz to 
use preliminary data gathered in twelve Amazon towns to lay the ground-
work for public health programs.144 This agenda would be considerably 
expanded subsequent to the accords signed between the Brazilian and 
U.S. governments in June 1942, which created a binational public health 
service in the Amazon (see chapter 2).
Physicians in Brazil, however, operated more broadly as remodelers of 
natural and political landscapes. As Julyan Peard has shown, a number 
of prominent doctors in nineteenth- century Bahia challenged dominant 
understandings of geography, attributing so- called tropical diseases to 
social conditions and customs rather than climatological factors.145 In as-
cribing the Amazon’s epidemiological conditions to poverty and govern-
ment inaction, Vargas- era physicians continued to wage battle against cli-
matic determinism. To be sure, by the 1920s most physicians worldwide 
refuted the notion that tropical climates impaired human physiology, up-
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holding that proper sanitation, hygiene, medical care, and personal disci-
pline would allow for white acclimatization in the tropics or, at the very 
least, the rationalized extraction of its natural resources by a reformed 
native population. Yet U.S. and European physicians continued to debate 
the potentially “enervating” effects of warm climates on the mental com-
position of whites (so- called tropical neurasthenia), while germ theory 
fueled pervasive fears of pathological native bodies and unhygienic prac-
tice as breeding grounds for contagious disease.146 Vargas- era physicians 
scrubbed away residues of climatic and racial determinism, even as they 
harbored and reinforced deep biases against the lifestyles and milieux of 
poor populations.
In the Amazon, perhaps the most renowned Vargas- era physician- 
cum- social scientist was José Francisco de Araújo Lima. Born on the 
island of Marajó in 1884, Lima attended medical school in Paris and in-
terned at the Pasteur Institute. Upon returning to Brazil, he practiced 
medicine in Manaus and held a distinguished record of public service as 
school superintendent in Amazonas, mayor of Manaus, and federal con-
gressman during the Republic. But Lima perhaps became most widely 
known outside his hometown as the author of Amazônia—A Terra e o 
Homem, first published in 1933. As a physician, Lima’s familiarity with 
germ theory and medical prophylaxis led him to reject climatic explana-
tions for Amazonia’s social or physical ills. Slamming Baron de Montes-
quieu, Ellsworth Huntington, and even Euclides da Cunha for their rants 
against tropical climates, Lima noted that Amazonia was neither heaven 
nor hell. Improvements in nutrition, public health, education, and pub-
lic policy would enable humans to transform the nature of the Amazon.
Yet Lima’s repudiation of climatic determinism was compromised by 
neo- Lamarckian principles upholding the importance of culture and en-
vironment for human heredity. According to Lima, while the environ-
ment did not determine physical anatomy, it did shape the psychologi-
cal realm: the geographic isolation marking forest- dwellers’ extraction 
of natural resources reportedly ingrained reclusiveness and suspicion, 
stunting the mental acuity and cultural know- how to transform nature 
through the application of scientific logic. Only “savages allowed them-
selves to be enslaved” to nature’s whims, he noted, while “cultured and 
advanced man modifies the environment with the apparatuses that sci-
ence inspires and industry produces.”147
Amazonia’s vast territory and scattered population did attenuate state 
power, increase transportation costs, bedevil access to medical care, and 
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abet monopolistic practices. Yet Amazonia’s natural and political land-
scapes had been anthropogenically shaped and historically patterned 
rather than psychologically wired, as Lima suggested. And although geo-
graphically isolated and subsistence- oriented, Amazonia’s rural poor 
were linked to economic markets through intermediaries who processed 
their products and furnished consumer goods under inequitable terms 
of exchange. As a medical doctor, Lima had claimed the scientific objec-
tivity to diagnose and cure the Amazon’s problems, but his class and pro-
fessional bias led to a tendentious rendering of nature and politics: one 
that represented lifestyles and landscapes in the Amazon as victims as 
much as spoilers of society.
engineers of amazonian development
Engineers were also prime movers in the Amazon’s transformation, im-
planting the infrastructure that channeled flows of people, goods, and 
information. Although institutional histories have viewed engineers in 
Brazil as distanced from political decision- making due to their under-
representation in legislative assemblies, the claim reflects a reduction-
ist understanding of the political realm.148 Since the nineteenth century, 
engineers’ skills placed them at the vanguard of modernization in Brazil 
via the construction of public works, the extension of railroads and more 
rapid forms of communication, and the procurement and transformation 
of raw industrial materials. More broadly, engineers spearheaded the re-
organization of space and human behavior through the dissemination of 
new regimens and principles of efficiency, speed, and thrift and the inter-
weaving of cities and hinterlands.149 A federal decree of December 1933 
standardized the accreditation of engineers in Brazil, consonant with offi-
cial regulation of other white-collar professions during the Vargas era.150
During the Estado Novo, engineers in Brazil could lay claim to their 
craft’s decades- long experience with railroad and telegraph line construc-
tion, geological exploration, border demarcation, and population resettle-
ment. Indeed, between 1890 and 1915, the Comissão das Linhas Tele-
gráficas e Estratégicas de Mato Grosso e Amazonas, under the direction 
of army engineer Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, linked Rio de Janeiro 
by telegraph line to Brazil’s northwestern regions.151 By the first decade of 
the century, engineers had also incorporated Belém and Manaus into the 
national telegraph network, with the latter city connected by thousands 
of kilometers of subfluvial cable laid in the Amazon River. Cartography, 
geographic surveillance, and border demarcation were also executed by 
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engineers: in 1901, Luis Cruls led an expedition to delimit the border 
with Peru on the Javari River, while Euclides da Cunha participated in 
the delimitation of the border on the upper Purus River in 1905. And 
under the aegis of the Serviço Geológico e Mineralógico do Brasil, created 
in 1907, engineers undertook a systematic geological study of the Ama-
zon Basin, prospecting for coal and mineral resources and petroleum 
deposits in the Maués region of Amazonas.152 From their work in Bra-
zil’s hinterland, engineers obtained ethnographic, geographic, geologi-
cal, and botanical knowledge, not to mention manly bragging rights. As 
engineer Pedro de Moura recounted his experience conducting geologi-
cal exploration in Amazonia in the 1930s: “In those pioneering days, the 
geologist suffered a monotonous life, day after day, in a thatch hut with 
a dirt floor, a kerosene lamp, with no way to read or to get news from the 
rest of the world. Bathing was in the river, sometimes with alligators in 
sight. The monotony was only broken when every forty or sixty days the 
ship of the Amazon River Line arrived with month- old newspapers. That 
was party time, just to be able to get a hold of an ice cube.”153
As administrators of the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works’ 
drought relief projects in the semi- arid northeastern backlands, engi-
neers also saw first- hand the population exodus in the Amazon.154 Thus, 
in 1942, the federal government’s Council on Immigration and Coloni-
zation dispatched Dulphe Pinheiro Machado, founder of the Instituto de 
Engenharia de São Paulo, to investigate drought conditions in the north-
east and recommend measures to resettle populations to the Amazon. 
Later that year, the Vargas government entrusted his colleague Paulo 
Assis Ribeiro with coordinating the wartime transfer of tens of thousands 
of nordestino men to the Amazon (see chapter 4).
Touting the profession’s expertise in regimenting (human) nature, 
the journal Engenheiro would note: “The engineer is the individual who 
after many years of study is prepared and trained to realize the dreams 
and ideas of all sectors of society through the execution of works and 
projects. In the meanwhile, a tremendous responsibility rests on their 
shoulders.”155 Yet Vargas- era engineers are perhaps better understood as 
mediators between landscapes and polities that they had, in part, helped 
to produce.
managers of plants and people
As plant specialists, Brazilian agronomists, botanists, and biologists like-
wise aimed to wrest order and profit from the forest tangle. As the Belém- 
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based Norte Agronômico affirmed in 1942: “Amazonia is a world to orga-
nize, in all ways, whether economically, financially, culturally, politically, 
and socially. The organization of labor [is needed] for the organization 
of production and efficiency in landholding. Why not make the agrono-
mist the mastermind of this organization that, sooner or later, Amazonia 
awaits.”156 Plant scientists also roamed as evangelists of nationalism in 
the backlands. The journal of the School of Agronomy of Pará, for ex-
ample, exhorted in 1943: “Brazilians! In the forests or on the rivers . . . 
your sentiment should be one: Love Brazil!”157
Prior to 1930, the Ministry of Agriculture had operated fourteen agri-
cultural research stations throughout Brazil (none in the Amazon re-
gion), but studies focused on selection of seeds rather than experimenta-
tion and instruction and the units were often staffed by engineers rather 
than agronomists due to the lag in professional specialization.158 The 
crisis of monocrop economies and the slump in global trade that ensued 
with the Great Depression underscored for policymakers the importance 
of diversifying agricultural production and managing natural resources 
in Brazil.159 Indeed, during the Vargas era, the professional status and po-
litical influence of agronomists and plant scientists waxed: between 1937 
and 1945, the Ministry of Agriculture was directed by two agronomists, 
Fernando Costa and Apolônio Sales. Moreover, amidst broader societal 
concern with health, fitness, and eugenics, plant scientists monitored 
popular diets for nutritional balance and vitamin intake (whose scientific 
discovery peaked between 1910 and 1940). A. J. de Sampaio, a botanist 
at the Museu Nacional in Rio de Janeiro, for example, called for improve-
ments in the diets of poor populations of the northeast and the Amazon, 
and lambasted their “primitive method of harvesting and grazing that 
only leads them to ruin the natural habitat.”160 Sampaio also penned one 
of Brazil’s early environmental texts—inspired by his participation in an 
international geography congress in Paris in 1931—in which he trum-
peted the importance of protecting national flora and indigenous peoples 
to “diversify the enchantment of human life.”161
In addition, the Vargas government created various federal instru-
mentalities and legal codes to regulate the usage of forests, minerals, 
and water; to guide research and policymaking for specific crops; to ex-
tend credit and technical assistance to smallholders; and to assist agri-
culturists in environmentally “challenging” regions.162 Brazil’s first For-
est Code (1934) classified types of forests and regulated usage, while the 
Forest Service established nurseries for the production and distribution 
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of seedlings of forest plants to agriculturists, conducted studies of flora 
and timber, and oversaw the organization of national parks.163 Brazil was 
on its way toward more systematic quantification of forest resources, a 
statistical regimen that remains fundamental to the representation, and 
by extension, the nature, of forests until this day.164 As noted, Vargas also 
established the IAN, the first federally funded government agricultural 
research station for the Amazon region.
Following World War I, a number of plant scientists and biologists in 
Brazil and other Allied nations touted the capacity of their craft to im-
prove agriculture, ensure social justice, and bridge national divides.165 
For example, Felisberto Camargo, the U.S.- trained agronomic engineer 
who served as IAN’s first director (see figure 1.5), celebrated Brazil’s 
“awakening to the potential agricultural importance of the vast Amazon 
Valley,” asserting that South American leaf blight would be controllable 
through the use of insoluble copper- based fungicidal sprays and bud-
ding with blight- resistant clones.166 His research partner, U.S. plant sci-
entist Elmer Brandes, likewise predicted success for rubber plantations 
in the Amazon: “The problem resolves itself into just another job of sci-
entific agriculture.”167 And in Plants and Plant Science in Latin America 
(1945), editor Frans Verdoorn championed the inter- American collabora-
tion of biologists, who were “in a position to assist with the creation, not 
of a planned supreme State, but a government of free responsible men, 
which will guide human relations and world affairs according to the laws 
of living Nature, as discovered and set forth by biologists.”168
In the Amazon, plant scientists would discover many “laws of living 
Nature”—often through the assistance of local, and professionally unac-
knowledged, informants. Yet they would also produce nature through 
modification, quantification, and representation. Botanists’ battle against 
South American leaf blight, cast as the struggle of science against nature, 
is a case in point. By nature, rubber trees grew dispersed in the forests of 
the Amazon, protected against the spread of leaf blight by the foliage of 
trees of other genera.169 Thus, the pathogen’s “natural” virulence accrued 
from anthropogenic modification of Amazonian ecosystems to cultivate 
Hevea brasiliensis in dense stands for the maximal extraction of latex—a 
viscous resin whose organic function served to repel insect pests from 
the tree, rather than for industrial application as rubber.170 Nor could the 
laws of “living Nature” smoothly “guide human relations” in the Amazon 
when scientists proved handmaidens as much as hostages to political 
partisanship, class interests, and national agendas.
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drawing Boundaries: geographers and the delimitation of amazonia
During the Vargas era, applied geography held forth the possibility of 
remodeling the Amazon through scientific study and public planning. 
Given Brazil’s territorial expanse, resource abundance, sparse settle-
ment, and weak interregional articulation, geographic knowledge had 
long bolstered claims to political problem- solving.171 Amidst geography’s 
contested and pluralist tradition, adepts in Brazil favored Frenchman 
Paul Vidal de la Blache’s regionalist study, which postulated that human 
communities were shaped by distinct natural milieux, but capable of 
transforming socioenvironmental conditions. Although repudiating en-
figure 1.5 Felisberto Camargo, first director of the Instituto Agronômico do Norte, with 
young rubber trees planted at the research institute. Source: National Archives.
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vironmental determinism, geographers in Brazil nevertheless natural-
ized territorial divides and cultural essences.172 Amazonia’s deficiencies 
were said to inhere not only in its demographic voids but in the extrac-
tive economies and “primitive” mindsets of populations that the protean 
landscape both reflected and inflected.
As an intellectual site where politics, space, and environment inter-
sect, geography, like history, offers an ideal medium to foment nation-
alist sentiment.173 Brazilian elites’ formal interest in the study of geogra-
phy dates back to the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro (IhGB), 
founded in 1838, which sponsored field trips, collection missions, and 
cartography to learn more about the hinterland. Most of the IhGB’s 
nineteenth- century members, however, were self- taught readers of Euro-
pean geographic texts and observers of the environment, rather than for-
mally trained geographers, since geography had not yet been established 
as a discrete academic discipline in Brazil. Among the first generation of 
professional geographers that emerged in Brazil during the 1910s and 
1920s—which included Carlos Delgado de Carvalho, Fernando Antonio 
Raja Gabaglia, Everardo Backheuser, and José Veríssimo—several had 
been educated in Europe and had been involved with the Escola Livre 
Superior de Geografia, created in 1926. In the early 1930s, military geog-
raphy became a required subject in Brazilian army academies, and offi-
cials with geographic training came to serve in the IhGB and the Socie-
dade de Geografia do Rio de Janeiro.174
Under Vargas, the study of geography migrated from the social clubs 
and the army academies to Brazilian universities and the state’s admin-
istrative apparatus, constituting a new professional class and a “scien-
tific” standard for comparative analysis of regional and national develop-
ment.175 The Universidade do Distrito Federal and the Universidade de 
São Paulo created academic lines (cadeiras) in geography in the 1930s; at 
the latter institution, geographers Pierre Deffontaines and Pierre Mon-
beig arrived as part of the French “mission” to professionalize the so-
cial sciences in Brazil.176 In 1937, the federal government established the 
Conselho Nacional de Geografia to coordinate geographic research, data 
collection, and public planning; the council was incorporated the follow-
ing year into the newly created Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatís-
tica (IBGE), a government bureau that paired geography with statistics, 
marshaling numerical forms to represent social realities.177 Although ge-
ographers brought the conceit of science to state building during the Var-
gas era, it is more accurate to place their ways of looking at the world in 
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the historical context of Brazilian state formation, rather than viewing 
the discipline as growing up to serve state expansionism.178
With Amazonia as a battleground, geographers in Brazil declared war 
on theories of environmental determinism.179 Challenging the image of 
a tropical inferno, the National Geography Council’s official publication, 
Revista Brasileira de Geografia, published the recorded average tempera-
tures and rainfall levels in various regions of the Amazon.180 Disavowing 
Anglo- American geographers’ fears of white degeneration in the tropics, 
Deffontaines asserted that Amazonia “was colonized by a predominantly 
white human type [northeastern backland peasants] fleeing near- desert 
steppes; Manaus is a beautiful city with a European aspect, with a popu-
lation almost entirely white, and the only important white city on the 
Equator. Human nature has shown here a unique adaptability.”181 And 
insisting that the Amazon’s demographic vacuums were transformable 
through state- directed settlement, Delgado de Carvalho affirmed: “land 
policies and colonization constitute elements that play such an important 
role in the geography of the great powers that space no longer provides 
the explanation for all that we are witnessing.”182
The theories advanced by Vargas- era geographers, however, also re-
inscribed Brazilian spatial divides and social hierarchies. The IBGE’s 
administrative division of the nation held that the “natural region”—
defined as a space possessing “typical characteristics in geology, topog-
raphy, ecology, climatology, and corresponding reflections in cultural 
manifestations of human geography”—offered the most effective basis 
for analyzing Brazilian realities.183 Thus, Delgado de Carvalho lamented 
that under the Republic’s state- based administrative division, Amazonas 
and Pará had been “brutally cut in two parts,” deprived of the “beauti-
ful geological harmony and the majesty of its great [river] artery, whose 
unity, whose economy constitute a world unto itself.”184 Similarly, the 
IBGE’s delimitation of the states of Amazonas and Pará and the federal 
territory of Acre under the “northern” region—narrowing a geographic 
designation heretofore applied by southern Brazilians to both the Ama-
zon and the northeast—hinged on the contrast between the Amazon’s 
wide rivers and humid forests and the semi- arid northeast, and the “prob-
lems [that] are manifested and derive from geographic facts, arising prin-
cipally from the imperatives of the physical medium.”185
The compartmentalization of the Amazon occurred through other 
forums as well. From its inception in 1939, Revista Brasileira de Geografia 
published numerous articles, photographs, maps, and drawings to docu-
42 Chapter 1
ment the distinctive flora, fauna, soils, and climate of the Amazon (see 
map 1.1). Moreover, between 1939 and 1944, the Revista dedicated nine 
entries to “human types and aspects of Amazonia”—including cowboys 
from Marajó Island, alligator hunters, and rubber tappers—who were 
said to define and to be defined by their natural region.186 In 1942, the 
quatercentenary of Orellana’s historic voyage, the Revista devoted two 
volumes to Amazonia, later reissued in a hefty tome entitled Amazônia 
Brasileira (1944).
Geographers drew boundaries in Brazil: they delimited external 
borders, segmented internal space and sociocultural hierarchies, and 
patrolled divides between so- called realms of nature and society. They 
had not invented, of course, aspects of regional geographies. Rivers, alli-
map 1.1 Current IBGE Regional Division of Brazil
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gators, rubber tappers, and Manaus’s (small) white population were fac-
tors that very much comprised the “natural region” of the Amazon. The 
day- to- day struggles of an Amazonian extractivist surely had little in 
common with a São Paulo businessman—even if it might with a paulista 
peasant and Manaus- based import- export merchant, respectively. Yet de-
pictions of Brazilian regions as static and distinct entities also reinforced 
erroneous notions of fixity in time and space, rather than fluidity and 
interconnectedness.187 Landscapes and lifestyles in the Amazon were as 
much the product of networks of trade, migration, politics, and ideolo-
gies as of ecosystems, yet geographers laid claim to science to natural-
ize divides. Moreover, geographers’ evolutionary theories, measuring a 
group’s “civilization” by its “independence” from nature, condemned 
(and mischaracterized) forest dwellers’ adaptive extractive and subsis-
tence economies, while upholding prospective northeastern migrants 
as “more amenable to progress.”188 While dualistic categories have long 
been imposed on landscapes and populations, the approach of modern 
states may vary not only because of the attempt to draw strict bound-
aries between multiple categories of people and space but also because of 
the greater technical, bureaucratic, and coercive power of modern states 
to control people and transform landscapes.189 Demarcating borders, 
Vargas- era geographers assumed as well the role of customs officials in 
designating the proper relationships between humans and the environ-
ment in the Amazon.
amazonia’s cultural Brokers
The invention of Amazonia through varied literary genres and visual arts 
has been amply explored in the field of cultural studies.190 Since repre-
sentations of realities should be seen as no less the work of artists than 
scientists, nor the concept of “culture” affixed to the arts rather than the 
multiple markers of power and protest in society, our investigation into 
the making of the Amazon during the Vargas era has ranged heretofore 
beyond the salon and museum. In any event, representations of the Ama-
zon were not marked by a strict boundary between the arts and sciences: 
just as natural and social scientists took certain artistic license in depict-
ing the Amazon, literati emulated scientific texts in detailing the role of 
nature in shaping human destinies.191 When essayist Clodomir Vianna 
Moog wrote of the prospect of aerial fumigation of Amazonian cities to 
eradicate mosquitoes, air- conditioned housing to balance the effects of 
heat and humidity on the human organism, and the creation of peasant 
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cooperatives under the direction of engineers and agronomists, author 
Monteiro Lobato hailed his colleague’s skillful use of “scientific method” 
which eschewed “excessive lyricism.”192
Yet literature, the arts, and the nascent leisure industries in Vargas- 
era Brazil did have their distinct set of producers and circuits. José Maria 
Ferreira de Castro’s A Selva (1930), which denounced the brutalization of 
tappers as a metaphor for social injustice in Brazil, drew on an intellec-
tual tradition dating back to the writings of Euclides da Cunha. And the 
designation of pre- Columbian Marajoara pottery and Portuguese colonial 
fortification in the Amazon as official national patrimony was established 
by federal officials in the newly created Serviço do Patrimônio Histórico 
e Artístico Nacional.193 In this vein, two twentieth- century Brazilian lit-
erary classics depicting Amazonia that circulated during the Vargas era 
were Mário de Andrade’s Macunaíma (1928) and Raul Bopp’s Cobra No-
rato (1931).
Modernist writers from southern Brazil, Bopp and Andrade had each 
traveled to the Amazon in the 1920s in search of the nation’s organic 
roots, inspired by the European avant- garde and the anthropological fas-
cination with the “primitive.”194 As Antônio Cândido argues, the cul-
tural complexities of Brazil, an ethnically mestizo Latin nation situated 
in the tropics, had been historically idealized or ignored by the nation’s 
intellectuals; modernism broke this mold, celebrating the toughness of 
tropical nature and the truculence of the Indian as a source of cultural 
elaboration.195 And as Roberto González Echeverría notes more gener-
ally, the Latin American novel of the 1930s moved from scientific dis-
course to anthropology, emulating ethnography’s search for knowledge, 
truth- bearing, and the origins of being in the cultural values, beliefs, and 
histories of non- Western societies.196 In the Amazon, Brazilian modern-
ists found a rich repository of material, reworking regional themes into 
markers of national distinctiveness.197
Bopp and Andrade further sought to parlay their affinities for the 
Amazon into public policy initiatives. As secretary of the Federal For-
eign Trade Commission in Buenos Aires, Bopp wrote Vargas in the late 
1930s of the geopolitical significance of the Amazon River (“the spinal 
vertebrae” of Brazil), and warned of threats posed by U.S. hegemony in 
the Caribbean basin, North American scientific expeditions in the for-
est, and the Ford Corporation’s rubber plantations. Bopp also opined that 
Belém would one day surpass the Argentine capital in importance due 
to its greater geographic proximity to New York and London.198 For his 
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part, Mário de Andrade piloted ethnographic training for researchers at 
São Paulo’s municipal department of culture, while serving as its direc-
tor from 1935 to 1938, and endorsed the creation of the Sociedade de 
Etnografia e Folclore, the first of its kind in Brazil.199 In 1938, Andrade 
dispatched a four- member Missão de Pesquisas Folclóricas to the North-
east and Belém to record and film “traditional” folk music and customs, 
which he believed were endangered by the onslaught of mass media.200 
The importance of Brazilian ethnographers in shaping public policies in 
the Amazon endures until today.201
Mass media during the Vargas era also aimed to mold popular percep-
tions of the Amazon. As a source of information and entertainment, a 
commercial venue, and the regime’s soapbox, the radio had much to sell 
with (and in) Amazonia.202 Some radio programs were aural travelogues 
of the old jungle book genre: between August 1936 and August 1937, for 
example, the Programa Infantil da Radio Jornal do Brasil broadcast re-
ports by its director, Ariosto Espinheira, of his plane travels in the Ama-
zon.203 Other radio programs aimed to popularize the March to the West. 
The radio station of the Ministério da Educação e Saúde and the Radio 
Difusora da Prefeitura do Distrito Federal, for example, beamed forty 
speeches between 1939 and 1943 on topics such as agricultural modern-
ization, frontier colonization, rubber tapping, and rural uplift. As Pro-
fessor Genaro Vidal Leite Ribeiro exhorted in a September 1940 radio 
address entitled “Amazonia, a Vital Problem”: “We cannot leave it aban-
doned any longer.”204 Film functioned, too, as a new medium to market 
the Amazon. During the 1920s, movies such as No País do Amazonas 
(1922), Terra Encantada (1923), and No Rastro do Eldorado (1925), made 
by the Portuguese Silvino Santos while residing in Manaus, had enjoyed 
significant success in Rio de Janeiro and in European cities. Brazil’s first 
filmed cartoon, Sinfonia Amazônica, created by the Latini Brothers be-
tween 1939 and 1945, used the region’s flora, fauna, and myths in its story 
lines.205 And through its newsreel series, Cinejornais brasileiros, the Estado 
Novo’s Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda disseminated images of 
the Amazon. The short O chefe do governo no Amazonas contained footage 
of Vargas’s Amazon River speech of October 10, 1940—an event officially 
commemorated each year throughout Brazil over the next five years.206
As Brazilian historiography has noted, there was much that was not 
new, or true, about Vargas’s vaunted New State.207 The Amazon region 
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had been the target of civilizing projects since the colonial period, while 
nineteenth- century positivist ideals of “Order and Progress,” emblazoned 
on the national flag, acclaimed scientific capability to engineer socioenvi-
ronmental change.208 Nor did the Estado Novo’s penchant for overstate-
ment and underachievement, bemoaned by revisionist historians, elude 
those like José Moraes do Carmo, a resident of Boca do Acre, Amazonas. 
In response to a 1939 questionnaire from the federal police chief regard-
ing the regime’s efficacy, Carmo stated, “today we are still in the same 
situation: without work, without schools, and even without justice.”209
Yet the Vargas regime did respond to and inaugurate a new era in Bra-
zilian politics. Amid the twin crises of the Great Depression and the Sec-
ond World War, Brazil’s industrial bourgeoisie ascended, as did a newly 
institutionalized technocratic sector. Vargas created Brazil’s first truly co-
herent national government with the machinery to distribute aid and co-
ordinate development at the national level, although public investment 
continued to be channeled primarily to the more industrial south.210 New 
forms of cultural nationalism congealed from elements of popular tradi-
tion and modernist expression.211 And Brazil’s working class nudged its 
way onto the political scene, challenging facets of oligarchic rule and de-
manding new regulatory roles for the state in society.
The nationalization of the Amazon “question” during the Vargas era 
embodied such trends. As I have argued, a confluence of national and 
global factors propelled this transformation: the centralization of state 
power; the leap in import- substitution industrialization; the expansion of 
the industrial bourgeoisie and the professional class; global competition 
for the Amazon’s natural resources; and the geopolitical anxieties of the 
militaries of Brazil and the United States. The Amazon’s rehabilitation 
was launched through regime policies and pronouncements that pro-
moted subsidized migration, agronomic research, rationalization of the 
rubber trade, nationalization of transport, and public health programs. 
And it was popularized through nationalist discourse that recast the 
Amazon as a metonym of Brazil: a region teeming with untold economic 
potential yet blighted by social injustice; a region of natural bounty dese-
crated by human depredation; a region with prodigious space cursed by 
interminable distance; a region inhabited by hardy but “deficient” popu-
lations; a region condemned by history yet liberated by science; a region 
deformed by open markets but restored by state regulation. The Amazon: 
the land of the future in the nation of the future. As Vargas affirmed in his 
speech in Manaus in October 1940: “In the same way that the image of 
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the river- sea [the Amazon River] is for Brazilians a measure of the great-
ness of Brazil, your problems, in sum, are those of the entire nation.”212
This chapter has also shown how the dialectic process of region- and 
nation- building and, more broadly, the making of nature and politics, 
is effected through agents of states, scientific institutions, professional 
organizations, and media industries; through producers and consumers; 
through technologies and commodities; and through statistics, graphs, 
maps, discourses, and other forms of representation that serve to consoli-
date these seeming binaries. I have focused on the political projects and 
narratives of discrete class and professional sectors in Vargas- era Brazil, 
whose diverse truth claims to effect socioenvironmental change in the 
Amazon were anchored in a combination of scientific reasoning, pro-
fessional expertise, and hands- on experience. These mediators did not 
invent physical realities of the Amazon any more than they created fix-
tures of Brazilian politics or the global economy, but their knowledge 
claims regarding regional landscapes and populations aimed to control 
and transform (human) nature. In forging national integration, they re-
inscribed regional and social inequalities in the spatial ordering of the 
New State.213
Historians of borderlands have long argued that the study of na-
tions’ boundaries—where geographic and social divides are fortified, 
transgressed, or blurred—can yield great insight into the formulation 
and contestation of national identities.214 Scholars of Brazil have been 
slower to take up this intellectual challenge in Amazonia, perhaps due to 
the north’s peripheral status in the nation’s political economy, the rela-
tive precariousness of historical sources, or the difficulties of inserting 
Amazonia into dominant historiographic frameworks.215 Or perhaps the 
low- level nature of warfare, the absence of mass deportations, and the 
powerlessness of indigenous victims of ethnic cleansing in the twentieth- 
century Brazilian Amazon have drawn less historical attention to this 
borderlands region than others. But as a geographic as much as a concep-
tual border, and an internal as much as an external boundary, the Ama-
zon, in fact, can shed new light onto the making of region and nation in 
Brazil during the Vargas era.
Amazonia redefined the ambit of the Brazilian state under Vargas, 
much as the regime and its era would come to redefine the region. What 
had once been the millennial vision of colonial clerics or the fancy of 
nineteenth- century European naturalist- explorers in the thrall of science 
and imperial service was now the pursuit of varied Brazilian government 
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bureaucracies and newly institutionalized social sciences. From the site 
for laboratory research in the nineteenth century the Amazon became 
the laboratory of research in the twentieth century. And what had once 
been the backstage entreaties of backwater elites now resonated in the 
forefront of state policies and pronouncements toward a high- profile 
 region.
With the advent of World War II, the scramble for raw materials and 
hemispheric defense would precipitate U.S. government intervention in 
the Brazilian Amazon as well. A set of U.S. actors—many sharing the sci-
entific or professional training and the class biases of their Brazilian col-
leagues—sprung to leave their mark on the Amazon, much as the forest 
would abruptly come to overshadow U.S. politics and society. Yet U.S. de-
mand for forest resources, stretching from Main Street to Wall Street and 
from the avenues of Pennsylvania to Pennsylvania Avenue, animated po-
litical projects and social imaginaries that were both diffuse and distinct. 
Binational wartime efforts to remake nature and society in the Amazon 
would reflect such overlapping and competing visions.
ChApTER 2
“the QUIckSandS of  
UntrUStworthy SUpply”
U.S. Rubber Dependency and the Lure of the Amazon
It is probable that the past two years have seen more actual explo-ration of the basin, more knowledge gained about its physical 
nature than have all the four centuries since that early conquis-
tador, Francisco de Orellana, was the first white commander to 
traverse it,” an American author noted of the Amazon in 1944. 
Although the writer rehashed the image of untrodden territory, 
“knowable” only through exploration by whites, over the previous 
years the United States government had sent hundreds of clerks, 
administrators, engineers, airline pilots, agricultural technicians, 
and doctors into the Amazon to increase rubber yields, improve 
health conditions, and study possibilities of raising foodstuffs in 
the basin.1 The Amazon starred in monographs, travelogues, films, 
novels, and newspapers in the United States, with bylines that an-
nounced that “the Amazon Valley may exert an effect far beyond its 
geographic province in its influence upon the human relations of 
the globe.”2 While most Americans focused on the European and 
Pacific military theaters, where thousands of loved ones fought and 
died, the heightened level of U.S. popular interest in the Amazon 
would probably only recur a half century later when tropical defor-
estation catapulted the region into a different geopolitical fracas.
Americans had turned to the Amazon in search of rubber. Fol-
lowing the Japanese invasion of the Malayan peninsula in May 
1942, the United States lost access to 92 percent of its supply.3 Be-
“
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fore the mid- nineteenth century, national capability had depended less 
on the availability of resources for mechanized industry and urban popu-
lations than on the qualities of soldiers engaged in hand- to- hand fighting. 
But the growth of the iron and steel industry had transformed warfare, 
increasing the strategic importance of minerals and other raw materi-
als as key determinants of national power.4 Distinct from many other 
commodities derived from tropical flora, rubber was indispensable for 
modern warfare.5 From airplanes, army trucks, tanks, battleships, motor-
cycles, gun mounts, bullet- sealing gasoline tanks, submarine storage 
battery jars, blimps, and barrage balloons to life rafts, hoses, raincoats, 
boots, and gas masks, rubber ensured the mobility, speed, and efficiency 
critical for military defense.6 Indeed, the Second World War spurred vora-
cious demand: U.S. national output of airplane tires jumped from 33,000 
in 1939 to almost 1.5 million in 1944, and Americans would use more 
than 40 million heavy- duty truck tires between Pearl Harbor and the 
Japanese surrender.7 In 1942, however, the United States had stockpiled 
only 578,000 tons of rubber, and even with anticipated imports of 53,000 
tons for the following year, the nation would face a potential deficit of 
211,000 tons for military use by January 1944.8 Moreover, an additional 
800,000 tons of rubber tire were required to keep more than 20 million 
civilian automobiles running to avoid grave economic disruption.9
In August 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt organized the Rub-
ber Survey Committee to undertake a nonpartisan investigation of the 
shortage and to recommend policy directives. Chaired by businessman 
Bernard M. Baruch, and comprising James B. Conant and Karl T. Comp-
ton, the respective presidents of Harvard University and the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, the committee assembled a technical staff, 
consulted with chemists, chemical engineers, and rubber manufacturers, 
and heard testimony from government officials and industry represen-
tatives. In its final report of September 1942, the committee endorsed 
government development of synthetic manufacturing plants (largely on 
the basis of petroleum) as the cornerstone of the wartime rubber pro-
gram, and the appointment of a rubber director to oversee policy.10 The 
committee also recommended a policy of broad- based conservation.11 In 
December 1942, the Roosevelt administration dropped the speed limit 
to 35 miles per hour (to prolong the life of tires), and imposed full- scale 
gasoline rationing to reduce tire use and to divert gasoline stocks for use 
in the manufacture of synthetic rubber.12
Although the committee prioritized the production of synthetics, 
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U.S. officials confronted the possibility of substantial output only after 
mid- 1943, with full capacity of over one million tons projected for 1944. 
Aside from synthetic’s start- up delays, the tires of heavy military vehicles, 
trucks, and buses required an admixture of natural rubber as high as 30 
percent to ensure greater resilience, tensile strength, and tear- resistance. 
In aircraft tires, where high speeds, resistance to shock, and flexibility at 
low temperatures were more important than mere abrasion, synthetic 
was rarely used at all.13 Thus, the Rubber Survey Committee also called 
for a minimum requirement of 41,000 tons of natural rubber for 1943 
and procurement of 68,000 tons of raw rubber in 1944.14 Sources of raw 
rubber were now confined to Ceylon and India (the largest producers 
of natural rubber remaining under Allied control), Africa, and Latin 
America.15
Since U.S. officials recognized that the price of natural rubber in an 
open market would skyrocket in response to war and consumer de-
mands, international arrangements aimed to establish a cooperative sys-
tem for the control of rubber consumption and the intensification of rub-
ber production in all producing countries in the Western Hemisphere. 
Between March and October 1942, the State Department, in conjunction 
with the Rubber Development Corporation, negotiated agreements with 
sixteen rubber- producing countries in Latin America for the sale of their 
exportable surpluses of crude rubber and rubber manufactured goods to 
the United States for a term of years at a fixed price, and the limitation of 
local consumption. Brazil, the largest rubber producer in Latin America 
at the time, signed the first agreement on March 3, 1942. By 1940, annual 
rubber production in the Brazilian Amazon, extracted from wild trees, 
totaled a mere 16,000 to 18,000 tons, a smidge of the ravenous U.S. de-
mand.16 Yet amidst global turmoil, U.S. officials zeroed in on the Amazon 
Valley and, more precisely, its rubber trees.
As David Harvey notes, “To say that scarcity resides in nature and 
that natural limits exist is to ignore how scarcity is socially produced and 
how ‘limits’ are a social relation within nature (including human society) 
rather than some externally imposed necessity.”17 In September 1942, 
the Rubber Survey Committee essentially reached the same conclusion 
regarding the origins of the rubber crisis in the United States. The com-
mittee noted there were two types of “shortages”: one where there is 
not enough to go around for essential purposes; another where enough 
material exists but is unavailable where it is urgently required. In most 
cases, the committee pointed out, the problem was the latter, due to the 
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use of materials for purposes not essential to the conduct of war; the lack 
of conservation, inventory control, and the finding of substitutes; and 
complicated or ineffective methods used to distribute materials and to 
control prices.18
Although sparked by the Japanese offensive in Southeast Asia, the war-
time rubber crisis in the United States, like other public emergencies, 
derived from a complex configuration of political, socioeconomic, and 
cultural factors. Prior to Pearl Harbor, U.S. policy advisers had advanced 
three principal options to offset national dependency on Southeast Asian 
rubber: market diversification, domestic stockpiling, and the develop-
ment of a synthetic industry. None was successfully pursued. Since the 
loss of Asian markets kindled U.S. wartime interest and public invest-
ment in the Amazon, laying bare the role of rubber goods as key media-
tors between tropical nature and domestic sociopolitical formations, this 
chapter explores the origins of the crisis, its repercussions in the valley, 
and its divisiveness for U.S. policymakers. Indeed, more than just a for-
est, the Amazon loomed, then as now, as a flashpoint for deeper Ameri-
can anxieties over modernity and national identity.
the reign of rubber
The history of industrial materials differs in their exploration, pro-
duction, application, and geopolitical importance.19 Resilient, flexible, 
waterproof, and airtight, rubber contains a number of features found 
only among certain plastics. It has a high abrasion resistance, far greater 
than steel or any other metal, is unaffected by the corrosive action of 
most common chemicals, insulates against electrical shock, and can be 
bonded firmly both to textiles and to steel.20 Rubber’s most distinguish-
ing physical property is a special type of elasticity or “bounce” that allows 
it to stretch and then approximately regain its form.21
Rubber’s pervasiveness in American life in the late 1930s, however, 
cannot be understood solely in terms of its “natural” adaptability. As 
Arjun Appadurai notes, even if we accept the anthropological insight that 
“things have no meanings apart from those that human transactions, at-
tributions, and motivations endow them with . . . this formal truth does 
not illuminate the concrete, historical circulation of things. For that we 
have to follow the things themselves, for their meanings are inscribed in 
their forms, their uses, their trajectories.”22 In fact, until the final third 
of the nineteenth century, rubber was a material of minor significance 
in the United States. In 1859, for example, the United States consumed 
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1,500 tons of crude rubber, and by 1900, only 27,000 tons, with footwear 
leading in usage.23 By 1940, however, the United States used 648,000 
tons of rubber per year—as much rubber as the rest of the world com-
bined.24 Or, in other terms, between 1910 and 1940 America’s annual 
need for rubber increased from 1 to 10.5 pounds for every person.25
The jump in rubber consumption owed to the rapid transformation of 
the United States from an agrarian society to a mass- production economy 
in the early twentieth century.26 By 1940, the United States, with 6 per-
cent of the world’s population and 7 percent of its land surface, produced 
half of the world’s supply of finished industrial products and 75 percent 
of its motor vehicles. Along with iron, steel, coal, and petroleum, rub-
ber became an essential material, entering into factory and household, 
farm and transportation facilities, peacetime goods and implements of 
warfare.27 At the time of World War II, more than 40,000 uses of rub-
ber existed, including the manufacture of motor vehicles, planes, sub-
marines, balloons, gas masks, electric motors, ships, trains, streetcars, 
electric lights, telephones, typewriters, printers’ tools, radios, surgical 
equipment, condoms, hoses, tubing, tractors, conveyor belts, milking 
machines, athletic goods, and shoes.28 As Carter R. Bryan of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce noted in 1942, the history of rubber and its 
adaptations over the previous century—“a very short time in the life of 
mankind and the world”—was “symbolic of the progress achieved by man 
in the past 100 years.”29
Rubber’s leading application in the United States at the time of the 
Second World War was in the tire industry, where it blazed a trail in indi-
vidualized, long- distance transportation. From 1938 to 1940, 76.6 per-
cent of all crude rubber consumed in the United States went into tires, 
inner tubes, and tire sundries, with pneumatic automobile tires account-
ing for 85 percent of this total.30 While there had been only four automo-
biles in the United States in 1896, and just 650,000 at the time of the 
first Indianapolis 500 in 1911, there were over 28 million cars by 1940—
or one car for every four persons.31 The number of motor trucks in the 
United States also mushroomed from 1,100 in 1906 to about 4,750,000 
in 1940.32
As James Flink notes, the unparalleled market for motor vehicles in 
the United States owed to various factors. With its vast land area and 
hinterland of scattered and isolated settlements and relatively low popu-
lation densities, the United States had a greater need for individualized 
automotive transportation than the nations of Western Europe. More im-
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portant, a higher per capita income and more equitable income distribu-
tion allowed Americans to take advantage of mass automobile ownership 
a generation ahead of Europeans. These market conditions, combined 
with low raw material costs and a chronic shortage of labor, especially 
skilled workers, encouraged the mechanization of industrial processes 
in the United States, necessitating the standardization of industrial prod-
ucts and volume production. The automobile boom of the 1920s also 
owed to an unprecedented expansion of consumer installment credit to 
finance sales, cementing the middle-class pattern of purchasing expen-
sive consumer goods on credit as a mainstay of the U.S. economy.33
Breaking down barriers of time and space, the motor vehicle revolu-
tionized American society. Trucks facilitated long- distance hauling, re-
ducing the delay, damages, and labor expenses associated with railway 
freight shipments. The automobile decentralized urban space, enabling 
some thirteen million Americans by 1940 to live in communities lack-
ing public transportation, and expanding social networks beyond nearby 
friends and family. Rural families could more readily avail themselves 
of urban amenities, and migrant workers obtained greater geographic 
mobility. The automobile offered middle- class women escape from the 
domestic sphere and access to employment, consumerism, and leisure 
through a form of transportation promising a measure of privacy, safety, 
and speed unmatched by public transit. The car undercut parental super-
vision and authority, and abetted romantic adventurers, adulterers, and 
prostitutes. It helped to sustain entertainment and recreation based on 
mass participation, allowed for extended vacations away from home 
(heretofore the privilege of the rich), stimulated the outdoor movement, 
and fueled strong public support for the acquisition of parklands and 
the conservation of natural resources. Bridging regional, sectional, and 
urban- rural divides, the car served to homogenize America’s cultural 
landscape.34 As one author noted of motor vehicle transportation: “It 
has contributed tremendously to the result that from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific and from the Great Lakes to the Gulf, our people speak the same 
language, serve the same flag, respond to the same impulses, and are 
guided by common ideals.”35 Automobiles relieved the stress and tedium 
of modern life, even as they contributed to them.
Wherever the automobile went, rubber goods rolled along. An aver-
age automobile contained around three hundred rubber parts, but the 
most prominent, of course, were the tires. As automobile makers in-
creased vehicular weight and speed capacity, rubber manufacturers built 
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larger tires and introduced antiskidding treads to ensure riding comfort. 
The balloon tire, introduced by Firestone in 1923, had 30 percent more 
rubber than older tires and twice the air capacity. The higher velocity at 
which autos could travel, in turn, called for four- wheel brakes, while the 
absence of vibration rattles encouraged more customers to buy closed 
cars, promoting year- round riding.36 American consumers also witnessed 
dramatic improvements in the life span and price of tires.37 Compound-
ing ingredients and fabric ensured strength, stiffness, and durability; 
layered plies of rubber- impregnated cotton fabric formed a strong, yet 
flexible, side wall; carbon black, obtained by the incomplete combustion 
of natural gas and added to the treads, resisted abrasion; and additives 
retarded oxidation which, left unchecked, restricted the life span of rub-
ber to merely two or three years after its manufacture.38 Whereas in 1908 
an automobile tire cost from $35 to $125 and was usually good for only 
2,000 miles of service, by 1936 it cost between $8 and $25 and lasted for 
20,000 miles on average.39 Small wonder rubber manufacturers trum-
peted the industry’s contribution to the miracle of motordom. As Harvey 
Firestone Jr. quipped: “Have you not noticed how hard the going is when 
one or more of your tires is flat?”40
In transforming realms of production, transportation, communica-
tion, commerce, hygiene, sexuality, and leisure in the United States, rub-
ber fanned the twentieth- century whirlwind of unfettered individualism 
and dispiriting impersonality.41 I do not mean to advance here the notion 
of history determined by technology: innovations in the manufacture 
and application of rubber goods were both the producers and products of 
political, economic, and cultural changes in American society—changes 
effected by human actors. But rubber goods enabled distinct societal con-
figurations in the United States, while their materialization from tree 
resin seemingly delivered on the ideological promise of the Enlighten-
ment to liberate humankind from onerous labor through improvement 
of the natural world.42
Rubber goods also formed part of the mass marketed consumer com-
modities that contributed to and communicated Americans’ sense of 
status as older values of discipline, self- restraint, and character- building 
surrendered to new ideals of pleasure, external appearance, and achieve-
ment through consumption.43 Arming users with the capacity to maxi-
mize speed, prevent disease, ensure safety, repel filth, erase mistakes, 
demolish distance, transform landscapes, enhance leisure, conquer time, 
increase production, and control reproduction, manufactured rubber 
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goods encoded and articulated ideals of progress, efficiency, and power. 
This credo pervaded lavish public spectacles, flashy advertising cam-
paigns, and everyday forms of consumption. At the World’s Columbian 
Exposition in Chicago in 1893, for example, pneumatic conveyors prom-
ised to eliminate bottlenecks in the distribution of consumer goods. At 
the Indianapolis 500, spectators could behold the grueling strain on man 
and machine that challenged “the nerves and moral force of every racer” 
as well as the tires upon which “they tore through space.” At the World’s 
Fair in New York in 1939, the Firestone Company wowed millions with a 
demonstration of the latest innovations in tire- making. And in daily use, 
rubber goods reinforced the image of the machine as an extension of the 
body and the body as extension of the machine.44
Rubber goods were imbricated, moreover, in the “cultures of Ameri-
can imperialism”—the political struggles for power with other cultures 
and nations that have constituted both domestic social formations and 
international relations.45 The late nineteenth- century spurt in urban and 
industrial growth accentuated U.S. perceptions of Latin Americans as 
“backward” and undisciplined.46 In this vein, the myriad of technological 
innovations linked to the industrial application of rubber came to recon-
stitute what many Americans believed defined happiness and communi-
cated success in their society and abroad. As Harvey Firestone Jr. asserted 
in a radio address in September 1931: “Today rubber enters into almost 
every phase and activity of life. Without it, no factory could run, no mod-
ern building could operate, no fast railroad train could travel across the 
country, and no steamship could sail the high seas. No home could be 
conducted in the modern sense without the articles and implements of 
rubber that are made for our daily use. From the first cry of the new- born 
babe until the last slow march to the grave, things made of rubber are in-
dispensable to our modern life.”47
dependent america
The consumption of rubber in the United States, one author noted after 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, “had been built upon the quicksands of un-
trustworthy supply.”48 Since the most elastic latex issued from the Hevea 
brasiliensis—which required a tropical, humid climate with temperatures 
in the 70- to 90- degree range and a rainfall of about 100 inches a year—
the commercial geography of rubber was confined to a comparatively nar-
row band extending ten degrees north and south of the equator in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America (see map 2.1).49 Hundreds of rubber- producing 
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trees, shrubs, plants, and vines did grow in the United States—the most 
promising being guayule, a shrub native to southern Texas—but the rub-
ber content of the latex of tropical plants far exceeded that found in tem-
perate regions, where labor expenses were also much higher.50 Indeed, 
crude rubber reflected what Fernando Coronil has deemed the “global 
division of nature,” which has secured regions of the so- called Third 
World a distinct role in the international division of labor.51 At the time 
of Pearl Harbor, 98 percent of U.S. crude rubber imports came from 
Southeast Asia, principally British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.52
Dependency on Asian rubber markets periodically touched a political 
nerve in the United States. Although complex markets tend to conceal 
from consumers the geographical regions and social relations that pro-
duce commodities, during the interwar period calls had surfaced for de-
veloping synthetics, conserving rubber stocks, and establishing supply 
sources outside the European colonial territories.53 Following the disrup-
tion of overseas raw material provisions for leading industrial nations 
during World War I, the War Production Board had recommended gov-
ernment stockpiles for future emergencies.54 And Secretary of Com-
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merce Herbert Hoover, railing against “foreign cartels” before the House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in 1923, obtained a 
congressional appropriation of $500,000 for the Departments of Com-
merce and Agriculture to explore opportunities for rubber cultivation in 
the Western Hemisphere and the U.S.- controlled Philippines. Between 
1925 and 1926, representatives from these government agencies trav-
eled more than 20,000 miles on thirty- seven rivers in the Amazon seek-
ing sites for potential rubber cultivation, and scoured regions of Central 
America as well. Large rubber companies also conducted independent 
surveys in the mid- 1920s in tropical America.55
Indeed, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, military strategists and 
mineral specialists in the U.S. Bureau of Mines and the Geological Sur-
vey, anticipating the difficulty of quickly adapting the American econ-
omy to the use of expensive ersatz formulas, called on the government 
and private industry to devise a comprehensive plan for raw materials.56 
And prior to the Japanese offensive in Malaya, various U.S. politicians 
and policymakers had warned of the danger of such a strike. As econo-
mist Eliot Janeway wrote in 1939: “The American economy, and with it 
American defense, cannot be operated without rubber and tin, which at 
present cannot be obtained in adequate quantity except from the British 
and Dutch colonies in Southeastern Asia. And Japan today commands the 
trade route connecting the west coast of the United States with the Malay-
sian Straits. . . . Here, ready to hand for Japan, is a safer and more power-
ful weapon against the United States than the folly of naval attack.” The 
following year, the U.S. Army and Navy Munitions Board reported: “there 
appears to be no question that rubber is almost as essential to national de-
fense as powder [or] explosives . . . national defense would be jeopardized 
should the supply from foreign sources be cut off.”57
Such self- styled victimhood was somewhat coy for a leading industrial 
and colonial power.58 Still, rubber self- sufficiency did elude the United 
States. European restrictionist policies, designed to reverse downward 
trends in rubber prices, certainly exacerbated U.S. vulnerability as a 
“have- not” nation. Britain’s Stevenson Plan (1922–28), which imposed 
compulsory production and export controls on rubber in its colonial ter-
ritories, had collapsed only after the Dutch East Indies and other Asian 
producers expanded production, and the U.S. government instituted a 
program of stockpiling and rubber reclamation.59 In 1934, however, pro-
ducing countries burdened with large surpluses due to the Depression- 
era drop in automobile sales created the International Rubber Regulation 
“The Quicksands of Untrustworthy Supply” 59
Committee (IRRC) to stabilize prices via designated production quotas. 
(Brazil, a minor producer, was outside the regulated area.60) The IRRC’s 
restrictionist policies reduced world rubber stocks and remained in effect 
until the Japanese seizure of Malaya.61 Protests to the committee by its 
consumer liaison, a representative of the U.S. Rubber Manufacturers As-
sociation, mattered little: IRRC officials could retort that U.S. manufac-
turers refused to commit to buying fixed amounts of future rubber pro-
duction or to maintain any designated level of stocks. Deeming rubber 
stocks a matter of business rather than politics, the IRRC ordered the sus-
pension of supplies to the Axis only following U.S. entry into the war.62
U.S. rubber manufacturers, in any event, had reached a certain ac-
commodation with restrictionist policies.63 They considered the rise in 
price levels induced by artificial scarcity as a lesser evil than price fluc-
tuations, which restrictionism aimed to contain. Price increases of crude 
rubber were not unimportant to manufacturers, but the extra costs of 
the material could be passed on to the final consumer; price fluctuations, 
however, had cost rubber manufacturers millions of dollars in inven-
tory write- downs, and negatively affected balance sheet value.64 Indeed, 
American corporate hedging, political inaction, and consumer compla-
cency contributed to the nation’s wartime rubber crisis, and the headlong 
rush of U.S. officials into the Amazon.
rubber acquisition and the “Big four”
Prior to Japan’s seizure of the latex producing colonies of Southeast Asia, 
the vertical integration of the rubber producing and manufacturing sec-
tors demanded a degree of U.S. government intervention and centraliza-
tion that neither external nor internal conditions could sustain.65 The fear 
of overexpansion and contraction haunted business leaders and govern-
ment officials before Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt, hobbled by isolationist sen-
timent, domestic opposition, and personal indecision, moved haltingly 
to secure alternative sources and stocks of rubber (and other strategic 
raw materials). And the American public, reeling from economic depres-
sion and leery of renewed entanglement in Old World conflicts, failed to 
mobilize for alternatives. In its stead, public policy delegated the acqui-
sition of strategic materials to private industry but lacked the power to 
compel American rubber manufacturers to invest in alternate sources or 
emergency stockpiles.66
By 1936, four tire manufacturers—U.S. Rubber, Goodrich, Goodyear, 
and Firestone—dominated the American rubber industry, controlling 75 
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percent of tire production. Located primarily in Akron, Ohio, the “Big 
Four” maintained chemical laboratories, research facilities, quality con-
trol, and internal information flow. It was here that processing took place 
in a marked global division of labor, as chemists, technicians, and fac-
tory workers vulcanized, compounded, reshaped, and colored rubber, 
determining the degree of softness, resilience, tensile strength, and tear- 
resistance for its specific purpose. By 1939, the rubber manufacturing 
industry employed more than 120,000 workers in the United States and 
produced goods valued at $900 million.67
Rubber manufacturers’ earnings were heavily tied to the demands of 
the automotive industry as well as the fluctuating prices of the materials 
used. Between 1920 and 1935, the rubber industry had lagged as one of 
the most profitless divisions in Big Business, as a drastic drop in the price 
of crude rubber in the recession of 1920–21 wiped out inventory values, 
while the Great Depression choked demand for the next half decade.68 
The extreme fluctuations in price also made rubber a perfect mark for 
speculators, as U.S. rubber- goods manufacturers prior to World War II 
bought three- fourths of their requirements primarily from New York- 
based importers and dealers.69
Manufacturers’ profits thus depended upon efficiency in industrial 
engineering and factory production, advertising and merchandising, 
overseas expansion, cartel agreements, and ruthless competition. With 
the consolidation of the Big Four, 35,000 independent tire dealers and 35 
small tire manufacturers went under between 1926 and 1929.70 Good-
year Tire and Rubber, on the other hand, expanded from a medium- sized 
firm in 1900 to a multinational giant with 46,194 employees in 1939 
that had turned out over 250,000,000 tires and consumed nearly one- 
seventh of all crude rubber.71
Stockpiles and Synthetics
Although the IRRC maintained quotas on exports, American consumers 
also determined the size of rubber stocks. With proper care and storage 
facilities, crude rubber can be stocked for many years, offering a safe-
guard against military and civilian shortage.72 The Interdepartmental 
Committee on Strategic Materials, composed of representatives from 
government departments both civilian and military, sought to alert the 
public to the importance of rubber inventories for national security, but 
with millions of Americans still facing poverty and unemployment and 
the nation not at war, Congress refused to authorize the acquisition of 
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rubber stocks, whose costs were estimated at hundreds of millions of 
dollars. Stockpiling by private industry proved no more successful. Op-
posing long- term plans that might result in large surpluses, higher rub-
ber prices, and weakened profits, the Big Four balked at being pressured 
to take up the government’s slack. In fact, privately owned rubber stocks 
in the United States shrank from a high of 355,000 long tons of rubber 
to 176,000 in 1940.73
Following the Nazi invasion of Holland and France, Congress autho-
rized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RfC), a multibillion gov-
ernment agency founded in 1932 to speed economic recovery, to oversee 
a vast program of purchase of strategic materials. One of its subsidiaries, 
the Rubber Reserve Company [later renamed the Rubber Development 
Corporation], was entrusted in June 1940 with producing, acquiring, and 
dealing in rubber. But it too failed to amass government inventories. To 
be sure, the IRRC’s restrictionist policy remained, while German milita-
rization prodded Britain, the Soviet Union, and other foreign buyers to 
snap up crude rubber at prices that Rubber Reserve refused to pay, pur-
portedly to avoid further hoarding and speculation.74 Although a minor 
producer, Brazil bore witness to similar trends: Rubber Reserve had con-
tracted in October 1941 to purchase the nation’s exportable surplus of 
rubber for five years at a price of 30 cents a pound (about twice as high 
as formerly paid for Asian rubber), but rubber- poor Argentina outbid, 
speculators hoarded, and a prohibition on exports to countries outside 
the hemisphere was difficult to enforce.75
U.S. government stockpiles primarily lagged, however, because pri-
vate industry retained preferential and unrestricted access to rubber pur-
chases.76 As consumer demand for automobiles skyrocketed in anticipa-
tion of a wartime disruption, Detroit turned out over a million more cars 
in 1941 than in 1939. Passenger car tire production reached fifty million, 
and the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company’s earnings jumped from 
$217,540,079 in 1940 to $330,599,674 in 1941.77 During this period, how-
ever, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation spent only $3 million on 
raw resource development in Latin America from a budget of $500 mil-
lion.78 As RfC Chairman Jesse Jones asserted in his postwar memoirs: 
“We had no intention of competing with the rubber industry in buy-
ing crude rubber, but felt that it was necessary to have a working ar-
rangement with them.”79 The centralization of rubber purchasing did go 
into effect in June 1941, ending competition between private American 
buyers and the government, but by this point Rubber Reserve had pur-
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chased only slightly more than 10 percent of total exports during the pre-
vious year.80 With raw rubber siphoned for nonessential civilian use, gov-
ernment stockpiles at the time of Pearl Harbor reached only 30 percent 
of the level deemed critical for national defense.81
The low- level production of synthetic rubber derived from a similar 
mix of government inaction, popular complacence, and the corporate 
bottom line. Since the nineteenth century, the chemical properties of 
rubber had been revealed as a polymer of isoprene (a butadiene deriva-
tive), a liquid hydrocarbon boiling at low temperatures, which can be 
obtained from rubber by distillation. Butadiene, the key ingredient of 
synthetic rubber, can be derived from petroleum, grain alcohol, or other 
raw materials, but it is a complex and expensive process. Indeed, growing 
military- industrial demand had prompted the governments of other rub-
ber dependent nations, such as the Soviet Union and Germany, to spear-
head the development of synthetics and achieve modest prewar output.82 
In the United States, all four major rubber companies, as well as Stan-
dard Oil and du Pont, had been involved in developing synthetic rubber 
but refused to pool their patents or exchange technical information prior 
to the war. Furthermore, as the Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment would reveal, a cartel agreement between Standard Oil Company of 
New Jersey and Germany’s IG Farbenindustrie delayed the development 
of synthetic rubber in the United States. Thus, at the time of Pearl Har-
bor, synthetic rubber comprised just 4 percent of the rubber consumed 
in the United States; of 200,000 tire stores in the United States in 1940, 
not one sold tires made of synthetic.83 Only after Pearl Harbor did rub-
ber companies sign an agreement with the Rubber Reserve Company 
placing at the disposal of the government agency all patent applications 
and know- how regarding synthetic rubber. Standard Oil pleaded guilty 
and paid a modest fine of $50,000, but no prosecutions ensued, nor did 
similar disclosures cost other guilty corporations war contracts.84
While revelations of corporate wrongdoing made for potent populist 
salvos, more mundane factors stymied the production of synthetic rub-
ber as well. Synthetic cost three times as much as natural rubber, was 
inferior in resilience and tensile strength, and confronted widespread 
consumer skepticism.85 Major rubber manufacturers and a number of 
government experts, therefore, insisted that without state- financed con-
struction of plants and a guaranteed market, synthetic rubber stood 
little chance of succeeding.86 As Assistant Secretary of War Louis John-
son urged in November 1938: “This constitutes a program of research 
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involving national defense and not normal competitive industrial rela-
tions.”87 But as late as September 1940, Roosevelt reportedly stated that 
“the wealthy rubber companies ought to build their own plants.”88
geographic diversification: corporate and government Initiatives
Interwar efforts at geographic diversification likewise failed to reduce 
U.S. dependency on traditional rubber markets. Plantation development 
represented a costly and long- term undertaking. A forty- acre rubber 
plantation in the Amazon, for example, necessitated about 600 man- 
days to clear the underbrush, an additional 80 man- days to line and stake 
the plot, and 75 man- days to plant the trees.89 Since rubber trees required 
at least five years to reach maturity, and premature collapse signaled total 
financial loss, U.S. companies eschewed developing plantations in un-
familiar areas.90
The Firestone Company’s Liberian plantations marked the most suc-
cessful attempt at geographic diversification prior to World War II. With 
Philippine land law barring corporate acquisition of large tracts in the 
U.S.- occupied territory, Firestone negotiated with the government of 
Liberia in 1926 a concession of one million acres for ninety- nine years 
in return for infrastructural development. The smallest of the Big Four, 
Firestone may have hoped to improve its competitive position by develop-
ing an alternative source of plantation rubber in Africa during the heyday 
of Britain’s Stevenson Act. Still, Liberia accounted for less than 5 percent 
of international rubber output at the time of Pearl Harbor.91
Henry Ford’s rubber plantations in the Brazilian Amazon signaled an-
other major corporate effort at diversification. Seeking a direct supply 
for his company’s automobile tires, Ford was heartened by U.S. govern-
ment reports from the mid- 1920s on the Amazon’s potential for rub-
ber plantations. The Companhia Ford Industrial do Brasil acquired a 
2.5- million- acre concession (about 82 percent the size of Connecticut) 
on the Tapajós River in Pará in 1927, which the company named Ford-
lândia. When leaf blight and soil erosion snarled production at Ford-
lândia, Ford traded 703,750 acres in 1934 for land 30 miles upriver at 
Belterra. The Ford plantations boasted millions of rubber trees under cul-
tivation, power plants, paved roads, sawmills, sanitary water, American- 
style architecture, and more than 1,000 buildings.92
While detractors slammed the Ford concession as an imperialist 
beachhead, his supporters in Brazil lauded the industrialist as a capital-
ist with a conscience who would bring social and economic progress to 
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the Amazon.93 Workers and their families received social services such as 
housing, schooling, dental and medical care, pasteurized milk for babies, 
recreational facilities (including movies), and free burials. On- site con-
cessionaries offered food and supplies at low prices, and the company en-
couraged workers to grow their own vegetable gardens. Workers earned a 
wage equivalent of 33 to 66 cents a day—at least twice the current wages 
paid elsewhere in the region, and higher than the wages of stevedores 
and factory workers in Belém—for a workday that began promptly at 
6:30 and ended at 3:30, with one hour for lunch. Clocks installed on the 
premises regimented workers’ schedule, and the company forbade alco-
hol consumption. On a 1938 visit to Belterra, Gastão Cruls gushed at the 
company’s achievements: “there one sees the most clamorous rebuttal 
to those who still assume that it is impossible nowadays to achieve agri-
cultural production in the Amazon . . . our caboclo is affixed for the first 
time to the land, and his hand, which once only knew how to forage and 
pillage, has grown accustomed to the act of planting.”94 Vargas heaped 
similar praise during his visit to the property in 1940.
Ford’s experiment also proved a costly blunder. A 1942 report noted 
that although Ford had expended $9 million in the Amazon over the 
previous twelve years, commercial tapping was only expected to begin 
in Belterra the following season.95 Historian Warren Dean has blamed 
Ford’s woes on South American leaf blight, but the properties also faced 
a chronic labor shortage.96 In 1941, for example, the combined labor force 
at the two estates had climbed to 2,723 from 1,700 three years earlier, 
but a producing plantation of 76,000 acres—the goal of the Ford con-
cession—would require 11,000 tappers alone. Ford, like other bosses in 
the rural Amazon, contended with a workforce accustomed to the rela-
tive autonomy afforded by subsistence agriculture and the extraction of 
wild forest resources, and one that chafed at managerial demands for 
timesaving, regimentation, and temperance reform. The plantations’ 
payroll dropped during the dry months, when wild rubber was extracted 
from the forest, and in response to demand for competing forest com-
modities.97 Archibald Johnston, general manager of the Ford plantations, 
for example, bemoaned that when the price of cumaru (Brazilian teak) 
seeds soared in 1938, three hundred workers abandoned the premises.98 
In vain, Ford endeavored to import laborers from Portugal and north-
eastern Brazil, and reportedly from Puerto Rico as well.99 As a student of 
the Amazonian rubber trade concluded: “Plantation rubber cultivation 
in Amazonia is not impossible—merely uneconomic.”100 The U.S. rub-
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ber firms, largely unresponsive to political pressure to develop sources 
outside of Southeast Asia, long understood this.101 Ford’s debacle in the 
Amazon only confirmed their fears.
Following the Nazi onslaught on France and Holland in the spring of 
1940, political support coalesced for increased government investment 
in the expansion of hemispheric rubber production. While Americans dis-
puted the significance of war in the Pacific and Europe for their country, 
few questioned the expediency of securing access to Latin American raw 
materials to ensure economic stability and military preparedness, and to 
keep Axis influence in the hemisphere at bay. As author John Gunther 
consoled readers in Inside Latin America (1940): “Should the war spread 
to the Far East and cut off the United States from its normal sources 
of rubber, quinine, hemp, and tin, we can only pray that Latin America 
will be a substitute.”102 Or as another U.S. author queried Brazilian offi-
cials in 1940: “Rubber, long the major product of the Amazon, is indis-
pensable in world industry today. With the war in Europe, with Japan’s 
movements in the South Pacific and her consequent threats to cut off 
our trade with the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya, why should the 
United States not turn to your country as its chief source of rubber?”103 In 
fact, between 1939 and 1941, a congeries of U.S. agencies, including the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Inter- American Development 
Commission, the Export- Import Bank, the Department of Agriculture, 
the Airport Development Program, the Office of Inter- American Affairs, 
the Economic Defense Board, and the War Department, aimed to com-
plement or supersede the State Department in strengthening U.S. eco-
nomic, political, and military interests in Brazil.104
In June 1940, Congress passed a bill that provided $500,000 to the De-
partment of Agriculture for the commercial development of rubber pro-
duction in the Western Hemisphere. The USdA’s Bureau of Plant Industry 
and the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations worked out a compre-
hensive program to conduct investigations, principally into the problem 
of leaf blight. Cooperative agreements were signed with fourteen Latin 
American countries as well as several commercial companies; and USdA 
plant scientists traveled to Latin America to survey the suitability for 
Hevea cultivation, health conditions, and wage rates. Experimental and 
demonstration sections were established in the Brazilian Amazon, Cen-
tral America, and the Caribbean to gather and propagate high- yielding 
clones of Hevea and to breed disease- resistant strains; and scientists ap-
plied fungicidal sprays to control leaf blight on the millions of disease- 
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susceptible seedlings growing in experimental nurseries.105 The agree-
ment that Elmer Brandes, head pathologist of the Special Rubber Project 
of the Bureau of Plant Industry, signed with the Brazilian minister of 
agriculture in October 1940, for example, authorized the operation of 
a survey team in the Amazon and the establishment of an experimen-
tal nursery on the grounds of the Instituto Agronômico do Norte (IAN) 
under a mixed Brazilian- American commission. By 1942, more than 
a million seedlings were undergoing trials at IAN, and fifteen million 
throughout Latin America.106
The most prominent domestic supporter of hemispheric rubber devel-
opment was Henry A. Wallace, who served as secretary of agriculture be-
tween 1933 and 1940, and vice president between 1940 and 1944. After 
July 1941, Wallace also chaired the Economic Defense Board, which co-
ordinated the activities of the various agencies involved in the procure-
ment and stockpiling of strategic materials, and in preclusive buying to 
block the Axis from obtaining essential war supplies. A plant geneticist 
and agricultural economist by training, Wallace had premised the suc-
cess of the New Deal at home on policies that favored the scientific man-
agement of agriculture, maximum productivity and distribution, and the 
promotion of international trade and cooperation through low tariffs and 
enforcement of antitrust legislation.107 In this vein, Wallace was a driving 
force behind the creation in 1940 of the Office of Foreign Agricultural 
Relations, which sought to boost agricultural training and complemen-
tary crop production in Latin America to strengthen hemispheric trade 
and defense.108 Between 1930 and 1940, agriculture provided 80 percent 
of Latin American export revenues, but half of these crops competed 
against U.S. products, while American imports of tropical and semitropi-
cal goods from Latin America represented only $16 million of a total 
trade of $236 million. Rubber epitomized a Western Hemisphere tropi-
cal commodity underutilized by U.S. industry: in 1938, for example, the 
U.S. had spent $1 million on rubber imports from all of Latin America, 
in comparison to $119 million from Asia.109
With Brazil producing only 17,480 tons of rubber in 1940—compared 
to 1,392,604 tons in Asia—military analysts and business leaders dis-
missed the Amazon’s capacity to meet short- term domestic needs in the 
event of a crisis.110 U.S. advocates of the hemispheric trade, however, in-
sisted that state- funded scientific research, disease- resistant Hevea trees, 
public health campaigns, and transportation improvements would allow 
the rubber trade to rebound in the Western Hemisphere.111 They endorsed 
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U.S. government policies that made use of a system of quotas and prefer-
ential tariffs, technical assistance, and long- term contracts with foreign 
governments and industries to render Latin American rubber competi-
tive with Asian exports.112 And while conceding the decade- long lag and 
the billions of dollars in expenditures that would be needed for tropical 
America to meet U.S. rubber needs, they stressed its importance for na-
tional defense and inter- American stability. As the USdA’s Agriculture in 
the Americas asserted: “The establishment of a successful [rubber] planta-
tion industry in the Western Hemisphere, along with the encouragement 
of other complementary crops, will go a long way toward improving the 
economic, financial, and social levels in many of the countries. By taking 
advantage of the many resources in Latin America, we will be supplying 
the nations to the south of us with purchasing power needed to create a 
solid foundation for lasting trade relations.”113
Indeed, for the America First Committee, founded in September 1940, 
Amazonian rubber, alongside other Western Hemisphere raw materials, 
would save the United States from apocalypse. Opposed to U.S. involve-
ment in the war—whether Roosevelt’s bids to provide Lend- Lease assis-
tance, escort war supplies to Allied ports, or place economic pressures 
on Japan—America First focused heavily on inter- American trade as an 
alternative to intervention in Old World conflicts. At the time of the at-
tack on Pearl Harbor, the organization contained approximately 250,000 
members (dominated by Republican opponents of the New Deal, but 
spanning the political spectrum), yet through media campaigns and 
rallies, and the furnishing of research data to Congress, America First 
proved highly influential in sustaining an anti- interventionist stance in 
the United States.114 For example, lambasting “alarmists” who claimed a 
Japanese attack on Southeast Asian strategic commodities would cripple 
the U.S. economy, the organization stated: “We need not go to war for 
rubber or tin; American boys need not fight and die in Dong Dang [sic] 
or Bangkok. The Western Hemisphere is self- sufficient in terms of raw 
materials.”115 Or as Senator Robert La Follette of Wisconsin thundered 
in a congressional speech of February 24, 1941: “If to our breath- taking 
resources we add the resources of a friendly Latin America, we emerge 
with rubber as our major deficiency—rubber which was first developed 
in the Western Hemisphere and may now be brought back to satisfy our 
needs. . . . With these fabulous resources, with the man power and ma-
chine power to convert them into goods to satisfy man’s hunger for suste-
nance and significance, we can end the paradox of poverty in the midst of 
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plenty. We can hold aloft a beacon to light the free way of life for all man-
kind.” Praising the USdA’s exploratory rubber surveys in Latin America 
and the October 1941 agreement with Brazil which allowed the U.S. gov-
ernment to purchase its export surplus of rubber, America First boasted 
that “within 10 years, Brazilian production could be restored to its former 
pre- eminence.”116
Dreams of tropical bounty within a Hemisphere of Peace, balms for 
anxious souls or isolationist convictions, were no substitute for concerted 
state policies; they may even have nurtured a false security that hindered 
alternative procurement channels for rubber, exacerbating U.S. unpre-
paredness at the time of Pearl Harbor. Yet government measures favoring 
a Western Hemispheric rubber trade also presented a bold reorientation 
in the global economy and U.S. foreign relations. As journalist Carleton 
Beals noted of the complicity of U.S. corporate and government poli-
cies in sustaining European colonial rubber monopolies: “If a price aver-
age for the past twenty- five years is struck, it will be found that it would 
have been cheaper to pay more for Brazilian rubber, that we could even 
have spent billions to finance a whole rubber industry in South America 
and also a synthetic industry and, as a nation, still have money in our 
pocket.”117 Indeed, the mere $500,000 earmarked by Congress in June 
1940 for rubber field surveys and the establishment of experimental sta-
tions in Brazil and other Western Hemisphere nations—half of the re-
quested funds—reflected the relative weakness of this alternative posi-
tion in business and political circles.
dawn over the amazon: envisioning nature and politics
If global warfare rekindled U.S. interest in the Amazon, contested visions 
of the tropical forest fractured public opinion. Since meaning is produced 
within existing symbolic contexts and prior conceptions of place, most 
Americans prior to Pearl Harbor probably imagined the Amazon as a site 
of degeneration. U.S. imperial ideologies in the Caribbean and the Pacific 
long cast tropical peoples as incapable of self- government, an image 
amply marketed by the media and culture industries.118 In Let’s See South 
America (1939), for example, Anna Witherspoon marveled at the tropical 
forests’ “great variety and abundance of the plant and animal life,” but 
railed that the hot climate and luxuriant landscape led “light- hearted and 
irresponsible” workers to labor “just enough to provide the necessities of 
existence.”119 Of his trek through the tropical forests of South America, 
William La Varre, a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society and the 
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American Geographical Society, noted in 1940: “The jungle is a friend to 
no one. Some men go crazy in the jungle—crazy with the gloom, crazy 
with the heat, crazy with forty days of rain, crazy with themselves.”120 
And Harold Noice’s 1939 account of his rip- roaring Amazon adventure 
began with the tantalizing hook: “Have you ever heard of rivers that run 
black as ink through the depths of the Brazilian jungle? Of man- eating 
fish the size of ordinary trout? Of savages who mix dead men’s bones with 
their beer? You have, have you? Well, so have I, and I’ve seen them too.”121
Other U.S. observers, however, drew inspiration from homespun 
myths of the regenerative power of frontier conquest. In Journey to 
Manaos (1938), for example, geographer Earl Parker Hanson gushed:
The average man can hardly realize how widespread is the idea, even 
in the United States, that the settling of South America would give 
another breathing spell to our civilized world. But, being interested, 
I find myself confronted at every turn by the romantic argument that 
the conquest of South America’s wilderness would do for the Western 
Hemisphere what the conquest of the West did for the United States 
at a critical time. . . . colonization of South America’s interior would 
give a miraculous boost toward prosperity and the consequent release 
of our pent- up spirits.122
Likewise, Carleton Beals’s vision of Amazonian modernization—replete 
with “great air- cooled cities [arising] on the banks of the Amazon and its 
tributaries,” the construction of canals and locks on rivers and expansion 
of air travel, and the cultivation of disease- resistant, high-yield rubber 
strains on small holdings—evoked moral rebirth in the Americas.123 In 
“The Future of the Amazon” (1941), he affirmed: “Certainly until man 
has made a determined and scientific assault upon this region, the New 
World will not have realized its full potentialities; South America cannot 
be said to have reached maturity or to have found its true place as one of 
the great active continents of the earth. Here is one of man’s last great 
physical frontiers. To tame that great wilderness will require the most 
extensive application of political and economic knowledge, the latest in-
struments of science and the noblest aims of human betterment.” The 
forest’s rich natural resources would unlock “fresh secrets for man’s mas-
tery of earth” and heighten “material and spiritual enjoyment therein.”124 
In this vein, Beals’s novel Dawn over the Amazon (1943) featured an in-
trepid U.S. engineer holed up in a fort in the Brazilian forest with a 
group of Latin Americans, defending the South American heartland 
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from a simultaneous German and Japanese invasion.125 The notion of the 
Amazon as patrimony of “mankind” rather than the sovereign territory 
of South American nations has a long history, as does the image of the 
heroic North American protecting the forest.
Henry Wallace’s support for hemispheric rubber development like-
wise traded on the spiritual allure of Latin America. As historian Fred-
erick Pike notes, for a number of U.S. intellectuals and political leaders 
who viewed the Great War and the Depression as punishment for their 
compatriots’ greed, Latin America came to represent wholesome, com-
munal cultures that offered inspiration for national renewal.126 Indeed, 
as Wallace wrote in 1939: “We are challenged to build here in this hemi-
sphere a new culture which is neither Latin American nor North Ameri-
can but genuinely inter- American. Undoubtedly it is possible to build an 
inter- American consciousness and an inter- American culture which will 
transcend both its Anglo- Saxon and its Iberian origins.”127 Contending 
that all cultures of the Western Hemisphere shared “an American be-
lief in a democratic progressive future,” Wallace preached that science, 
capital, and management, under the firm direction of progressive gov-
ernments, could help to create a cooperative hemispheric community.128 
Although by spring 1941 Wallace had shifted back to a firmer internation-
alist position after Roosevelt committed the nation to Lend- Lease, the 
vice president retained a special interest in the economic development, 
democratic consolidation, and cultural mores of Latin America.129
Given the centrality of the frontier in the United States in the formu-
lation of national myths and imperial visions, perhaps more intriguing 
than application of a well- worn cultural gloss to the Amazon were the 
varied meanings that observers imparted.130 Over the course of the late 
1930s and early 1940s, Americans staked the Amazon as arsenal, labora-
tory, shrine, and inferno. For idealists, the remaking of the Amazonian 
landscape not only promised new directions for inter- American trade and 
the U.S. industrial economy, but moral regeneration through mastery of 
nature and cross- cultural fertilization.131 For seekers of El Dorado, the 
use value of the forest lay in “the wealth and money- acquiring oppor-
tunities in the great valley of the Amazon for those willing to make the 
sacrifice imposed by a tropical climate and living difficulties.”132 For iso-
lationists, the forest’s raw materials would stave off catastrophe. And for 
skeptics, the Amazon lurked as an ominous jungle.
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accords and discord in washington
In the wake of the Japanese invasion of Malaya, the U.S. government 
scrambled to find alternative sources for rubber. As noted, the Rubber 
Survey Committee prioritized the creation of a domestic synthetic in-
dustry. Yet crude rubber acquisition remained paramount due to its irre-
placeability for certain industrial applications and the lag in the construc-
tion and operation of synthetic plants. In the Amazon, U.S. policymakers 
favored the expansion of wild production through improved tapping tech-
niques and clearing of forest trails, rather than longer- term plantation 
development. The Office of the Coordinator of Inter- American Affairs 
(OIAA), a government agency headed by Nelson Rockefeller and staffed by 
representatives from the private commercial sector, dispatched seven of 
its agricultural technicians to the Brazilian Amazon in February 1942 to 
gather information on the production and commercialization of wild rub-
ber.133 Consonant with the OIAA’s goal of strengthening U.S. political and 
economic influence in Latin America, Rockefeller vowed to offer long- 
term technical assistance to the Brazilian government in its efforts to de-
velop the Amazon basin and to produce “commodities vital to a rounded 
hemisphere economy and because of the increased purchasing power 
which would be created.”134
On January 28, 1942, Vargas severed diplomatic ties with the Axis. The 
U.S. Joint Army- Navy Board shelved its “Basic Plan for the Occupation 
of Northeastern Brazil” (code- named “Plan Rubber”), a proposed Ameri-
can invasion of Natal, with subsequent landings at Salvador, Belém, and 
Fernando de Noronha, that had been devised after Pearl Harbor to seize 
control of the strategic western hemispheric side of the South Atlantic.135 
In March 1942, the United States signed a series of agreements with 
Brazil that represented the most comprehensive military and economic 
assistance program heretofore attempted in Latin America. The so- called 
Washington Accords provided for a $100 million loan to Brazil to under-
take production of strategic materials; a $14 million loan for development 
of Itabira iron deposits and the Vitória- Minas railroad; a $5 million fund 
to improve the production of raw rubber in the Amazon; and a simi-
lar amount to finance a health and sanitation program in the rubber- 
producing areas (see figure 2.1). The agreements also called for the even-
tual delivery of $200 million worth of military equipment.136 After a spate 
of Nazi attacks on Brazilian merchant marine and passenger ships that 
claimed the lives of thousands of civilians, Vargas declared war on Ger-
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many and Italy on August 22, 1942 (see figure 2.2). Brazil would become 
the only Latin American country to send air and ground troops to Europe, 
dispatching 25,000 members of its armed forces to southern Italy to fight 
alongside the Allies in July 1944.137
To increase Amazon rubber exports, the U.S. government negotiated 
fixed rubber prices to avert sudden price fluctuations, offered expanded 
credit to reduce operating costs, and secured Brazilian consumption 
quotas.138 Under the Washington Accords, Brazil set its annual inter-
nal consumption of raw rubber at 10,000 tons, and agreed to sell the 
United States its exportable surplus of crude rubber for a fixed price until 
December 31, 1946. The initial price of 39 cents per pound for the high-
est grade of rubber (washed and dried Acre fina), applied to purchases for 
consumption within Brazil as well as sales to the United States, was ad-
justed in May 1942 to 45 cents per pound to reflect the rise in the cost of 
living—the equivalent of $4.70 per pound in terms of prices in 2002.139 
In February 1944, the United States applied a price premium of 33.3 per-
cent to Brazil to offset increased production costs, making the effective 
price 60 cents per pound for higher grade rubber. The United States 
also agreed to pay a premium for rubber produced over certain tonnages 
toward a fund to develop rubber plantations in the Amazon, and com-
mitted to buy all of Brazil’s surplus manufactured rubber. The Rubber 
Reserve Company (Rubber Development Corporation) served as the pur-
chasing agency of the U.S. government. In Brazil, the Banco de Crédito da 
Borracha, a government bank created in July 1942 with funding from the 
Brazilian and U.S. governments (60 and 40 percent, respectively), and 
led by a board of directors of four Brazilians and two Americans, acted as 
the sole purchaser of rubber. The bank also provided credit to the opera-
tors of rubber properties for purchase of supplies, clearing of forest trails, 
and cultivation of selected rubber trees.140
Bilateral agreements also aimed to improve health conditions and to 
increase and supply the labor force in the Amazon. A July 1942 accord 
between the OIAA’s Institute of Inter- American Affairs and Brazil’s Min-
istry of Education and Health created the Serviço Especial de Saúde Pú-
blica (SESp), with initial funding of $2 million and $250,000 from each 
agency, respectively.141 Staffed by Brazilian and U.S. health care profes-
sionals, SESp focused on malaria control and medical assistance to tap-
pers; the construction of hospitals in Amazonian cities and medical 
posts in smaller towns; the training of doctors, sanitation engineers, and 
nurses; and sanitation and nutrition campaigns.142 A September 1942 ac-
figure 2.1 Parade in Belém on Brazilian Independence Day in 1943 celebrating the 
Brazilian-U.S. wartime alliance. The top banner reads: “Viva Brazil! The Americas  
United, United Will Triumph, Whatever the Cost.” Source: National Archives.
figure 2.2 Hitler hanged in effigy in Manaus in 1943. Source: National Archives.
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cord between the OIAA and the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture estab-
lished the Brazilian- American Food Supply Division, whose binational 
board sought to improve crop production and nutritional standards in 
the Amazon and northeast in light of the restricted food supplies caused 
by disruptions in coastal shipping.143
Under a December 22, 1942, accord between the Rubber Development 
Corporation (RdC) and the Serviço Especial de Mobilização dos Trabalha-
dores para Amazônia (SEMTA), the Brazilian government agency pledged 
to relocate 50,000 male laborers to the Amazon by May 1943. The RdC 
subsidized the operation at a cost of $100 per man accepted at Belém, 
or a total liability of $5 million. The RdC also agreed to provide funding 
to the Superintendência de Abastecimento do Vale Amazônico (SAvA), 
the wartime agency entrusted with assisting and supplying migrant- 
tappers in the Amazon. An April 1943 agreement between the RdC and 
SAvA committed the former to warehouse and sell foodstuffs and tapping 
supplies at discounted and fixed prices, purchasable only in cash, in the 
larger cities and upriver towns of the Amazon. Valid through December 
1944 (with an option for renewal), the agreement with SAvA set a maxi-
mum profit margin of 15 percent on the resale of RdC goods to tappers, 
and courted local merchants by offering better- priced merchandise than 
established Amazonian firms.144 Under the wartime accords, the Brazil-
ian government retained full jurisdiction for enforcing labor legislation 
and price controls in the Amazon, while U.S. agencies were restricted to 
monitoring conditions and providing technical help for the migration 
project and on the rubber properties.
The efficacy of wartime agencies in transforming socioenvironmen-
tal conditions in the Amazon is examined over the course of subsequent 
chapters. For now, we might underscore that the accords reflected ten-
sions between shorter- term goals for rubber extraction that focused on 
labor and production and long- term development objectives promoting 
health and sanitation, agricultural colonization, and public financing. 
This friction can be said to mirror competing policy objectives of U.S. 
and Brazilian officials respectively in the Amazon, but parsing such divi-
sion along national lines also conceals considerable cross- national like- 
mindedness as well as significant internal divisions.145 Indeed, Brazilian 
government representatives spoke of deep schisms among U.S. policy-
makers (and vice versa). Visiting the United States in 1942, João Alberto 
Lins de Barros, Vargas’s wartime coordinator of economic mobilization, 
noted that the government agencies responsible for formulating policy 
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toward Brazil were like “hermetic compartments, each one struggling 
to assert its supremacy.”146 In fact, such “struggles” among U.S. policy-
makers emanated, in part, from deep conflicts between liberals and con-
servatives over acquisition procedures for raw materials. If both sides 
cast the debate over procurement policies in the Brazilian Amazon as a 
matter of U.S. national security—out of sincere conviction as well as to 
secure congressional funding and popular support—they also drew upon 
and disseminated competing images of the forest.147
Save the amazon: the Board of economic  
warfare’s new deal for the forest
Political wrangling over rubber procurement in the Amazon issued, 
most narrowly, from a jurisdictional overlap between agencies of the 
U.S. government. Since 1940, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
(RfC) had been authorized to create and fund subsidiary corporations 
for advancing national defense, such as the Rubber Reserve Company. 
After the Japanese invasion of Malaya, the press blamed the RfC’s cost- 
conscious, business- oriented approach for contributing to the rubber 
crisis by understocking. Indeed, four months after the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, Rubber Reserve still had only one representative in Brazil.148 
Thus, under Executive Order 9128 of April 13, 1942, Roosevelt vested in 
the Board of Economic Warfare (formerly the Economic Defense Board), 
chaired by Vice President Wallace, complete control for directing the pro-
duction and procurement of all raw materials from abroad. Rubber Re-
serve therein lacked the power to delegate authority, delimit the responsi-
bilities of its field representatives, and earmark the usage of development 
funds without a directive from the Board of Economic Warfare (BEw). In 
theory, Rubber Reserve served as the administrative agency of the gov-
ernment to carry out the plans formulated by the BEw.149 In practice, as 
the banker of the BEw, the RfC retained the power of the purse strings, 
since Roosevelt denied Wallace’s requests for independent funds to pur-
chase strategic supplies. Through delays and parsimony, RfC chairman 
Jesse Jones limited the actions and scope of the board’s procurement pro-
gram, all the while denying access to Rubber Reserve files.150 As BEw di-
rector Milo Perkins later asserted: “We fought the ‘foot- dragging’ tactics 
of Rubber Reserve Company every hour of every day and every week of 
every month. It caused personal tensions but it got rubber development 
work started that was not being pushed aggressively prior to April 13, 
1942.”151 The turf war would last until February 1943.
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But the bureaucratic overlap, in fact, also reflected Roosevelt’s style 
of governance, which aimed at maintaining the uneasy alliance between 
northern liberals and southern conservatives that formed his power base 
in the Democratic Party.152 Jones and Wallace, both longstanding mem-
bers of Roosevelt’s administration, in many ways represented its ideo-
logical poles. Jones, a Houston mogul who had amassed a fortune in lum-
ber, real estate, construction, banking, and media ownership, defended 
low commodity prices, fiscal conservatism, and business interests in the 
Amazon and elsewhere in Latin America. Like other conservatives, Jones 
called for waging economic warfare through private business firms and 
limited government involvement.153 Wallace, on the other hand, endorsed 
higher wages and commodity prices, social policies for Latin American 
producers of raw materials, long- term loans to “industrially backward na-
tions,” and the elevation of regional living standards. Like other liberals, 
Wallace feared that corporate influence in the wartime economy would 
undermine social welfare programs in the United States and future post-
war prospects for international cooperation and popular empowerment. 
To appease conservative Democrats for placing Wallace on the vice presi-
dential ticket, Roosevelt had appointed Jones in 1940 to serve as secre-
tary of commerce. But if Roosevelt would not use the war for the purpose 
of reform and long- term planning, he continued to approve of Wallace’s 
self- assumed role as an adventurous spokesman to test the responses of 
national and international audiences to bolder proposals that he could 
not risk as president.154
Wartime rubber policy became a battleground for the vice president’s 
endeavors to promote long- term economic stability and social justice 
in both the United States and Latin America. For Wallace, “wise rub-
ber statesmanship” aimed for low cost to motorists, certainty of supply, 
and promotion of peace and security through friendly ties with nations 
in the Western Hemisphere. Just as the vice president had denounced 
international cartels that throttled competition and fostered global con-
flict, he now admonished that government- constructed war plants and 
raw material procurement would benefit monopolists rather than small 
businesses. “It is evident that the oil people, interested in building up an 
industry which will be profitable to them,” Wallace wrote of the emergent 
synthetic rubber industry and its reliance on petroleum- based butadiene, 
“sacrificed the national welfare to their own cupidity or ignorance.” And 
since Brazil and other Latin American countries were forging ahead with 
natural rubber production (which Wallace mistakenly believed would 
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soon achieve efficient production due to bud- grafting experiments and 
use of high- yielding strains of Hevea), he worried that a tariff wall would 
force U.S. consumers to pay higher costs for synthetics, and deal “a severe 
blow to these countries and their faith in our friendship.”155 Still, recog-
nizing that the main supply of new rubber during the war would be syn-
thetic, Wallace endorsed government controls to combat price- fixing and 
to ensure greater flexibility in accommodating the economic and political 
concerns of Latin American producers, which he believed private indus-
try would disregard.156
In this vein, the corporate pedigree of officials in the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation and Rubber Development rankled BEw functionar-
ies.157 The long list of suspects included J. W. Brickell, executive vice presi-
dent of Rubber Development, who had overseen the Asian operations of 
the United States Rubber Company; R. B. Bogardus, vice president of the 
RdC, who hailed from the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company; William 
Clayton, the assistant secretary of commerce and director of the for-
eign purchase program of the RfC, who ran the cotton brokerage firm of 
Anderson- Clayton with extensive holdings in Brazil; Maurice McAshan, 
the chief representative of the RfC and vice president of Rubber in Bra-
zil, and Clayton’s son- in- law; and Douglas Allen, president of the RdC, 
whose opposition to higher prices for Brazilian rubber producers, critics 
charged, stemmed from his own firm’s marketing of tropical forest prod-
ucts in the Peruvian Amazon, including rubber allegedly smuggled from 
Brazil into Peru and Bolivia, where it fetched higher prices. As Paul Hays, 
chief of the development branch of the BEw’s rubber division, noted upon 
his return from the Amazon in August 1942: “There is no reason to be-
lieve that because a man has been successful as a subordinate official of 
an American concern handling a venture of limited commercial scope, 
he is going to be able to organize the tremendous problems of supply, 
labor, transportation and production in the Amazon. The emphasis on 
commercial experience, like the emphasis on Brazilian experience, is 
limiting the supply of personnel and producing highly disappointing 
jobs.”158 Board officials also denounced Rubber’s operations in the Ama-
zon for favoring private (Brazilian) firms, restricting U.S. involvement, 
and deferring in commercial matters to the Brazilian government, not-
withstanding its inability to ensure the social welfare of tappers.159
The BEw officials acknowledged the “tremendous administrative job” 
to acquire wild rubber in the Amazon, given the region’s labor short-
age, unhealthy conditions, inadequate supplies, and poor transportation. 
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Yet perhaps for this very reason they deemed the Amazon undertaking, 
with a proposed $200 million annual volume of trade, one of the board’s 
“most significant projects.”160 The board called for higher rubber prices 
and working wages and improved health care for tappers. It demanded 
a more active role for the U.S. government in supplying goods and food-
stuffs and enforcing protective measures for forest laborers.161 And it 
pushed for increased aviation and marine units for the Amazon, in line 
with Wallace’s advocacy of a global version of the early New Deal with vast 
public works projects modeled on the Tennessee Valley Authority and 
programs to build international highways and airways.162
In the BEw’s vision, U.S. financial and technical support would mod-
ernize and moralize Amazonian society, freeing a local market long 
held hostage by monopolies, both domestic and international. Neither 
national character nor tropical miasma foreclosed development of rub-
ber production in the Amazon, but rather the exploitation of tappers by 
bosses, who were themselves disadvantaged by a corporate- dominated 
global trade. But Wallace had also invented a new salvific role for the 
Amazon: its rubber would rescue U.S. citizens from the monopolistic 
clutches of industrial capitalism and the specter of future global conflict. 
Thus, in a rejoinder to Jones, who scoffed at the suggestion that planta-
tion rubber in Latin America might one day be produced for as low as 
ten cents a pound, the vice president shot back: “I told him that if we 
expected to sell anything to the rest of the world after the war, we would 
have to figure out what we could accept from the rest of the world, and 
rubber was one of those things.”163
The vision of a New Deal for the “common man” in the Amazon found 
its popular seer in Charles Wilson’s Trees and Test Tubes (1943). In his 
global history of the rubber industry, Wilson bemoaned that while tire 
workers in Ohio earned good wages, “their employment had long been 
desperately imperiled by the serfdom, peonage, and bitter poverty of the 
hundreds of thousands of unknown, dark- skinned workers on the other 
side of the earth—those other men of rubber whose sweat, toil, and suf-
fering have made possible most of the indispensable motion of Ameri-
can life and trade, as well as the existence of tires and the tireworker 
of Akron.” Championing the right of tappers to wages compatible with 
those earned by the manufacturers of rubber goods, Wilson argued that 
support for small- scale rubber producers would distinguish U.S. foreign 
policy from exploitative European colonial practices: “Western Hemi-
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sphere rubber lands can be and will be lands of free men and private 
ownership; the growing of rubber can and will merge into a new and 
better order of hemisphere agriculture and trade—an order free of the 
anarchies of international cartels and other devices begotten from the ex-
orbitant profit of a self- chosen and usually absent few at the price of the 
economic and political subjugation of multitudes of tropical peoples.”164
Liberals’ wartime vision for the Amazon reflected an agenda aimed 
at restraining corporate capitalism and uplifting the poor worldwide. To 
be sure, the global New Deal envisioned by Wallace sought to buttress 
American private enterprise, not to bury it. As Wallace affirmed: “Ameri-
can capital can play a great constructive role—and a profitable role—in 
the development of the economies of other countries. It will provide us 
with enormous postwar foreign markets. For our greatest markets are 
in prosperous, industrialized countries.”165 His endorsement of U.S. 
government aid for developing nations heralded the postwar mandate 
of the U.S. Agency for International Development, while his defense of 
workers’ rights in the Amazon resonates in the contemporary struggles 
of human rights and labor activists. Reflecting a mix of Christian ideal-
ism and Woodrow Wilson’s internationalism, Wallace envisioned a future 
in which peace and abundance would grace all peoples.166
Like Woodrow Wilson, however, Wallace endeavored to remake for-
eign nations in a (progressive) U.S. mold. Similar accusations have been 
leveled at Nelson Rockefeller—Wallace’s key foreign policy ally (and 
tennis partner)—for promoting the Americanization of Latin Ameri-
can societies through public health programs, agricultural moderniza-
tion, market growth without the redistribution of wealth, and expanded 
opportunities for U.S. business.167 Indeed, while the BEw assumed re-
sponsibility for U.S. development activities in wartime Latin America, 
including overseas technical missions to stimulate the provision and ac-
quisition of foreign materials, the OIAA oversaw programs focused on 
medical services, sanitation reforms, and agricultural production.168
American officials’ modernization project for the Amazon conformed 
as well to a certain imperial vision that has viewed colonies as laborato-
ries for social engineering by scientists, medical personnel, technicians, 
missionaries, and educators.169 In the context of Amazonian history, the 
BEw program perpetuated a time- honored tradition of outsiders to view 
the region as a tabula rasa. New Deal internationalists not only underesti-
mated the capacity of the Amazon trade to resist restructuring accord-
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ing to market principles and state regulation, but the opposition of U.S. 
conservatives to public policies that challenged their vested interests and 
core beliefs.170
the rubber development corporation and  
the amazonian heart of darkness
Averse to increased regulation of the domestic economy even in wartime, 
conservatives assailed liberal proposals for government assistance to up-
lift the poor worldwide.171 W. P. Witherow, president of the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers, grumbled that he was “not fighting for a quart 
of milk for every Hottentot, or for a TvA on the Danube, or for govern-
mental handouts for free Utopia.”172 The Chicago Tribune chided that “the 
mystic Mr. Wallace” was “engaged in dreams which should invite more 
skepticism than admiration.” And Martin Dies, a Texan Democratic con-
gressman who chaired the Un- American Activities Committee, alleged 
that a number of top officials in the BEw were affiliated with the Commu-
nist Party.173 But one of Wallace’s staunchest opponents was Jesse Jones.
In his postwar memoirs, Jones claimed that the procurement policies 
of RfC subsidiaries, working closely with foreign and multinational capi-
tal, had spared taxpayer money and the rubber program from national 
scandal.174 Unlike proponents of “big government” at the BEw with their 
projects to “Americanize the Amazon,” Rubber Reserve argued that limit-
ing U.S. personnel and technical assistance in the Amazon would avoid 
“unnecessary interference with the habits and customs of the people,” 
including social reform, “except in so far as such reforms had a direct 
bearing on productivity of labor.”175 Whereas liberals argued that the in-
clusion of social welfare policies in foreign procurement dealings would 
incentivize worker productivity, conservatives lambasted the use of U.S. 
political and economic influence to improve social conditions abroad as 
a government handout and a sure- fire bet to antagonize bosses and radi-
calize labor.176 And while liberals charged that low rubber prices would 
deter tappers from producing latex, conservatives contended that high 
prices would prompt loafing.177 In any event, argued Rubber Develop-
ment president Douglas Allen, direct American action might succeed in 
a controllable operation, such as a mine, factory, or plantation, but rela-
tions of production in the forest would resist fundamental overhaul by 
U.S. officials.178 Moreover, given Brazil’s geopolitical anxieties regarding 
the Amazon, Rubber Reserve and the Department of Commerce con-
demned positions that might arouse suspicions regarding an “American 
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invasion, such as suggestions to turn over to U.S. officials the handling of 
immigration and transportation problems in the Amazon.”179
Efforts to transform the Amazonian raw rubber trade through the 
elimination of middlemen and institution of wage labor during the turn- 
of- the- century boom had indeed foundered on the shoals of socioenvi-
ronmental conditions.180 Yet wartime conservatives’ pleas for cultural 
relativism in the Amazon, stemming from probusiness bent and Brazil-
ian diplomatic pressure rather than anthropological sensitivity, skirted 
the fundamental question of U.S. government commitment to fair labor 
standards in Latin America.181 Conservatives’ deference to Brazilian sov-
ereignty in matters of social policy was self- serving given their dispar-
agement of the “fiction of the truly Brazilian character” of ad hoc agen-
cies cobbled together to meet the exigencies of diplomatic accords.182 It 
was also rather selective given the substantial wartime infusion of U.S. 
capital and government personnel into the Amazon region. Nor did crit-
ics of “big government” in the Amazon object to U.S. corporations reap-
ing future windfalls from a synthetic rubber industry subsidized by hun-
dreds of millions of dollars of public monies.183 Conservatives’ position 
toward the Amazon foreshadowed postwar U.S. foreign policy prescrip-
tions for Latin American nations, promoting free market principles to 
stimulate economic development rather than commodity agreements 
and government subsidies.184
The repudiation of New Deal internationalism in the Amazon re-
flected as well deep- seated cynicism regarding the prospect of ameliorat-
ing forest workers’ living standards. In his memoirs, Jesse Jones pilloried 
Henry Wallace and his “social- reformer colleagues” for their belief that 
improved living conditions in the Amazon would have led to increased 
rubber production. Mocking Wallace’s alleged suggestion that providing 
350,000 tons of staple foodstuffs to the Amazonian rural poor (includ-
ing flour fortified with vitamins) would have ensured greater tapper pro-
ductivity, Jones retorted: “The people down there, like most people all 
over the world, work only because they want to eat. If they were fed free, 
many of them would do no work at all and, therefore, there would be 
little or no rubber.” Jones also (falsely) charged that the BEw’s support 
for fair labor clauses would have compelled Latin American producers 
to pay wages with sufficient purchasing power to equal the North Ameri-
can scale, and to supply “‘social’ benefits” that violated the sovereignty 
of foreign nations and interfered “with the eating, housing, hygienic and 
working habits of their peoples.” To make his point, Jones chose what he 
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probably believed to be Wallace’s most ludicrous proposal: the notion that 
“it would make for a happier world to teach the Indians in the jungles of 
the Amazon to grow vegetables in the North American manner” when 
in fact they were accustomed “in their innocent content with a cornmeal 
and frijole [sic] diet.”185 Aside from a poor understanding of Amazonian 
society—citing cornmeal and beans rather than manioc as dietary staples 
of populations that were overwhelmingly non- Indian—Jones rehashed 
the image of the tropical forest as a site of decadence. In blaming tappers 
for their plight, rather than the exploitative socioeconomic conditions of 
a region disadvantaged within the broader global division of labor, Jones 
articulated a cynical (and cyclical) view of rural Amazonians as deadbeats 
whose marginality was both inevitable and merited.
As David Harvey notes, “The denigration of others’ places provides a 
way to assert the viability and incipient power of one’s own.”186 Indeed, a 
number of scholars have noted that “tropicality” has served as a foil for 
purported European and North American essences of industriousness 
and rationality.187 Notwithstanding significant U.S. intervention in Ama-
zonia during wartime, conservatives perpetuated the idea of a distant 
and different place whose populations were deficient and impervious to 
change.
The showdown between Wallace and Jones (and their respective con-
stituencies) will be discussed in chapter 5, which examines struggles 
over public policies and narratives in the wartime Amazon. For now, we 
might conclude that although both Jones and Wallace were internation-
alist in seeking to spread American ideals—endorsing free trade and an 
integrated international system—their visions of the Amazon (and the 
Americas) differed significantly. Whereas Wallace aimed to efface the 
legacy of past injustice in Amazonia under the promise of future libera-
tion, Jones sneered at efforts to accord the region such historical signifi-
cance. Whereas Wallace’s paternalism stressed Amazonian redemption 
through U.S.- led reform, Jones deemed the native population as refrac-
tory to uplift. If capitalism tends toward both equalization and differen-
tiation in the production of nature and geographic space, Wallace and 
Jones embodied its Janus- faced profile.188
In his radio speech of June 12, 1942, Franklin Delano Roosevelt deliv-
ered an urgent message. “I want to talk to you about rubber, about rub-
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ber and the war, about rubber and the American people,” the president 
solemnly pronounced. With an anxious nation at war, Roosevelt broke 
the bad news that the United States had lost over 90 percent of its rub-
ber supply—a material essential to “build the planes to bomb Tokyo and 
Berlin” and to “build the tanks to crush the enemy wherever we may find 
him.” Launching an intensive two- week coast- to- coast collection drive, 
Roosevelt enjoined citizens to turn in old rubber articles at the nation’s 
gas stations. The petroleum industry offered donors a penny a pound 
for the scrap rubber, which was transported to central collection points, 
sold to Rubber Reserve, and reprocessed to meet military and civilian 
needs. Although far from the battlefields of Europe, North Africa, and the 
Pacific, the war had literally come home as Roosevelt urged Americans 
to comb their cellars, barns, stock rooms, garages, and attics in search 
of rubber, and to conserve tires by driving more slowly and limiting car 
usage. “This is serious,” the president noted of the rubber emergency, “I 
know the nation will respond.”189
The nation did respond. Ten- year- old Sheila McAuliffe from Los Ange-
les sent her donation directly to the president: a piece of raw rubber that 
her father had obtained for her two years earlier from the Firestone Com-
pany when she was learning about Brazil in school. “I am now sending 
it to you because our country needs it and I’ll get another sample when 
we’ve won the war,” she wrote.190 In the Los Angeles Coliseum, 80,000 
people gathered for a rubber rally, where “an inspired matron” publicly 
removed her girdle and tossed it on the scrap pile. Actresses gave up 
rubber bathing suits, children donated their toys, and Falla, Roosevelt’s 
dog, surrendered his rubber bones.191 Roosevelt ultimately ordered a ten- 
day extension of the campaign, netting approximately 450,000 tons of 
scrap rubber—almost seven pounds of rubber for each man, woman, 
and child.
The scrap rubber campaign encapsulated a number of wartime trends 
in the United States: the rationing or recycling of goods; individual sacri-
fice on behalf of the national interest; and the importance of the federal 
government, in tandem with big business, in spearheading industrial 
production and the distribution of consumer goods. But the undertaking 
also reflected another aspect of wartime conversion: the failure of the 
United States to diversify rubber sources to lessen overreliance on South-
east Asian supplies. Recycled rubber, lacking adequate elasticity, served 
primarily in the production of lower- grade automobile tires and recap-
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ping of existing tires. It was inappropriate for usage in heavy vehicles and 
aircraft and could not address long- term needs.
Interwar patterns of rubber acquisition and application in the United 
States are also critical for understanding the government’s involvement 
in the Brazilian Amazon during World War II. As we have examined, 
although the United States was a “have not” nation when it came to rub-
ber, the failure to diversify sources of natural latex, increase government 
stockpiles, and develop synthetics left the country deeply vulnerable to 
Japanese disruption of traditional supplies. While wartime policymakers 
prioritized the creation of a synthetic industry, the prospective shortage 
of rubber for military and civilian needs also propelled U.S. officials to 
the Amazon, and the forest to the American political landscape. If na-
tions of the Northern Hemisphere have endeavored to secure or substi-
tute tropical resources, their projects for the Amazon have shifted accord-
ing to fluctuating consumer demands.192
War- era views of the Amazon in the United States also drew upon an 
assortment of myths regarding tropical and temperate America. Tropical 
landscapes long inspired visions of paradise or perdition, while the gen-
dered romance of the western frontier conjured promises of economic 
opportunities and moral regeneration. Yet amidst the crisis of industrial 
capitalism, the advent of the welfare state, and global warfare, images of 
El Dorado or Green Hell acquired new messengers and meanings. New 
Dealers favored state regulation and subsidies to modernize the raw rub-
ber trade, achieve enduring social reform, and offset monopolistic con-
trol by the emerging synthetic industry. Conservatives defended busi-
ness prerogatives in the Amazon, corporate concentration in the United 
States, and the maintenance of the international division of labor. In-
deed, if we view the ideal of the Western Hemisphere as a geographic 
concept rooted in nineteenth- century anticolonial movements that 
has sparked varied socioeconomic, cultural, spiritual, and geopolitical 
visions, the Amazon embodied its extremes for prominent U.S. wartime 
observers.193 For Jesse Jones, the alterity of the forest epitomized and per-
petuated vast, unbridgeable divides between North and South America. 
For Henry Wallace, the complementarity of Amazonian nature promised 
a shared future of peace, prosperity, and social justice.
Analysis of the circulation and application of rubber in the inter-
war and wartime United States reveals a host of human and nonhuman 
mediators—rubber manufacturers, automakers, and automobile tires; 
chemists, botanists, and industrial workers; bureaucrats, journalists, 
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and social reformers; advertisers, consumers, and drivers—that have im-
parted uses and meanings to nature and politics in the Amazon. Indeed, 
a transnational focus not only underscores the fundamental linkages be-
tween commodity producers and consumers, and the uneven impact of 
natural resource dependence, but frictions between geographic outsiders 
and locals in fashioning the Amazon.
ChApTER 3
rUBBer’S “SoldIerS”
Reinventing the Amazonian Worker
distressed properties, overgrown forest trails, profits wrung from commercial exchange rather than economies of scale, 
and a sparse, footloose workforce often earning less than the cost 
of food and supplies: the challenges to increase latex output in the 
Amazon confounded wartime officials. During the previous boom, 
observers noted that rubber yields were nearly immune to price 
fluctuations since tappers controlled the means of production. 
Neither the extraction nor the processing of rubber, which owed to 
the common knowledge shared by tappers, required the presence 
of specialists.1 Moreover, tapping occurred almost exclusively in 
the dry summer months between June and December, since heavy 
precipitation during the winter bedeviled the coagulation of latex 
and access to trees; in the rainy season, tappers turned to other 
extractive activities, such as gathering Brazil nuts, or retreated to 
the nearest village or a small plot of farmland on the terra firme.2 
Wartime government guarantees of fixed rubber prices and below 
market supplies aimed to boost yields, but increased capitalization 
and regulation of the Amazon rubber trade would matter little if 
bosses eschewed expansion, tappers remained scarce and wedded 
to their work rhythms and subsistence patterns, and suppliers 
failed to synchronize shipments with seasonal fluctuations.
In 1940, government officials estimated there were 34,000 
“active tappers” in the Amazon—based upon annual production 
of 16,000 to 18,000 tons of rubber, rather than official census 
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data—although worker output varied widely.3 Along the Hevea- rich Juruá 
River near the Tarauacá watershed, for example, U.S. wartime techni-
cians carped that production per tapper (seringueiro) ranged from 100 to 
1,000 kilos annually, with workers cutting rubber anywhere from 10 to 
120 days during the six- month dry season.4 Such inconsistency led U.S. 
officials to bemoan:
The seringueiros work only about one half the available working days 
for various reasons, some of which are: Sunday is a religious holiday, 
Thursday is Seringueiro day and his day to do what he pleases, every 
Saint’s day must be celebrated and usually for more than one day; then 
if it looks like rain he can’t work, if he feels a little bad he can’t work 
for there is no one to tell him that he must, and deep down in his heart 
he has the idea that no matter how hard he works that the boss will get 
all his money anyway.5
Brazilian observers likewise condemned the “inertia” of the Amazonian 
caboclo as a “physiological, psychological, and social vice.”6 The forest 
dwellers’ catholic embrace of subsistence and market participation, con-
flation of realms of work and leisure, and apparent contentment with a 
spartan lifestyle impelled government officials to scour for new laborers 
to fit the bill. The employment scouts devised a splotchy calculus of racial 
and ethnic pedigree, physical and psychological make- up, and environ-
mental adaptability.
This chapter explores the binational wartime efforts at remaking Ama-
zonian workers and their relationship to the natural environment. As a 
U.S. Department of Commerce official noted in May 1942: “It will require 
great, and constantly vigilant, manpower to regiment the Amazon. The 
jungle never gives way to man, unless there are more men than trees.”7 
The Vargas regime, in promoting the March to the West, had preached 
the same for several years, echoing an old lament of Portuguese colonial 
officials and Brazilian imperial leaders. Now, a rubber emergency left 
U.S. policymakers shouting too that the Amazon labor force required 
greater numbers and doers, even as they bickered among themselves and 
with Brazilian officials over the profile of the recruits and strategies to 
maximize productivity.
Galvanizing agents from high offices in Washington and Rio de Janeiro 
to small towns in the Amazonian hinterland and northeastern back-
lands, publicity for the rubber campaign employed radio, film, posters, 
print media, advertisements, contests, church sermons, and public cere-
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monies to recruit labor and popularize the program. In promising fi-
nancial returns, government assistance, and patriotic laurels, boosters 
sought to promote tapping not only by expanding the labor force but by 
modifying its social meanings.8 Gone was the historic death trap for mili-
tary conscripts and migrants.9 Gone was the Amazon’s notoriety as penal 
exile for criminals and political prisoners and a lair of wayward or traf-
ficked women. Gone was the inferno of “jungle novels” and sensationalist 
journalism.10 Gone was the image of the Brazilian state as a coercive or 
shadowy force in the lives of the poor, endlessly parodied in popular verse 
in the unwelcome figure of the tax collector, inspector, judge, police offi-
cer, and military recruiter.11 Amazonia was no longer “the green hell of 
yore but now the promised land.”12 Debt peonage and worker disenfran-
chisement would wither away as migrant- tappers bloomed into remuner-
ated servicemen and rights- bearing citizens. Outside specialists would 
rectify native mismanagement or neglect of natural resources.
More broadly, the rubber campaign trumpeted the reconstitution of 
politics in Brazil and the United States. Amazonia lay a long way off from 
the centers of political power in both North and South America, but its 
proper regimentation could be brought home to viewers, listeners, and 
readers in São Paulo or St. Paul as a marker of good government and 
(inter)national unity. For the modernizing Vargas regime, the remaking 
of the Amazonian landscape entailed a political rite of feudal exorcism. 
For U.S. emissaries, a Good Neighbor’s technology and capital transfers 
would wow the public in Brazil and at home, extend the Eagle’s shadow 
over the heart of South America, and civilize the natives. In both coun-
tries, the Amazonian program became a matter of national security: U.S. 
press coverage of the Rubber Development Corporation’s operations in 
the Amazon required clearance from Washington, while Brazil’s Na-
tional Security Council screened prospective employees in the rubber 
program.13
The wartime manufacture and sale of public policies in the forest, as 
we will explore, represented an exercise in (mis)adventure. They reflected 
what James C. Scott has termed a “high modernist” ideology, or the pro-
clivity of state planners to standardize and oversimplify the variability of 
the human and natural environment.14 In the context of Amazonian his-
tory, they exhibited the longstanding tendency of outsiders to imagine 
the region in Manichaean terms rather than to contend with some of the 
contingencies and ambiguities examined herein.15 Wartime programs, 
however, also had a marked impact on Amazonian history. Binational 
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governmental efforts underwrote the transfer of tens of thousands of 
migrants to the Amazon. And although a chasm separated recruitment 
goals from outcomes, and legislation from enforcement, wartime poli-
cies also reveal how fledgling welfare states in the Americas aspired to 
standardize the social rights and obligations of citizens in seemingly the 
most unlikely of places.
confronting modes of production and exchange  
in the amazon rubber trade
Historian Barbara Weinstein’s seminal study of the great Amazon rub-
ber boom (c. 1850–1910) analyzed the trade’s pyramidal structure and 
non- capitalist mode of production. At the base was the tapper, who typi-
cally tended to two trails, connecting between 100 and 200 rubber trees 
in the form of loops of perhaps some four miles in length, and worked 
on alternate days. Rubber trails (estradas) constituted significant human 
interventions in the forest. Wide, cleared of vegetation, and dotted with 
bridges and steps linking trees, the meandering loops comprised an arti-
ficial landscape underneath the forest canopy that clearly differed from 
the narrower, straighter, and more trodden paths in the forest.16 Armed 
with a tapping knife, a rifle, and a poronga (kerosene lamp), the serin-
gueiro set out in the predawn hours along a trail, slashing each tree and 
inserting a small metal bowl to gather the oozing latex (see figure 3.1). 
In the afternoon, he made a second round to retrieve the accumulated 
liquid, netting some twenty to thirty liters of latex for a trail with 120 
trees, and returning to his residence, a hut made of paxiuba wood and a 
thatch roof and constructed on piles. In the smokehouse in his yard, the 
tapper placed burning palm nuts beneath an inverted cone open at the 
top (see figure 3.2); using the smoke that poured through the opening, 
he hardened the latex by rotating it on a wooden paddle. This produced 
a péla, or oblong ball of fine rubber, weighing between thirty and fifty 
kilos.17
A tapper’s expertise resided in his ability to execute closely spaced in-
cisions of a precise depth that kept the tree healthy and maximized the 
amount of latex yielded over the long run. While a skilled tapper would 
use procedures appropriate for each tree—considering the resistance of 
the outer bark to the blade, the format of the trunk, and his own knowl-
edge and manual dexterity—an incompetent worker might damage rub-
ber trees due to errors with incision, the division of the trunk, or the tap-
ping schedule. Thus, aggressive tapping might double output, but could 
figure 3.1 Early twentieth- 
century photograph of 
Amazon seringueiro 
beside Hevea with tapped 
tree panel. Upon making 
his second round on the 
forest trail to collect latex 
tapped earlier in the day, 
the seringueiro would pour 
the contents from smaller 
bowls into an aluminum 
bucket. The tapper relied 
on a rifle for protection 
and for hunting, and 
stored food or medicinals 
gathered during the trek in a 
jamanxim, a straw backpack. 
Source: Departamento de 
Patrimônio Histórico e 
Cultural do Estado do Acre.
figure 3.2 Tapper smoking rubber with palm nuts. Source: Departamento de Patrimônio 
Histórico e Cultural do Estado do Acre.
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destroy the tree after two to three years. In this sense, the alternate- day 
and seasonal tapping schedules decried by observers as a mark of indo-
lence may be viewed as a form of productive investment.18
Tappers delivered their weekly or monthly output of rubber to the 
main trading post (barracão), controlled by either a large landholder 
(seringalista) who leased the trails to them, or a local merchant (see figure 
3.3). Rubber devoid of impurities would be classified as Acre fina; rub-
ber that coagulated improperly or with visible impurities (entrefina), and 
strips and pieces of rubber that had hardened naturally (sernambi), com-
manded lower prices (see figure 3.4). Tappers’ compensation typically 
came in the form of goods or credit, often under unfavorable systems of 
exchange: many tappers became saddled with debt as bosses deducted a 
significant percentage of the market value of rubber for transport costs 
and taxes, and overcharged for food and supplies. The seringalista then 
shipped the pélas directly to one of the major urban centers in the Ama-
zon, if the trading post had a wharf where steamboats could dock. If not, 
or if the boss received cash and goods from a merchant of a wet and dry 
goods store in a nearby town who served as an agent for a larger commer-
cial firm, the rubber would be sent to the local merchant. Rubber would 
then be placed on a ship owned by a state- subsidized company or a large 
rubber trading firm and, upon arrival downstream, stored in the ware-
house of a commercial firm (aviador), inspected for impurities, crated, 
and prepared for export. Aviadores sold the rubber to the export houses—
the first time that transaction occurred on a cash basis—who served as 
agents for buying firms in the United States and Europe, and who de-
termined rubber prices. The aviadores also contracted with importing 
houses to distribute goods to small- town merchants, seringalistas, and 
tappers; advanced credit for goods, tools, and labor to open up new rub-
ber districts or set up commercial contacts; arranged for the transport 
and distribution of northeastern migrant labor; and acted as legal and 
financial agents for wealthier clients upriver.19
With the interwar ascendancy of Asian rubber, a downturn in the 
Amazonian trade weakened ties between the productive zones and 
market centers.20 Overall rubber output dropped. For example, on the 
Abunã River, the well- stocked tributary of the Madeira, rubber produc-
tion plunged from around 2,000 tons annually during the boom years to 
750 tons by 1941.21 Similarly, between 1912 and 1915 an estimated 3,200 
seringueiros on the Javary and its affluents delivered 1,800 tons annually, 
but by 1941, there were fewer than 1,200 tappers producing 365 tons.22
figure 3.3 Photograph of Seringal Remanso in Acre from early twentieth century. The 
barracão (trading post) is the larger building in the center. Source: Departamento de 
Patrimônio Histórico e Cultural do Estado do Acre.
figure 3.4 Owner and manager of seringal undertaking inspection and weighing of rubber. 
Source: Departamento de Patrimônio Histórico e Cultural do Estado do Acre.
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Many upriver workers migrated to the relatively rubber- free areas 
along the Solimões River, where they cultivated tobacco, manioc, and jute 
and grazed cattle.23 In his 1927 survey of the Solimões (Middle Amazon) 
region, for example, Father Constant Tastevin found that the communi-
ties of Coary, Tefé, and Fonte Boa boasted 30,000 inhabitants, whereas 
eighty years earlier the entire river had barely 5,000. Among the new-
comers, he noted, were Cearenses from seringais on the Juruá, Jutahy, or 
Japurá who had resettled on the Solimões “where life is easier and more 
independent, as the capital is closer and imported merchandise cheaper 
while exports are less burdened with transportation costs.”24 Likewise, 
during his visit to the Solimões in the early 1930s, geographer Robert 
Platt reported on the Cordeiro family, a couple with two young children 
“of mixed Negro and Indian stock” that lived in a palm- thatch hut on 
two recently cleared acres of forest about ten miles north of Manaus. He 
speculated that the family belonged to the rubber- gathering population 
of the upriver regions, but had since turned to marketing charcoal and 
cassava in the city, and growing beans, pineapples, and other food crops 
for subsistence. In the upriver rubber zones, residents turned to other 
extractive commodities and forms of subsistence. For example, at Per-
pétuo Socorro, located thirty miles from Brazil’s western border, tappers 
continued to deliver rubber to the trading post, where they received cloth 
and knives as payment from the trader. But they also furnished wood to a 
steamer making monthly trips to Manaus; fished in flood- plain lakes for 
the sturgeonlike pirarucu (dried on open- air platforms and marketed); 
hunted peccaries (whose hides were commercialized as pigskin leather); 
and wove hammocks from palm fiber. Bananas, manioc, sugarcane, and 
corn grew on several acres of cleared land near the trader’s house, and 
residents had planted the same crops on their own plots.25
By 1940, the terms of exchange for some tappers may also have 
loosened somewhat. The more “traditional” setup, said to predominate 
in the state of Amazonas at the time of Pearl Harbor, obliged the serin-
gueiro to deliver all of his rubber to the boss, who in turn consigned 
the rubber for sale in Manaus or Belém, deducting 20 percent of the 
sale value in compensation for rent, maintenance, and transportation. 
Under this arrangement, the seringueiro had to purchase all of his sup-
plies from the boss, who defended goods sold with markups of no less 
than 100 percent as reasonable charges to cover the steep cost of freight, 
insurance, warehousing, and distribution.26 The economic bust had also 
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brought about another arrangement, said to predominate in the federal 
territory of Acre. Lacking access to credit, seringalistas charged tappers 
an annual rent of 30 to 60 kilograms of rubber for every two or three 
trails that they worked but allowed them to purchase merchandise from 
peddlers (regatões), whose sales prodded bosses to reduce markup by as 
much as 50 percent.27
War- era observers, however, undoubtedly overdrew the distinction 
between hidebound Amazonas and liberalized Acre, since systems of 
exchange in the rubber trade long varied from one seringal, river, and 
region to another. Moreover, tappers’ pooled labor and varied uses of 
forest resources helped to sustain communities both under and outside 
formal trade regimens. Indeed, Mauro Barbosa de Almeida’s fine- grained 
ethnographic study of the rubber tappers of the upper Juruá River from 
the 1980s details the constitution of an Amazon forest peasantry orga-
nized in colocações, or settlement areas, containing anywhere from one 
to four houses. Although each house might not have contained a nuclear 
family, most members were relatives, who pooled labor and took de-
tailed decisions over the volume of rubber production, the use of labor 
time, and the exploitation of trails. Tapping groups, for example, con-
sisted of household heads and available male labor; women and older 
children who gathered latex during short periods and usually during the 
daylight hours; and even hired men who worked in teams of two with the 
household head. And rather than isolated families linked only to a trad-
ing post, extended networks composed of several linked macrohouses 
served to reinforce real and fictive kin relations, constituting spheres of 
interaction within which people cooperated in household or yard chores, 
shared meat, exchanged gifts, held parties, found marriage partners, and 
joined together to face conflicts. Residents’ extensive knowledge of for-
est ecosystems shaped varied niches of activity, whether hunting, fishing, 
gathering, extracting, or planting.28
Struggles on the Seringais
As during the great boom, war- era rubber bosses struggled against the 
spatial distribution and autonomy of tappers, the vicissitudes of nature, 
the dearth of capital, and the tenuousness of state power in the rural 
Amazon. Debt peonage, for example, may have enslaved workers in iso-
lated cases and locations, but tappers were too mobile and often too re-
mote to be trapped by debt, and the use of legal channels for debt re-
covery was too onerous.29 In the 1940s, for example, João Antonio de 
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Oliveira did bring criminal charges against tapper Artur Batista dos San-
tos for the theft of his canoe, which the latter had appropriated after 
being denied permission to take his ailing wife to the Hospital de Per-
pétuo Socorro in Guajará- Mirim, and which was set adrift following the 
couple’s disembarkation in town. Oliveira’s resolve to pursue criminal 
charges— despite Santos’s offer to debit the value of the canoe from his 
account—may have stemmed from anger at the tapper’s disobedience 
and was certainly facilitated by his relative proximity to law enforcement 
in the border town.30 Similarly, creditors managed to obtain judgment 
for a public auction in Rio Branco, Acre, of tapper Francisco Fausto’s 
goods—including 5 pélas of rubber marked “Fausto” weighing 230 kilos, 
and a Winchester rifle and cartridges.31 Yet far more commonplace for 
parties contemplating the courtroom for debt recovery were the hurdles 
that confronted the denizens of Brasiléia, Acre: the nearest judge was a 
four- to five- day journey away.32 In any event, debtors had few assets to 
seize. When tapper Antonio Silva died on the Rio São Domingos, he left 
behind one old canoe, two 16- caliber rifles, and one broken guitar, as well 
as his hut and smokehouse. When José Antonio do Nascimento died in 
1943, his worldly belongings consisted of one mosquito net, two fishing 
nets, two pairs of pants, two pairs of underwear, one pair of old shoes, 
four plates, two enamel mugs, two pots, a small knife, a tin of lard, eight 
hooks, eight bullets, half a can of gunpowder, a small hammer, a hoe, an 
alarm clock, a container of hair brilliantine, two cruzeiros in specie, an 
umbrella, a broken rifle, and a balance of 395 cruzeiros with his boss.33 
Many bosses undoubtedly resembled Frederico Machado in Barcellos, 
who lamented to the Manaus- based forwarding firm of J. G. Araújo in 
1941: “Our customers [ fregueses] here only pay us when they want to be-
cause they have nothing to guarantee their accounts with us except for 
their labor and we do not have laws that require them to work until they 
pay off their debts.”34
Amazon bosses might also threaten or resort to violence to coerce or 
retain labor.35 Irishman Roger Casement’s shocking 1910 report, com-
missioned by the British government, denounced the pervasive brutaliza-
tion of the indigenous labor force in the Amazonian rubber trade.36 Like-
wise, in the 1920s, Father Tastevin noted that the population loss on the 
upper Juruá owed to “the drop in rubber prices, and the abuse of certain 
bosses who beat their workers with iron cables.”37 And in March 1943, a 
Porto Velho newspaper recounted the case of six tappers who had fled the 
Seringal Palmeiras because they feared being enslaved but were captured 
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en route by the boss’s posse on the Rio Candeias, where several casualties 
ensued.38 Throughout the Amazon today, stories abound of bosses who 
tortured and murdered tappers with impunity.39
Yet seringalistas also had compelling reasons to eschew systematic 
violence as a mechanism to ensure social control.40 Armed with knives 
and hunting rifles, tappers might retaliate with physical violence or de-
struction of property.41 Thus, José Pereira da Silva, a seringalista with a 
reputation for “using violence against his tappers, as almost all of his 
former tappers could corroborate,” was physically assaulted in Guajará- 
Mirim by a former worker after the boss refused to pay for the construc-
tion of a hut that he had commissioned. At the trial of Silva, who stabbed 
the worker in “self- defense,” one of the witnesses noted that the boss 
“had long been threatened with beatings and aggression by some of his 
ex- seringueiros, who refuse to pay up their accounts, fleeing at collec-
tion time and even going to work for new bosses without his approval.”42 
Indeed, Silva alleged that his assailant had mutilated rubber trees with 
“monstrous chops” and uprooted manioc prior to leaving the seringal.43 
Similarly, tappers Fortunato Porto and Raimundo Martins confronted 
the boss at Seringal São Francisco, Antonio Feliciano de Freitas, at the 
trading post after purportedly being cheated, suffering physical abuse, 
and going days without food. During the altercation, Porto clubbed the 
seringalista on the head and knocked him to the floor, where the two con-
tinued to scuffle. Martins and Porto then fled in two canoes to a nearby 
seringal.44
More commonly, as Father Tastevin’s testimony suggests, brutaliza-
tion prompted workers to abandon the property—and to warn others to 
stay away. On the Rio Candeia, Dr. Martins, a leading seringalista, had a 
hard time trying to recruit labor in Manaus because of his “bad reputa-
tion.”45 And because the Jutaí River had a “bad reputation for unpunished 
lawlessness,” as well as poor epidemiological conditions, workers were re-
luctant to go there.46 In fact, some bosses zealously defended their honor: 
in the aforementioned conflict at the Seringal Palmeiras, Bohemundo 
Affonso, the proprietor’s brother, felt compelled to remind newspaper 
readers that it was the property’s lessee who perpetrated the atrocities 
and not the “landowner whose hard labor of more than forty years never 
allowed him to deviate from a GOOd and MORAL path.”47 Such protests 
and qualifications offered small comfort to victims of violence, yet their 
very issuance suggests an informal and limited capacity to temper it.
With socioenvironmental constraints hindering labor control, bosses 
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sought to forge clientelistic bonds with tappers. Their paternalistic pos-
ture resonates in the 1934 “rulebook” (“regulamento interno” ) of seringa-
lista Otávio Reis. A prominent merchant on the Abunã River near the 
Bolivian border, Reis, who hailed from the southeastern state of Espírito 
Santo, operated numerous seringais by the mid- 1940s, with a total work-
force of some 700 tappers.48 In his rulebook, he vowed to furnish his 
“customers” with workable trails and reasonably priced goods, to guaran-
tee fair and punctual payment, and to tend to tappers’ health. In return, 
Reis demanded that tappers avoid damaging bark and maintain trails 
in good condition, trade rubber exclusively at his post, and register any 
complaints “calmly and with good cheer.” Rubber tapping has “liberated 
you from the foreman’s whip, making the extractor the master of his 
destiny,” preached Reis, describing the seringal as one big “family carry-
ing out our tasks, irrespective of race, religious faith, nationality, and 
position.”49 While social mobility and harmony eluded most Amazonian 
rubber properties, Reis’s desideratum underscores bosses’ idealization of 
patron- client relations as a mechanism to coax production if not produc-
tivity, collaboration if not conformity, and honorability if not collegiality. 
In this vein, alongside relationships of godparentage and sponsorship of 
religious festivals on holy days, debt merchandising in particular aimed 
to promote tapper dependency and to discourage commercial exchanges 
with outside parties.50
Reliant on bosses for access to land and credit, tappers, too, under-
stood the importance of vertical ties. In insalubrious regions with scant 
state services, a boss’s credit line could literally be a matter of life or 
death. When balata tapper José Beserra fell ill, his boss, Raul Vilhena, 
authorized J. G. Araújo to advance payment for medical treatment at the 
Benficiência hospital in Manaus.51 When tapper José Antonio do Nasci-
mento sought medical care at the Cachuela Esperanza in Bolivia, his 
boss, Luiz Dantas, advanced the money to pay for transportation, the 
consular pass, and hospitalization (ultimately deducting the expenses, 
and burial fees, from the deceased tapper’s estate).52 And at the Seringal 
Parati, several tappers lauded the health care: in the event of a debilitat-
ing illness, the manager transported the patient to the trading post by 
donkey or by hammock, where he received food, medication, and the 
assistance of a nurse.53
On a more mundane level, credit enabled tappers to subsist and trade 
in the forest, since the absence of work supplies impeded rubber pro-
duction, lack of bullets spelled defenselessness, and shortages of con-
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sumer goods increased privation.54 Wartime technicians, for example, 
estimated that a new tapper in Acre required one machete, one tin basin, 
one bucket, 1,000 small tapping cups, one 16- gauge shotgun, and one 
box of shells; a family of four that did not produce its own food would 
also need several kilograms each of coffee, rice, beans, sugar, salt, milk, 
butter, manioc flour, jerked beef, and dried fish, as well as kerosene, 
matches, and tobacco.55 Indeed, as one traveler on the upper Purus River 
noted, “High prices on goods revolt all seringueiros; however, shortage of 
merchandise disgusts them considerably more.”56 Seringalista Eufrozino 
Gomes de Araújo could certainly attest to that: in 1940, he complained 
to J. G. Araújo that as a result of the firm’s failure to provide goods on a 
regular basis, his “customers” refused to do business with him “due to 
the delay in sales and the lack of products.”57 And in 1945, Francisco de 
Assis Vasconcellos reported that he had to remain on Seringal Tabatinga 
near Sena Madureira, Acre, because he feared “an uprising by his clien-
tele” fueled by the lack of merchandise on his property (and the region 
in general).58
But the significance of credit was more than utilitarian. In his account 
of a 1929 boat voyage from Belém to Rio Branco, Pedro Mattos described 
a “caboclo” that disembarked at an upriver dock in search of necklaces, 
pendants, perfumes, soaps, and other knickknacks that “have such value 
for individuals isolated in the immensity of the forest seeking to thank 
and please their female companion.”59 Mattos reinforced the stereotype 
of the spendthrift river- dweller and of consumption driven by frivolous 
female tastes; other observers more even- handedly noted that the “aver-
age seringueiro” not only occasionally bought handkerchiefs, hats, shirts, 
and hose and shoes for women, but also “luxury items” such as cachaça, 
perfumes, and hair oils for himself.60 Still, these accounts indicate that 
debt- merchandising also allowed for the acquisition of urbane accoutre-
ments in regions where possession of consumer goods distinguished 
their holders from “primitive” Indians, and gender imbalance spawned 
stiff competition for female companionship. To affirm that petty consum-
erism may have adorned hardscrabble lives in the forest need not en-
throne a “rational peasant” governed by market principles.61 Rather, it 
suggests that dignity emanated from how one resolved to spend one’s 
time as much as one’s scant resources.
Tappers also possessed distinct understandings of debt- merchandising. 
Payment in kind, rather than specie, did not necessarily amount to evi-
dence of exploitation since cash transactions mattered little in remote 
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zones of rubber production. Viewing credit as an advance or even a 
bonus, tappers sought to turn what observers saw as coercive to their ad-
vantage.62 Indeed, revisionist scholarship in Latin America has explored 
the varied roles of debt under different systems of production and his-
torical moments, and emphasized the importance of understanding the 
perspectives of the subjected labor force.63 For example, anthropologist 
Neide Esterci’s research in the 1970s concluded that in relations based 
heavily on reciprocity, workers felt a moral obligation to their boss for 
protecting or assisting them; they did not necessarily question the notion 
of debt per se, but their lack of control over it.64 Mauro Almeida also 
found that although rubber tappers considered the advance credit system 
and the corresponding debt as legitimate, they did not accept as equally 
legitimate either the monopoly clauses demanded by the patrons or the 
use of violence to ensure them.65 In the Amazon rubber trade, debt estab-
lished a commercial bond among unequal social actors, who struggled 
to moderate its terms and to determine the proper boundaries of social 
legitimacy and honor.66
Nor, we might add, were tappers always in the red. When seringalista 
Alfredo Severino Gomes died intestate on the upper Madeira in 1942, 
the inventory of his estate showed that a number of tappers and salaried 
workers received their outstanding balances: tapper Antonio Costa col-
lected CR$1,039.80, Raimundo Merência received CR$4,713, and Na-
zário Merência came up with only CR$481.69.67 Indeed, when bosses set 
prices for necessary consumption by the measure of the least productive 
houses, households with greater productivity—based on the number of 
trails and/or workers per house—could benefit from surpluses in com-
modities beyond the minimum reproduction cost.68
Since bosses punished troublemakers, tappers had additional in-
centives to acquiesce, if not cooperate. For example, when the operator 
of Seringal Ouro Negro dispatched José Bento Cavalcante to seize his 
fugitive co- worker, Severino Silva, he debited Silva’s account for the ex-
penses incurred in his capture, while crediting Cavalcante for the same 
amount.69 When Martins Claro da Silva spread rumors that the seringal 
manager had sold his customers used rifle cartridges, fellow tapper José 
Souto de Lima cursed the accuser as a “son of a bitch” and a “bandit”—
although Lima paid for his managerial allegiance, and his sharp tongue, 
with his life.70 Likewise, Francisco Jacinto da Silva’s comrades balked at 
his plot to confront the property manager and seize the trading post in re-
taliation for chronic short- changing: aside from having “no complaints,” 
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the long trek from their huts to the barracão would reduce their “capacity 
to produce in order to pay for the merchandise that had been furnished 
to them.”71 In official depositions such as these, tappers undoubtedly laid 
clientelistic deference on thick, but that was exactly the point, since loy-
alty had its perks.
To temper abuses, which included gouging, short- changing, fining, 
physical violence, and abandonment, tappers employed multiple strate-
gies in the absence of formal legal recourse. In 1931, for example, thirty- 
five armed seringueiros expelled the manager of the Seringal Iracema 
near Xapuri, leading the federal interventor in Acre to request munitions 
to assist the local police in restoring order.72 Yet taking up arms against 
bosses or managers was most likely not the commonest response; most 
of the criminal cases in the judicial archive in Rondônia that I consulted 
involved violent confrontations among seringueiros over charges of theft, 
adultery, and insults to masculine honor—conflicts that reflected com-
petition among peers for access to goods, status, and female companion-
ship. Relocation proved a more standard move for malcontents on the 
seringais, since the natural landscape may have hampered escape but also 
surveillance, while some bosses merely showed disaffected workers to 
the door. As the manager of the Seringal Parati noted, when a seringueiro 
demonstrated “lack of interest” and salaried work could not be found to 
cancel his debt, he would merely be asked to leave, “even though he still 
was owing.”73 Similarly, seringalista Frederico Machado observed that on 
the Rio Negro “when a customer leaves without paying, the new boss as-
sumes responsibility for what he owed,” indicating that new bosses often 
paid off workers’ outstanding debt to previous employers, as mandated 
by the Brazilian Civil Code of 1916.74
Socioenvironmental conditions favored additional mechanisms for 
remediation. Trade with river peddlers, who plied the waterways of the 
Amazon since the first rubber boom, punctured commercial monopolies. 
In 1943, for example, lessee Henrique de Oliveira Bastos railed against 
interlopers who sold cheaper goods to tappers on layaway plans, paid 
higher prices for rubber, and badmouthed bosses as “thieves and liars.”75 
Similarly, Antonio Rosas Sobrinho, the lessee of the Seringal Nova Em-
presa, announced in a Rio Branco newspaper that he would crack down 
on the “outrageous practice of clandestine and unauthorized traders” who 
had been “invading” his properties.76 Tappers’ methods of extracting and 
smoking wild rubber, which likewise eluded bosses’ direct supervision, 
offered other shortcuts. Sap from sorva (cow tree) and other latex- yielding 
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plants mixed into cured rubber was difficult to detect through simple in-
spection, while soil, pebbles, sand, and other tree saps also found their 
way in.77 The commercial firm J. G. Araújo even reported the spectacu-
lar case of a 22- kilogram péla from the Juruá River that was composed of 
pieces of wood covered with rubber whose actual content amounted to 
no more than eight kilograms.78
Ultimately, tappers’ varied forms of land and resource use served 
to mitigate unfair exchange or the inadequacy of supplies. Indeed, as 
Almeida points out, rubber tappers are best understood as extractors, cul-
tivators, hunters, fishermen, and artisans, who mapped and used natural 
resources through technical procedures that depended on both the for-
est niches and imported equipment. His ethnography provides a rich ac-
count of households’ distinct use of forest resources: from extraction of 
latex and collecting along the trails; to a hunting economy that employed 
diverse techniques and strategies to kill pacas, deer, tapirs, boars, agoutis, 
monkeys, armadillos, and squirrels; to annual planting of maize, beans, 
watermelons, potatoes, tobacco, and manioc on the várzea upon the con-
clusion of the rainy season; to triennial planting of manioc on plots of 
newly cleared forest; to raising of livestock and fowl, vegetables, medici-
nal plants, and calabash trees (for gourds) in the yards. These multiple 
activities relied on residents’ extensive knowledge of forest ecosystems, 
whether the location of a rubber tree, a stump with bees’ honey, a heart 
of palm or another with ripe açaí, a trail frequented by paca, a river bend 
teeming with fish, or a riverbank whose clay would serve to smooth one’s 
hair. Access to forest resources and simple technology even allowed for 
the substitution of many consumer goods, although cutting back might 
mean a certain diminution in self- image.79 In this sense, forest resources 
served as both a springboard and a buffer for tappers’ insertion into the 
market economy.
Bosses and tappers linked in a vertical commercial hierarchy under-
stood that in the absence of public assistance, competitive markets, and 
the rule of law, life could indeed be nasty, brutish, and short. A trading 
system marked by quasi- contracts and legitimized by informal rule as-
sumed primacy in establishing certain order in and for the forest, sus-
taining the century- long resilience of the rubber economy. But given that 
risks and dividends of the forest trade were profoundly unequal, con-
flicts abounded. Traders and tappers often attributed misdeeds to greed, 
ill- will, jealousy, or desperation, but such actions also reflected broader 
contests over the uses and meanings of forest resources.
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Brazilian and U.S. wartime officials, vexed by the Amazon rubber 
trade’s undermanned properties and inconsistent outputs, demanded 
new bodies and mindsets. In their estimation, only 20 percent of the 
existing labor force in the forest would work “well and most of the time” 
in rubber; and although authorities deemed some residents nearer to the 
Amazon’s urban centers likely to be lured by higher rubber prices, they 
did not expect much from former tappers who “gave it up for farming, 
fishing, or just plain loafing.”80 In the quest for the model jungle labor 
force, government officials wrangled over workers’ rights and obliga-
tions, and the best methods to reach and teach them. Their deliberations 
not only underscore how visions of the Amazon derive from historically 
specific matrixes but have ramified in public policies with far- reaching 
consequences.
the race for the new amazonian worker
Brazilian and North American policymakers assessed the competence of 
prospective wartime laborers in the Amazon in part according to their 
racial and ethnic stock. These were old topics for the tropics, as evinced 
by Brazilian and North Atlantic racial science and immigration debates. 
In 1924, for example, University of Michigan agronomist Carl LaRue af-
firmed, “a million Chinese in the rubber section of Brazil would be a 
godsend to that country,” echoing an old refrain of foreign observers of 
the Amazon rubber trade that “the sooner the Orientals come along and, 
by their competition (and by interbreeding), raise the efficiency in the 
native worker to their own level, the better for Brazil, and especially for 
the native, and it is only false kindness to say otherwise.”81 For his part, 
Governor of Pará Dionysio Bentes noted in a Belém daily in 1926 his 
preference for white immigrants over blacks due to their “degree of de-
velopment.”82 But age- old debates about race, geography, and national 
character took an urgent turn in wartime. Deeming Latin American 
laborers “neither experienced nor industrious enough” to produce ade-
quate latex, Pennsylvania Congressman Charles Faddis, a member of the 
House Committee on Military Affairs, introduced a bill in March 1942 to 
import men from the East Indies, “both Caucasian and Malayan,” to serve 
as managers and laborers, respectively.83 And U.S. author Henry Albert 
Phillips opined that the Brazilian worker, “even when vitaminized to his 
highest pitch of energy,” lacked the initiative of the European “to open 
wide the deadly jungle, or to invest a generation or two of settlers in the 
toil and moil, sacrifice and innovation of the pioneer.”84
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In Brazil, the wartime quest for the ideal Amazonian worker assumed 
racial and nationalistic tones as well. Japanophobes, who had railed 
against earlier land concessions to Japanese in the Amazon as “the dan-
ger within [national] borders,” prevailed upon the Vargas regime to re-
locate immigrants in the vicinity of Belém and Parintins to a concentra-
tion camp in Tomé- Açu, Pará, for the duration of the war.85 And following 
the U- boat sinking of the Baependi in August 1942, which claimed the 
lives of hundreds of Brazilian civilians, a crowd in Manaus retaliated by 
trashing the German consulate and jailing the consul, raiding the office 
of Bayer pharmaceuticals, and destroying the Bhering Export House.86 In 
sum, the question of who belonged in the Amazon was also premised, in 
part, on ethnic and racial exclusion.
Although some Brazilian policymakers dreamed of welcoming Euro-
pean refugees to the Amazon, the Vargas regime rebuffed wartime pro-
posals to import non- Brazilian labor.87 Disruptions in Atlantic shipping 
had scuttled mass transoceanic transport, but recruitment of Brazilian 
nationals was also favored due to the government’s fragile hold on the 
Amazon amidst mounting U.S. involvement; immigration restrictions 
that aimed to safeguard the nation’s “traditional” ethnic formation; des-
ignation of the Amazon frontier as a domestic safety valve; and elites’ 
conviction that Brazil’s climate- hardened and miscegenated populations 
were “naturally” suited to clear the jungle. Fearful of antagonizing a key 
wartime ally, the U.S. State Department toed the line. Still, with Brazil’s 
forty million people residing mainly near the eastern littoral, German 
attacks on coastal shipping, and understaffed government agencies ill- 
equipped to effect mass population transfers, controversies swirled over 
which workers to target.88
Indigenous peoples, for example, stirred public policy debates. Due to 
a history of enslavement, proselytization, and miscegenation, the native 
Amazonian population had dwindled in 1940 to between 30,000 and 
40,000, according to government estimates, of which officials expected 
no more than 10 percent might work in rubber.89 But since Indians were 
“on the spot and well adjusted to all phases of living in the area,” one U.S. 
official argued, they would require “no particular expenditures such as 
for recruitment and transportation of labor and the providing of many 
so- called essentials which need to go to the more civilized workers.”90 
Officials in Brazil’s Indian Protection Service (SpI) pointed to the Mun-
duruku contribution to the rubber campaign as an indication of native 
patriotism and the agency’s success at indigenous integration.91 On the 
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other hand, irked by reports of Indian attacks on rubber tappers on Acre’s 
Jaquirana River, rubber technician Constantino Alexopoulos questioned
why we are willing to bomb German cities in order to preserve our 
liberty, but hesitate to use the same methods with the Indians for the 
same purpose. The truth of the matter, as it now stands, is that un-
less the Indians are cleaned out of the rubber- producing regions, this 
method of increasing rubber production disappears.92
Alexopoulos’s endorsement of native genocide reveals the extremes that 
some have contemplated to remake the Amazonian landscape in the 
name of liberty.
Perhaps one of the most unorthodox suggestions for harnessing in-
digenous labor in the Amazon came from Ernest E. Maes, a field repre-
sentative of the U.S. Department of the Interior’s National Indian Insti-
tute. Maes viewed the SpI as the only Brazilian agency capable of assisting 
laborers in the rubber campaign but lamented that the Indian Service fo-
cused on the physical defense of unacculturated tribes and the protection 
of indigenous land, rather than offering support to acculturated Indians 
and the general caboclo population. “If they [the SpI] accept the thesis 
that a majority of the rubber collectors could be included among the seg-
ment of the population that by law comes under their protection,” Maes 
argued, “then it would seem that they are the logical Brazilian agency to 
administer a program designed to increase rubber production by pro-
tecting the rubber collectors.” Based on his estimate that about 1 million 
of the 1.75 million rural dwellers had “predominant Indian blood,” this 
would represent a substantial gain.93 Maes, however, had not only mis-
takenly endowed the anemic Indian Service with jurisdictional stamina 
but had assumed that local populations, irrespective of ethnic classifi-
cation, would mobilize to tap rubber with due diligence. His proposed 
biological criteria for defining Indianness in the Amazon dismissed local 
understandings of racial identity that were based upon phenotype and 
conformity to dominant Luso- Brazilian cultural patterns.94 Maes’s Ama-
zonian census, in other words, replicated another common misconcep-
tion of outsiders: that most of the region’s population was, or should be 
considered, Indian.95
An alternative labor scheme entailed the remotion of Rio de Janeiro’s 
poor to the forest, one of the Vargas regime’s proposed correctives for 
rapid population growth in southern cities. In January 1943, SEMTA dis-
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patched 300 men overland to the Amazon from the Albergue da Boa 
Vontade, a shelter in the capital maintained by the Ministry of Labor. 
The following month another 1,242 men signed up for the rubber cam-
paign, although 206 (or 16.58 percent) failed to embark. The director 
of Boa Vontade provided some statistics on the recruits: 94.76 percent 
were bachelors, 78.42 percent were literate, 52.5 percent had a carteira 
professional (“working papers”), 48.6 percent were army reservists, and 
only 31 percent were originally from Rio de Janeiro. He listed their racial 
background as 44.2 percent white (including fifteen foreigners), 39.14 
percent pardo (brown), and 16.6 percent black.96 One migrant, a mer-
chant marine who had spent time in prison for insubordination, told a 
reporter that he yearned to labor in the Amazon for the “victory of human 
freedoms.”97 It is unclear whether release from jail was contingent upon 
embarkation to the Amazon; banishment to the forest (“desterro” ) formed 
an old tactic of the Brazilian state to punish labor radicals, political dissi-
dents, and vagrants. In any event, Brazilian authorities soon shelved re-
cruitment from Rio de Janeiro due to the high cost and logistic complica-
tions of transportation to the Amazon, employer opposition, and worker 
desertion.98
Most wartime migrants to the Amazon hailed from the northeast in 
an odyssey naturalized by elites as the outgrowth of racial heritage, physi-
cal ruggedness, and innate wanderlust.99 One treatise noted that “the 
sertanejo [resident of the northeastern backlands] has amalgamated in 
his psyche the Indian’s characteristics of resistance and environmental 
adaptation with the boldness of the white colonist.”100 Likewise, accord-
ing to the Revista de Imigração e Colonização, northeasterners constituted 
the “genuinely Brazilian element spread out throughout the vastness of 
our territory, principally in the north,” and an “ethnic reserve of the first 
order for miscegenation from which, in the future, will emerge the Bra-
zilian ethnic type now in formation.”101 Or as Felisberto Camargo wrote 
to the OIAA representative in Brazil in 1941: “Having lived in constant 
struggle against tropical endemic diseases, the sons of the Amazon itself 
or sons of the northeast territory are the only ones capable of carrying out 
the first steps for the conquest and utilization of those lands. Brazil has 
always counted on the capacity of these sons for all initiatives required 
in this part of the country.”102 Yet competing visions of the Amazon led 




In the March to the West, the Brazilian government and the Catholic 
Church favored the subsidized migration of northeastern families to the 
Amazon under the aegis of the Ministry of Labor’s National Department 
of Immigration (dNI).103 Family colonization would assuage moral panic 
about the skewed sex ratios on the rubber properties and sustain long- 
term regional development. The Boletim Geográfico, for example, labeled 
tappers “sodomites, onanists, sexual perverts due to their social state.”104 
Brazilian elites insisted that only women’s “moral, affective, and physio-
logical” ministrations would keep masculine vice in check.105
United States officials, however, worried that family migration would 
hamper Washington’s primary goal of boosting rubber production in 
the Amazon. Due to German submarine attacks on the Brazilian coastal 
trade and limited shipping space, only 9,088 nordestinos had been 
transported to Belém (the port of entry to the Amazon) in 1942, many of 
whom headed for the agricultural zones of Pará rather than the rubber 
properties.106 Moreover, as U.S. officials bemoaned, adult male laborers 
represented less than one fourth of the total passengers amidst larger 
numbers of women and small children.107 In November 1942, Vargas 
established the Serviço Especial de Mobilização de Trabalhadores para 
Amazônia (SEMTA) to meet U.S. demand for mass recruitment of male 
laborers to the Amazon, and to assist with drought evacuation in the 
northeast. With full U.S.- government subsidization, SEMTA committed to 
transport 50,000 men between the ages of 18 and 45 to the Amazon by 
mid- 1943, although the dNI continued to relocate northeastern families 
to the Amazon for the duration of the war.108
Hailing the creation of SEMTA, Brazil’s coordinator of economic mobi-
lization João Alberto Lins de Barros vowed to earn recruits’ “confidence” 
by “granting them all necessary assistance” on their journey to the Ama-
zon.109 Upon the successful completion of medical examinations and vac-
cinations, workers who enrolled with SEMTA signed a recruitment con-
tract; in the case of illiterate workers, the document was signed by two 
witnesses. In return for a two- year commitment to tap rubber, migrants 
en route to Belém received free transportation, lodging, and medical 
care, as well as “religious assistance.” The Brazilian government agency 
provided each worker with a shirt and one pair of pants and sandals, a 
hammock and mosquito net, and one dish and set of utensils. During 
transit, SEMTA paid eleven cruzeiros per day to workers with dependents 
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who provided labor service and ten cruzeiros to those without depen-
dents; workers who did not perform labor service en route received seven 
and six cruzeiros, respectively. Migrants were charged three cruzeiros 
per day for meals and were liable for the damage or loss of equipment. 
The SEMTA guaranteed all recruits a minimum cash balance of twenty- 
five cruzeiros upon disembarkation in Pará, or the rough equivalent of six 
days’ payment for menial labor in the northeast. The contract also obliged 
SEMTA to return migrants under the same conditions as established for 
recruitment if employment was “not advisable or possible” upon arrival 
in the Amazon.110
As in other wartime mobilization campaigns, gender ideologies under-
lay Amazon recruitment strategies.111 Brazilian and American propa-
ganda trumpeted rubber tapping as a bachelor’s pay dirt for his bride- to- 
be, a breadwinner’s meal ticket, a patriot’s duty, and a he- man’s workout. 
Such patriarchal ideals pervaded the northeastern backlands and were 
most likely cherished by many male migrants themselves in one varia-
tion or another—whether the head of household who smarted under the 
tenancy and sharecropping arrangements common in the region, or an 
adult son stifled by an overbearing father.112 In a 1934 essay, for example, 
historian Thomaz Pompeu Sobrinho bragged that the hard- knock north-
eastern outback, unlike the coastal sugar plantations, had never bred 
“aristocratic milquetoasts with womanly hands, lazy bones, libertines, 
dandies ashamed of having legs and feet to walk and step on the ground 
like any slave or plebeian.”113 And popular lore and chapbooks trafficked 
in images of robust nordestinos who penetrated “virgin” forests, con-
fronted hostile Indians, and defied villainous bosses.114 “The seringueiro 
is a strong man / of tremendous courage,” noted the cordelista [popular 
bard] Raimundo Nonato, the son of nordestinos who settled in Acre.115 
Or as José Pio de Lima, a wartime migrant from Ceará to the Amazon, 
recounted more than a half century later: “Life in the forest is only for 
someone who is very macho. The lazy ones did not stand a chance.”116 
Walking in pitch- dark forest, confronting jaguars and poisonous snakes, 
hunting wild game, and producing and hauling large amounts of rubber 
constituted a source of pride for men on the seringais.117
Yet if Brazilian and American government officials had not invented 
these “macho” roles for nordestinos, they preyed upon men’s anxieties 
to fulfill them. Newspaper articles reminded Cearenses that single men 
long migrated to the Amazon to earn money to “acquire a house and 
set up a home with his heart- felt, chosen companion.”118 In this vein, 
108 Chapter 3
a small Portuguese- language booklet in cartoon- format (most likely de-
signed by the OIAA) recounted the adventures of a nordestino cowboy 
who left his ranch to try his luck in the Amazon. Although he pined for 
sweetheart Maria Inéz, good fortune smiled upon him: an experienced 
tapper taught him how to extract rubber, his earnings multiplied, and he 
sent for his beloved, whom he married in a festive ceremony in the Ama-
zon.119 Posters produced by the OIAA featured feminized commodities 
linked to the preparation of food and clothing—such as china, utensils, 
and sewing machines—whose acquisition would burnish tappers’ repu-
tation as breadwinners (see figure 3.5). And newspapers published ex-
cerpts of letters written by migrants in transit to their wives or mothers, 
including the cash value of remittances.120 Alternatively, the mass media 
targeted fathers. “For the poor classes of Ceará, it is totally impossible to 
give their children a basic education because in most cases boys are put 
to work from the age of seven and the girls go to work as soon as they can 
as nannies in the houses of wealthy families,” asserted one northeastern 
periodical. Migration to the Amazon would offer a father “the economic 
means to educate his offspring so that they do not become beasts of bur-
den, as he himself is.”121
The Brazilian government and media outlets also used shaming to 
cast stay- at- homes as sissies, slackers, and second- bests. If “strong men 
belonged and were in Amazonia,” who were the homebodies?122 If photo-
graphs of migrants showed “the strong bodies and bulging muscles of 
these men from the interior of the states of the northeast, accustomed to 
the rigors of the tropical sun and to ‘earning their bread with the sweat of 
their brow,’” who were the weaklings on the sidelines?123 If even a female 
employee of SEMTA could make the arduous trek from the northeast to 
the Amazon, surely none of the male recruits “would wish to be seen as 
weaker.”124 If Inácio Epifânio Souza could send CR$100 to his mother 
upon arrival in Belém, certainly “any single lad who remained behind in 
that deathtrap was a fool, especially when Brazil faced an emergency.”125 
If “only the cowards and the loafers did not earn money in the Amazon,” 
the losers had only revealed their true colors.126 And if good taste openly 
disallowed it, recruitment posters conveying subliminal messages of 
penetration in the forest hinted at yet another titillating perquisite that 
stay- behinds would forfeit (see figure 3.6).
Wartime propaganda, however, heralded a new social role for rub-
ber tappers: guardians of national defense and global freedom. Brazil-
ian rubber tappers had long been hailed as conquerors of the Amazo-
figure 3.5 Wartime 
propaganda, heavily 
reliant upon visual 
images, encouraged 
nordestinos to view 
rubber tapping as an 
avenue to respectable 
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figure 3.6 Recruitment posters for the SEMTA agency designed by Swiss- born artist 
Jean- Pierre Chabloz, seated at center. The messages of the posters read: “More Rubber 
for Victory?”; “Rubber Campaign ‘V’”; “Go Too to the Amazon, Protected by SEMTA,” 
“Nordestino: Do You Want to Work in Amazonia? Enlist in S.E.M.T.A., which will give you 
passage, transport, food, a good contract, aid to your family, and medical and religious 
assistance.” Source: Departamento de Patrimônio Histórico e Cultural do Estado do Acre.
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nian hinterland—including the former Bolivian territory of Acre—but 
they now appeared in posters, films, newspapers, and official pronounce-
ments as fighters for the “victory of democracy” and “liberators of en-
slaved peoples.”127 A SEMTA brochure entitled Rumo à Amazônia: Terra 
da Fartura (Bound for the Amazon: The Land of Plenty), for example, de-
clared the nordestinos’ “obligation” to fight for world freedom “in the 
blessed lands of the Amazon.”128 A Fortaleza daily exhorted nordestino 
men: “It is time to guarantee for humanity the resources for the con-
quest of Freedom and the strangling of the Axis!”129 And Álvaro Maia’s 
Na vanguarda da retaguarda (1943) hailed tappers as the “vanguard of the 
rear guard,” in the “universal war against tyranny and oppression.”130 The 
Vargas regime’s official denomination of the migrant- tappers as “solda-
dos” in the “batalha da borracha” (“soldiers” in the “battle for rubber”) ex-
emplified this patriotic encomium. As Brazilian newspaper articles from 
1943 extolled, “The army of the ‘soldados da borracha’ is a brave legion of 
our countrymen entering the jungle under a glorious banner of staunch 
patriotism to extract from the miraculous tree the precious latex that is 
so necessary for the Victory of the United Nations.”131 With these “healthy 
and strong soldiers, Brazil will win, for itself and for the United Nations, 
the Battle for Rubber.”132
Casting patriotic light on hardscrabble lives, the wartime rubber cam-
paign conferred political prestige and social rights and responsibilities 
upon Brazil’s marginal male populations. As a scholar of the military has 
noted, “Considered in purely mechanistic terms, the state needed unob-
structed access to the citizen; in turn, to gain his willingness to work and 
fight for the state, the individual had to be offered political power, or—if 
that was impossible—new psychological inducements and social oppor-
tunities to enable him to reach full potential.”133 Militaristic salutes to the 
rubber “soldiers,” in fact, were more than rhetorical: A decree- law issued 
by Vargas granted Amazonian tappers deferment of military service for 
the two- year period of their contracts.134
Drawing upon an array of culturally available symbols, gender evokes 
multiple and often contradictory representations.135 Government offi-
cials, elites, and migrants and their families, in fact, struggled with the 
inconsistencies of masculinity for poor men in Brazil. Rubber tappers 
might have been at the “vanguard of the rear guard,” but poor, young, 
transient working- class men have long been stigmatized as predators and 
vagabonds. The valiant backwoodsmen pursuing economic opportunity 
and patriotic glory left behind mothers, wives, and children vulnerable to 
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destitution and dishonor.136 Intrepid jungle warriors had to perform un-
manly domestic chores. And the vigor of men who braved the Amazon 
rendered their libidos suspect.
Government authorities thus undertook various measures to patrol 
normative gender roles or reconcile their contradictions. Men en route to 
the Amazon underwent medical exams and treatments for venereal dis-
ease, while officials prescribed physical exercise and religious ministra-
tion to sublimate “sexual vices and aberrations,” and hospitalization and 
“treatment” for homosexuals.137 For wives and children left behind, the 
SEMTA contract provided direct support from the time of the migrants’ 
enlistment until placement on the rubber properties through monies set 
aside by the Rubber Development Corporation for a family welfare fund. 
The families would receive a minimum of two cruzeiros per day per de-
pendent, and a maximum payment of eight cruzeiros, although workers 
with dependents were required to contribute one cruzeiro per diem to the 
fund as well. An alternative method of family support offered dependents 
lodging at SEMTA- run camps (núcleos) in urban areas of the northeast, 
while another arrangement promised assistance at agricultural coopera-
tives. The contract also stipulated that once on the seringal, the migrant 
worker could choose to continue to provide assistance to his family for 
the two- year duration of the tapping contract, with the amount recorded 
monthly in a booklet issued by the employer according to the existing 
law and provisions. Subsequently, in 1944, the procedure for family assis-
tance following placement on the seringal was altered, with allowances 
for the corresponding amounts to be debited in the worker’s booklet 
upon the termination of the harvest through the Banco de Crédito da 
Borracha. Assistance to dependents would terminate upon revocation of 
the contract or if the family joined the worker in the Amazon.138 In sum, 
if popular perceptions in Brazil construed rubber tapping as a masculine 
livelihood, the wartime campaign for the “Battle for Rubber” deployed 
gender ideologies to hasten regional transformation of the Amazon.
formalizing labor and citizenship in the forest
War and military service play an ambiguous role in the forging of citi-
zens and nations. The collective experience of shared danger and mobi-
lization can bind isolated individuals or marginal ethnic groups to the 
nation- state in the spirit of camaraderie and patriotic duty and offer the 
most equal access for disadvantaged members of society. But military 
service may present untold danger and privation, and stigma, as well as 
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nonrecognition and nonpayment for veterans.139 In Brazil, military re-
cruitment had never been egalitarian, as army service historically fell 
upon the unprotected poor.140 Since most laborers recruited in the rubber 
campaign lacked means and status, and fulfillment of new- found rights 
would be delayed for decades, postwar scholarship has harped on the 
victimization of migrant- tappers by the Estado Novo and its oligarchic 
allies.141 That the Vargas regime failed to enforce the rule of law for rub-
ber workers was devastating, but not altogether unsurprising: even with 
postwar consolidation of state power and aggressive infrastructural de-
velopment, the Brazilian government has been challenged to combat vio-
lence, environmental depredation, smuggling, and debt servitude in the 
Amazon.142 What was novel during the World War II era, however, was 
the binational government effort to standardize production and formal-
ize rights in the Amazon forest.
The institution of a standard tapping contract in Brazil in June 1942 
reflected the political ambitions of welfare states to mediate labor rela-
tions amidst wartime crisis. The contract apportioned to tappers 60 per-
cent of the official price of rubber in effect in Manaus or Belém, without 
deductions for freight charges, insurance fees, taxes, or commissions; 33 
percent to bosses as property lessees; and 7 percent to proprietors.143 It 
obliged bosses as well to deliver workable trails, to assist tappers in con-
structing a barraca (shack) and defumador (smokehouse for curing rub-
ber), and to advance foodstuffs, clothing, tools, medicine, and ammuni-
tion without overcharge. During the off- season, tappers were guaranteed 
a minimum wage for services to the seringalista, and the right to cultivate 
up to one- and- a- half acres of crops and to hunt and skin animal game. 
But the contract also required the seringueiro to extract rubber six days a 
week during the tapping season and trade exclusively with his boss, pro-
hibiting change of employment unless a prospective employer settled his 
outstanding debt. Violators faced the prospect of confiscation of goods 
and “criminal legal proceedings.” The Justiça do Trabalho, a special labor 
court created in 1939, was vested with the adjudication of disputes aris-
ing from breach of contract.144 Where informal patron- client relations 
between “bosses” and “customers” long reigned in the Amazon, Brazil-
ian government officials now spoke of mediating disagreements between 
“employer and employee: that is, seringalista and seringueiro.”145
It is noteworthy that the Ministry of Agriculture had first drafted a stan-
dard tapping contract in January 1941 but met with vigorous opposition 
from bosses who insisted that any standard agreement “protect our capital 
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and good order.”146 The seringalistas’ counterproposal required tappers to 
buy exclusively from bosses at the going rate in the region; held them liable 
for damage to rubber trees and for unauthorized trading (at double the 
value of a transaction, and triple for subsequent violations); and subjected 
those who absconded with credit advances to “legal measures or simply 
police action.”147 Tappers would have had the right to denounce abuses 
to (unspecified) government authorities.148 But bosses seemed intent pri-
marily on stonewalling any prospective government regulation of labor re-
lations and commercial exchange.149 They branded official safeguards use-
less for “individuals with little education and from miserable backgrounds 
who suddenly find themselves awash with money,” and who squandered 
their earnings on urban shopping sprees or lavish homecomings in the 
northeast.150 In general, Vargas- era agrarian elites argued that opportuni-
ties for social mobility in the countryside foreclosed the need for govern-
ment regulation; if any group deserved “social rights,” it was landowners, 
who were exploited by merchants, speculators, and industrial capitalists.151 
That the official contract of June 1942 ignored seringalistas’ admonitions 
and even dropped some of the more punitive clauses aimed at tappers 
casts doubt on the seamlessness of Vargas’s purported oligarchic pact.
Calls for rural social reform, in fact, were advanced on various fronts 
during the Estado Novo. Progressives in Vargas’s Ministry of Labor de-
nounced debt peonage in the Amazon rubber trade, calling for govern-
ment assistance to “our abandoned brothers on the seringais suffering 
the darkest, most horrendous miseries.”152 The Conselho Federal do 
Comércio Exterior, which established a special commission in the early 
1940s to study the economic problems of the Amazon, endorsed pay-
ment to tappers on a weekly or biweekly basis. In September 1942, the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s Serviço de Economia Rural even proposed the 
creation of state- supported tapper cooperatives.153 The push for social 
policies in the countryside also had the support of junior army lieuten-
ants who had spent years traversing the backlands in rebellion against 
the republican government.154 Indeed, biographical accounts of Chico 
Mendes, the renowned labor leader and environmental activist murdered 
in the Amazon in 1988, recount his acquisition of literacy as a teenager 
in the early 1960s from Euclides Fernandes Távora, a follower of Luis 
Carlos Prestes, who had led the lieutenants’ revolt in 1924 and the failed 
Communist armed uprising in 1935.155 Under the 1943 federal labor code, 
rural workers in Brazil gained the right to minimum wage, paid annual 
vacations, and notice prior to dismissal.
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Brazilian government reformers had modeled the restructuring of 
the Amazon rubber trade along the lines of agrarian development in São 
Paulo. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the state of 
São Paulo had subsidized the recruitment and transport of hundreds of 
thousands of European immigrants to the coffee estates, where they par-
took in a mixed system of sharecropping, wage labor, and subsistence. 
From initial efforts to provide immigrants with legal advice and exami-
nation of employment contracts, a more elaborate system of state pro-
tection for agricultural workers had developed by the 1940s throughout 
São Paulo.156
The invention of a rights- bearing Amazonian tapper drew ideologi-
cally upon the Vargas regime’s credo of trabalhismo, which premised 
the political inclusion and social rights of labor on workplace produc-
tivity.157 Brazilian historiography has underscored the masculinist bias 
of Vargas’s corporatist project but has largely depicted trabalhismo as an 
urban, industrial matter.158 The assessment may be more revealing of aca-
demic than government agendas. A radio address from November 1942, 
for example, reminded listeners: “In the Amazon valley, more than in any 
other place in the nation’s territory, the most important labor is taking 
place, the most arduous task, the most enormous struggle, the most de-
cisive effort during this spectacular hour.”159 Or as Abelardo Conduru, 
the president of the Banco de Crédito da Borracha, affirmed in a radio 
address of June 1943: “President Getúlio Vargas, the benefactor of the 
Amazon, sees in the seringueiro what he represents for our War effort, 
the worker who more than any other requires continuous assistance and 
care of the government, which is tending to him and providing better 
days for him.”160 Slogging away in the hinterland, the mixed- race tapper 
represented the authentic roots of Brazil.161 Endowed with new rights, re-
sponsibilities, and respectability, he heralded its progressive future.
The institution of a standard tapping contract further revealed the 
influence of Board of Economic Warfare officials who endorsed protec-
tionist policies for Latin American laborers in wartime procurement. 
Perhaps inspired by the Justice Department and the Abolish Peonage 
Committee’s efforts to eliminate debt slavery in the southern United 
States, Leonard H. Heller, chief of the BEw Rubber Division, asserted: 
“We consider that an agency of the Government should not accept re-
sponsibility for establishing peonage conditions in Brazil which would be 
unconstitutional in the United States.”162 In this vein, the BEw urged Rub-
ber Reserve not to oppose minimum wage and social welfare legislation 
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in the Amazon on the grounds that they raised the cost of rubber. Rather, 
the BEw suggested various measures to empower rubber workers and the 
Brazilian agencies entrusted with their protection, such as publicity cam-
paigns to generate awareness of contractual rights, deployment of Brazil-
ian labor experts to monitor conditions in the Amazon, and quotas and 
incentive plans to reward above- average rubber producers in either cash, 
goods, or prizes.163 Under the labor clauses of the official rubber contract, 
the OIAA furnished assistance in health and sanitation programs.
Indeed, by spring 1943, more than 100 standardized labor contracts 
had been instituted for workers in Latin America engaged in the procure-
ment of wartime materials.164 None of the contracts applied U.S. labor 
legislation to foreign countries, but aimed instead at obligating govern-
ments and businesses in Latin America to comply with local labor laws, 
provide fair wages, and ensure health standards.165 Nevertheless, board 
officials hailed the unprecedented efforts of the U.S. government to im-
prove social conditions and strengthen alliances with progressive sectors 
in Latin America. “It is the first time in history,” they noted, “that one 
nation, in negotiating for the products of another, has given an express 
guaranty against the exploitation of labor; has realistically and frankly 
recognized that laboring men and women who receive a fair wage, work 
reasonable hours and work and live under decent conditions of health 
and sanitation, actually produce more and better products than those 
who do not.”166 Although the archival documentation does not indicate a 
clear- cut role of the BEw in the formulation of the Brazilian tapping con-
tract, it is reasonable to assume that U.S. progressives strengthened the 
hand of reformers in the Vargas government.
In an attempt to standardize forest labor, U.S. government officials 
also urged an overhaul of tapping methods. Of particular concern were 
“primitive” tapping methods that left the trunks of the Hevea brasilien-
sis scarred and knotty. Wartime technicians denounced the pervasive 
wounding of rubber trees, which occurred when tappers scraped off the 
cambium, or fine growth tissue between the bark and the wood, causing 
the formation of excrescences composed of stone cells covered by a thin 
layer of bark with few latex- producing cells.167 On the Javari River, they 
claimed that “the trees have been ruined by deep and severe tapping with 
the machadinha and the Amazonas knife in the past and have become 
very unproductive.”168 In the Muaná district near Belém, they reported 
that more than one hundred trails had been reopened in October 1943, 
but the rubber trees had been so badly mutilated over the years that it was 
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impossible to employ a knife for a low panel; in many cases the workers 
had to use ladders to tap at a height of ten feet.169
In the technicians’ minds, “good” tapping followed standard, mathe-
matical formulae: cuts should leave one millimeter of bark outside the 
cambium, since less depth represented a loss of latex, while greater depth 
was apt to result in wounding and permanent damage to the tapping sur-
face.170 Touting the advantages of full spiral fourth- day tapping of mature 
Hevea trees over the half- spiral alternate- daily system practiced in the 
Amazon, W. E. Klippert offered a detailed time- motion comparison of the 
two methods based on a 120- tree task on wild trails—including walking 
from tree to tree, cleaning scrap from cut, cleaning the cup, and making 
tapping incisions. “It is the old story of saving unnecessary motion,” con-
cluded Klippert. “With this [full spiral] system one is able to obtain on 
one visit to the tree more than twice as much latex as can be obtained by 
two visits to the tree on the other system.”171 On their visits to the serin-
gais and migrant labor camps, technicians promoted the Asian Jebong 
knife, which consumed less bark than the Amazon knife and hatchet.172
Since many of the RdC technicians had served as inspectors on Asian 
rubber plantations, their economistic concept of natural resource man-
agement is unsurprising. As the motto of the agency, emblazoned on in-
structional posters and illustrated manuals, proclaimed: “Good bark is 
the capital of the seringal.”173 More generally, the technicians followed a 
long line of scientific and agricultural “experts” who doubted the capacity 
of poor people to conserve natural resources.174 Brazilian elites shared 
such beliefs, from nineteenth- century abolitionist Joaquim Nabuco to 
twentieth- century Amazonian historian Arthur Cezar Ferreira Reis, who 
charged that “evidently, the seringueiros, with the ruthless destruction 
that they caused, did not think about the future,” contributing to the “im-
poverishment of regions where their disorderly offensive operated.”175 
Counterposing wartime depictions of tapper predatoriness with contem-
porary environmentalist tributes to forest dwellers’ model of sustainable 
development underscores how outsiders’ understandings of the Ama-
zon have shifted, in part, according to dominant actors’ cognitive frame-
works.176
In sum, amidst the serpentine trails, dense forests, and flooded river 
plains of the rubber properties, wartime reformers in Brazil and the 
United States sought to invent formal labor in the Amazon. Through 
standardized contracts and the rule of law, they aimed to remake caboclo 
and bravo “customers” into working- class citizens of Brazil endowed 
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with uniform rights and obligations. Through regulated markets, price 
controls, minimum wages, and job incentives, they hoped to regiment 
laborers and sustain productivity. Through novel tapping methods, they 
sought to impose universal standards for natural resource management.
the Battle for hearts and minds: the media and the message
Brazilian and U.S. officials employed a multimedia approach to stimu-
late popular interest in rubber production in the Amazon.177 As the U.S. 
consul in Belém noted in June 1943: “A good public relations man or a 
publicity man could help the program immensely by pounding through 
every means available, especially through the press and radio, exactly 
what the Rubber Development Corporation is doing and how it plans to 
do it.”178 To be sure, there was a good deal that needed to be “pounded.” 
In early 1943, Axis radio broadcasts in Latin America denounced U.S. 
authorities for dragooning tappers and labeled Fordlândia a colonial fief-
dom, but the seeds of division were not only sown by the enemy.179 In 
the Amazon, merchants grumbled that the Rubber Development Corpo-
ration offered too low a price for rubber under the Washington Accords, 
undercut their business, and possessed fleeting interest in the raw rubber 
trade. Residents of Belém and Manaus griped that the arrival of the RdC, 
with two hundred American employees and an even greater (and less re-
munerated) Brazilian staff, sparked competition for labor and housing—
including office space in the latter’s famed opera house—while the influx 
of thousands of migrants exacerbated food shortages. Peasants attuned 
to socioenvironmental conditions in the forest shrugged at official de-
mands for revamping lifestyles and open- ended promises of public assis-
tance. Conservative Catholics feared that an invasion by American Prot-
estant males would undermine church authority and traditional gender 
roles.180 Brazilian authorities were leery that inter- American collabora-
tive scientific research on rubber might benefit other countries in tropi-
cal America.181 And all the while, the Vargas regime jockeyed to prevent 
the U.S. government from stealing its thunder in the March to the West.
In the United States, conservatives fumed over the misuse of tax-
payer money in the Amazon. The RdC suspected that although the Var-
gas regime assumed full jurisdiction over the recruitment of labor and 
transport to the Amazon, the agency would “probably share the blame,” 
should anything go wrong.182 Officials at the OIAA muttered that “Bra-
zilians, like all Latins, are ultra- sensitive and take offense when none is 
intended.”183 And then there were the day- to- day indiscretions of U.S. 
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government employees in the Amazon, such as an RdC administrative 
assistant who ranted that “we’ll cut off a few of these God damned Brazil-
ian heads,” in the presence of local merchants who understood Eng lish; 
the nocturnal escapades of his fellow employee, arrested after a drunken 
row at several bordellos in Manaus’s red light district; or the divorce of an 
American couple employed by the RdC after the woman became “infatu-
ated” with a Brazilian administrator at the agency.184 Small wonder the 
consul in Belém worried about how to win hearts and minds in Brazil.
The nature of U.S.- Brazilian collaboration in wartime propaganda has 
been well documented.185 In Brazil, the Departamento de Imprensa e 
Propaganda (dIp) used mass media and censorship to popularize the Es-
tado Novo’s agenda.186 In the United States, the OIAA produced documen-
tary films conveying the sociocultural dimensions and technological and 
scientific achievements of the United States and Latin America; beamed 
radio broadcasts promoting inter- American alliance and the “American 
way of life”; worked with the United Press and Associated Press to pub-
lish favorable reports on the United States in the Latin American media 
and vice versa; convinced Hollywood to depict Latin American subjects 
in a positive light; provided pro- Allied newspapers in Latin America 
with subsidized shipment of newsprint; and published a glossy maga-
zine in Spanish and Portuguese modeled after Life which was entitled Em 
Guarda in Brazil.187 The OIAA office in Brazil, headed by coffee importer 
Berent Friele and a board composed of local representatives of American 
corporations, worked closely with the Brazilian media industries and the 
dIp, producing various print publications and over one hundred films in 
Portuguese, many covering the war effort in Brazil.188
The publicity for the Battle for Rubber mirrored these trends. The gov-
ernment information bureaus and the media of both nations, as well as 
the specialized agencies directly involved in the rubber campaign, made 
use of film, radio, newspapers, posters, and photography. In the United 
States, the OIAA regaled domestic audiences with The Amazon Awakens 
(1944), produced by Walt Disney Studios, which offered a triumphalist 
depiction of the rubber campaign and the modernization of the Ama-
zon.189 Brazil at War (1943), produced by the OIAA for U.S. newsreels, 
proclaimed: “a million and a half square miles of wild rubber trees in the 
friendly Amazon basin is again being tapped to supply the needs of the 
United Nations. Brazil’s production of rubber alone may prove to be a de-
cisive factor in winning this war.”190 And the RdC consistently sought to 
impress U.S. audiences with the magnitude of its mission in the Amazon. 
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When National Geographic agreed to publish only two of the Amazonian 
prints by RdC photographer Francis Joannini, due to the “uninteresting 
choice of subject matter and unimaginative arrangement,” a government 
memorandum suggested a new checklist: “get action in all pictures,” 
“avoid static, purely scenic shots,” “concentrate on foreground figures, 
more emphasis on people,” “keep crowds of curious nationals from sur-
rounding objects photographed or otherwise clogging photograph.”191
In Brazil, the OIAA collaborated with Vargas’s propaganda department 
on publicity material for the rubber campaign, including the production 
of a 35 mm film entitled Borracha para a vitória (Rubber for Victory), re-
leased in August 1943 for distribution in theaters nationwide.192 The OIAA 
also worked with the Rubber Development Corporation to co- ordinate 
publicity in Brazil. For the Amazon and the northeast, the RdC produced 
handbills, posters, and news articles announcing the prices for rubber, 
the terms and costs for tapping supplies, and the availability of antima-
larial medication. It also published instructional tapping literature for 
distribution through relevant Brazilian channels.193 To spread the word 
among northeastern and Amazon populations, marked by high rates of 
illiteracy, geographic isolation, and mistrust of state officials, publicists 
relied heavily on audiovisual materials. One OIAA poster, for example, 
showed a diminutive, panicky Hitler being overrun by an enormous 
tire—although the caption, “Esborracha- o com borracha!” (“Rub him out 
with rubber!”), added certain oomph (see figure 3.7). Similarly, the OIAA’s 
monthly publication, No Front da Borracha (On the Rubber Front), fea-
tured on one of its covers a Nazi octopus stabbed by a tapper’s knife.194 
Rubber Reserve printed illustrated booklets and pamphlets, including 
20,000 copies of Dona Gota Borracha, which recounted the journey of 
“Miss Rubber Drop” from tree trunk to heavy artillery tire, and was dis-
tributed by the Brazilian government’s propaganda bureau.195
The use of newer technologies aimed at reaching mass audiences. In 
Cinema, Aspirinas, Urubus (2005), a feature film based upon the wartime 
experience of the director’s great- uncle, radio broadcasts served to draw 
nordestinos to the Amazon.196 In fact, in the 1940s, most poor sertane-
jos lacked radios, but broadcasts did reach a larger swath of the back-
land population.197 A history of Limoeiro, Ceará, for example, notes that 
the radio at the Salão Freitas hangout “kept the popular classes well in-
formed” through news broadcasts from the Ceará Radio Clube, the Rio- 
based stations, and even the BBC.198 And traveling in August 1943 through 
the interior of the states of Ceará, Paraíba, and Rio Grande do Norte, an 
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RdC official deemed radio broadcasts effective in recruiting labor to the 
Amazon.199 In Amazonas, Álvaro Maia and the state’s department of pro-
paganda made regular use of the radio, while the Radio Clube of Pará 
broadcast its “rubber program” nightly.200 The OIAA also arranged for 
16 mm films to be screened in October 1944 in the towns of Manacaparu, 
Anamã, Codajás, and Coari on the Solimões River to an estimated 14,900 
people, courtesy of the American Redemptorist Fathers, who transported 
the projector and a portable generator.201 In presenting spectators with 
new forms of social interaction and reconfigurations of speed and time, 
the medium of the movie was also the message.202
The recruitment campaign, however, also enlisted old- fashioned power 
brokers in northern Brazil, such as town mayors, the press, philanthropic 
groups, military commanders and state police, and the Catholic Church 
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(see figure 3.8).203 The latter had long partaken in public ceremonies, 
charitable works, drought relief, and political campaigns in Ceará.204 
Thus, in his pastoral letter of May 1942, Archbishop Antônio de Almeida 
Lustosa of Fortaleza instructed priests to counsel parishioners suffering 
under drought that Divine Providence “tempers our punishment sud-
denly with succor. . . . The soldados da borracha leave with every possible 
comfort. And it is the [government] plan to provide comfort to the family 
that he had once assisted.”205 In December 1942, SEMTA director Paulo 
Assis Ribeiro met with the papal nuncio to coordinate the church’s role 
in recruitment efforts.206 Father Helder Câmara, director of SEMTA’s reli-
gious division, encouraged clergy throughout the northeast to promote 
Amazonian migration. (Among the preoccupations of Câmara, an earlier 
supporter of Brazil’s fascist Integralist movement, was that U.S. Protes-
tants were “eyeing the opportunity to infiltrate the Amazon.”207)
During 1943, Catholic newspapers in Ceará endorsed rubber tapping 
as the “greatest blessing of God” for nordestinos to support their chil-
dren, admonishing that any father who failed to “fulfill this responsibility 
before the Creator was undeserving of the grace he had received and 
would have been better off if he had never possessed procreative facul-
ties!”208 And in backland towns and migrant camps, priests officiated at 
masses, ceremonies, and baptisms for rubber “soldiers” and their fami-
figure 3.8 Procession of rubber “soldiers” in Fortaleza organized by SEMTA. The banners 
read: “More Tires for Victory” and “Bound for Amazonia, The Land of Plenty.” Source: 
Departamento de Patrimônio Histórico e Cultural do Estado do Acre.
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lies prior to departure for the Amazon.209 The audience was not always 
deferential. In postwar testimonies, residents of Limoeiro recalled that 
one Sunday, as parishioners emerged from mass, Helder Câmara stood 
on a bench in the town square, exhorting: “I am not saying that you 
should go to Amazonas. I am saying, let us go to Amazonas, because I, 
too, will go with you.” When Tabosa, a painter and the sole Communist 
in the town, heckled Câmara, the mayor had him arrested.210 Documen-
tation of the church’s role in the Amazon is sparser. In 1943, João da Mata 
Amaral, the newly appointed bishop of Amazonas, told the U.S. consul 
of his intent to replace German and Italian clerics with Brazilians in the 
interior of the state, and expressed the church’s support for the rubber 
campaign and concern for migrants’ physical and spiritual well- being.211 
Wartime photographs of civic ceremonies often feature the bishop at the 
side of interventor Álvaro Maia.
Most wartime mediators of the Amazon had slight knowledge of the 
region that they sought to represent. The halcyon rendition of life on the 
seringal designed by Swiss immigrant artist Jean- Pierre Chabloz for one 
of SEMTA’s recruitment posters, for example, had been gleaned from his 
brief, lone visit to Belém. The instructional tapping film undertaken by 
the Coordinator’s Office and Rubber Development reveals similar disso-
nance between the images and realities of the Amazon.212 Intent upon 
depicting rubber tapping as a large- scale, epic production, rather than a 
scattered operation among small groups of seringueiros in remote areas, 
the cameraman traveled to Acre, where he hired several seringueiros to 
band together to extract large quantities of rubber. Since his arrival also 
did not coincide with actual transport of the rubber by mule and raft, he 
had to pay to stage these scenes as well.213 Ultimately, RdC technicians 
slammed the footage for showing seringueiros cutting from right to left, 
as was customary in the Amazon, rather than the reverse, as practiced in 
Asia. The film was apparently never completed.214
The relevance of campaign propaganda to the wartime experiences 
of migrants and tappers will be analyzed further in the subsequent two 
chapters. We might point out here that the historian’s conundrum of 
gauging cultural reception haunted wartime bureaucrats as well. In re-
porting on the public response to film screenings in Amazon towns, for 
example, Mabel Gustin noted that “everyone recognized Hitler and en-
joyed heckling him whenever he appeared” in Walt Disney’s animated 
cartoon, Der Fuehrer’s Face, although she suspected that the audience 
did not understand the entire film.215 A number of rubber technicians 
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also claimed that tappers welcomed patriotic pep talks and the distribu-
tion of propaganda literature.216 From the Middle Amazon, technician 
Moacyr B. de Mello reported that “whenever we mentioned the amount 
of rubber needed to build a bomber (and we mentioned this wherever we 
stopped) the reaction was instantaneous and a crowd would gather seek-
ing further information. Luckily we had a list of the amounts needed for a 
medium tank, a battleship and a gas mask!” And distribution of the OIAA 
magazine Em Guarda—with its “pictures of airplanes, tanks and trucks 
with their rubber parts plainly visible”—reportedly could not keep up 
with demand: at a meeting place of seringueiros, for example, an RdC 
technician found some old copies of Em Guarda whose dog- eared con-
dition suggested that they had passed through many hands. Other ob-
servers scoffed, however, that tappers used propaganda material “mainly 
to adorn their bare walls,” and that “wallpaper would stimulate greater 
interest.”217 In a similar vein, Mabel Gustin disparaged river dwellers’ 
lack of decorum during the film screenings, exclaiming: “It is difficult for 
us to believe these things, but after traveling in the interior, you realize 
what children these people are.”218
It is fair to surmise that most nordestinos bound for the Amazon 
were not seduced by patriotic appeals or government promises. Along 
with other workers mobilized for special wartime labor in the Americas, 
whether the Mexican bracero or Rosie the Riveter, northeastern migrants 
pursued economic opportunities through networks of kin and commu-
nity that had been shaped by historical patterns and cultural norms.219 
As for long- time forest residents, the observation of one RdC technician 
seems rather apt: “They regard us tourists or city folks with a certain 
amount of pitying disdain. Outsiders might have luxurious automobiles 
or big launches but when they get out in the country they invariably make 
some awfully funny and foolish mistakes. . . . It is just a constant source 
of amazement to them how anyone who can’t even find his way around 
ever managed to get enough money or had enough sense to get himself 
food and drink, much less an automobile or a launch.” Such errors, he 
concluded, “only made the natives question the authenticity if not the 
veracity of all the statements we make.”220
Unlike laborers in other extractive industries, such as mining, Amazo-
nian gatherers enjoyed unusual autonomy and mobility in their work, 
even if geographic dispersal bedeviled collective organization.221 Thus, 
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during the great rubber boom, bosses forged vertical bonds through 
credit to coax production while tappers wedded the trade in forest com-
modities with varied subsistence patterns. Tensions strained commercial 
relationships in which bosses routinely gouged and short- changed their 
“customers,” while workers tempered abuse through myriad forms of 
evasion and noncompliance. In the interwar doldrums, credit- strapped 
bosses struggled to secure labor and sustain rubber production as tap-
pers migrated downriver and turned to subsistence and other extractive 
economies.
To increase wartime rubber output, Brazilian and U.S. authorities en-
deavored to change the nature and meaning of work in the Amazon for-
est. While authorities from North and South America may have bickered 
over the profile of the new Amazonian worker—the former favoring un-
accompanied men to tap rubber, and the latter, family colonization—both 
envisioned remaking (human) nature in the Amazon. The institution of 
standard labor contracts sought to recruit migrants, regiment produc-
tion, circumscribe worker autonomy, and curb employer abuse. Tappers 
received promises of set returns and price controls on consumer goods, 
access to health care, and the right to labor mediation. Bosses obtained 
guarantees of subsidized labor and supplies and a regimented workforce. 
To mobilize far- flung populations with limited insertion in the market 
economy, a high illiteracy rate, and spotty identification with the nation- 
state, government officials counted on diverse media and social actors to 
broadcast masculinist ideals of adventure, social mobility, and patriotic 
service.
The publicity blitz surrounding National Rubber Month in June 1943 
encapsulates the image- making intrinsic to such efforts to refashion 
the Amazon. The brainchild of RdC officials and advertising executives 
from the J. Walter Thompson Agency, National Rubber Month had been 
adapted from the nationwide U.S. scavenger hunt of the previous year. 
The Brazilian campaign employed public spectacle, contests, and media 
broadcasts to prod tappers to increase production and city dwellers to re-
cycle scrap.222 In Fortaleza, the primary transshipment point for north-
eastern migrants to Amazonia, the state of Ceará’s Department of Propa-
ganda organized a lavish parade of “rubber soldiers,” who were flanked 
by high school students and boy scouts, and saluted by Brazilian govern-
ment officials and members of the U.S. and British diplomatic corps.223 
In Pará, a group of university students sailed upriver on the “caravan of 
victory” to rally with tappers and bosses in the major rubber- producing 
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counties.224 In Manaus, the Trade Association of Amazonas (ACA) an-
nounced a yearlong tapping competition to “ensure rubber for our army 
and armies of the other nations that are fighting against Germany and 
Italy.” Each of the top rubber producers in the state’s twenty- eight coun-
ties would be awarded CR$1,000, and an all- expense- paid fifteen- day visit 
to Manaus; the top five producers would receive a bonus of CR$1,000 
each, and the grand prize winner an additional CR$2,000.225 As a bi-
national undertaking, National Rubber Month also reflected deft diplo-
matic maneuvers. Lest Brazilians lose sight of the broader significance of 
the rubber program, in vetting the commemoration, Vargas insisted that 
footage of his 1940 visit to the Amazon and his historic speech inaugu-
rate the month’s festivities “so as to show that he was the instigator of 
the program for the ‘rebirth’ and development of the Amazon Basin and 
Mato Grosso . . . opening up now one of the most fertile and promising 
Hinterlands to systematic exploration.”226
While Brazilian and U.S. publicists did not invent images of the 
Amazon from whole cloth, we might underscore some of the wartime 
campaign’s (mis)representations. In a society where credit sustained 
livelihoods, reformers denounced debt merchandising as unmitigated 
exploitation. Where noncapitalist modes of production reigned on the 
rubber properties, progressives envisioned the triumph of wage labor. 
Where the rule of law was elusive, bureaucrats and politicians trumpeted 
workers’ new- found rights. Where few achieved social mobility, boosters 
promised windfall profits. Where variability marked forest ecosystems, 
outsiders yearned for standardization and predictability. And in a region 
that had become (in current- day parlance) significantly “international-
ized,” the Vargas and Roosevelt administrations labored to uphold the 
semblance of Brazilian national sovereignty. Such discrepancies suggest 
less the calculated duplicity of government officials than an urge to con-
ceal their ignorance or impotence regarding the Amazon, and their con-
descension toward local practices and systems of knowledge. They also 
reveal that behind the efforts to save the Amazon often lies the impulse 
merely to wish away its realities.
Political change, of course, requires bold policy initiatives, but the 
wartime campaign demonstrates how outsiders have long imagined and 
represented the Amazon as a region transformable by fiat or fancy. Serin-
gais did not even vaguely resemble coffee plantations. The former’s trees 
were scattered over vast forests; their sinuous trails might become over-
grown after heavy rains and during the months when they were not used 
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for gathering rubber; and their trading posts perched atop “ports” often 
consisted of a staircase carved into a steep river bank leading to a rudi-
mentary platform made of tree trunks.227 Methods of collecting rubber, 
social conditions and geographic distances in the Amazon, and the inef-
fectiveness of labor inspection by the regional delegation of the federal 
labor ministry and the labor courts (particularly in comparison to the 
São Paulo Labor Department’s staff of one hundred inspectors) all served 
to undermine wartime visions of regional transformation.228 Similarly, 
Asian tapping methods could hardly appeal to seringueiros when the Je-
bong was less suited than the Amazon knife for tapping old, mistreated 
trees, or when tappers’ eyesight had become so debilitated by smoked 
ball production that they needed to rely on its familiar feel. Not to men-
tion that tappers laboring under exploitative conditions might hardly see 
a new kind of knife as their panacea.229 Bosses and tappers instead would 
rely on time- tested methods of control and negotiation.
Although the wartime campaign failed to transform modes of pro-
duction and exchange in the Amazon, revisionist accounts fall into dif-
ferent traps in evoking lives and landscapes wasted by dictatorial wile.230 
We might reconsider indictments of Vargas’s demagoguery when bi-
national accords with the United States set the parameters for Brazilian 
public policies in the Amazon. We might question the dismissal of Bra-
zilian wartime nationalism as an elite manipulation devoid of popular 
underpinnings.231 We might challenge, as I explore in the subsequent 
chapter, tales of nordestino enticement to the Amazon that are belied 
by migrants’ historical expectations and experiences. And we need not 
trivialize endeavors to forge citizenship in the forest when the Vargas 
regime’s formalization of tapper rights and obligations, backed by New 
Deal internationalists, represented a significant counterpunch and his-
torical precedent. Contemporary defense of the social rights of “tradi-
tional peoples” in the Amazon did not originate with the Catholic Church 
and foreign environmentalists amidst increased social conflict and defor-
estation in the 1970s and 1980s. Their legal foundations date back to the 
Brazilian- American wartime alliance and the efforts of welfare states to 
remake nature, work, and politics in the forest.
ChApTER 4
the enVIronment of northeaStern 
mIgratIon to the amazon
Landscapes, Labor, and Love
Between 1941 and 1945, the Brazilian government transported 54,972 migrants to the Amazon in the largest state- subsidized 
domestic transfer of free labor in the nation’s history.1 Accord-
ing to the December 1945 report of the Comissão Administrativa 
do Encaminhamento de Trabalhadores para a Amazônia (CAETA), 
34,423 migrants came to the Amazon between 1943 and 1945: 
10,123 men, brought by the agency’s predecessor, SEMTA, between 
March and September 1943; and another 16,235 men and 8,065 
women between October 1943 and April 1945.2 The Departamento 
Nacional de Imigração (dNI) claimed to have relocated another 
20,549 individuals in family units between 1941 and 1943. These 
official tallies exclude “spontaneous,” or nonsubsidized, migration, 
nor does “transport to the Amazon” reveal much about migrants’ 
precise destinations or destinies.
During the Brazilian Constituent Assembly of 1946, convened 
in the wake of the Estado Novo, a brouhaha erupted over the fate 
of the wartime migrants. Congressmen from several northeastern 
states alleged that 23,000 of their compatriots, lured by the Vargas 
dictatorship’s get- rich- quick schemes and promises of state assis-
tance, were “dead or lost” in the forest.3 As Ceará congressman and 
reporter Paulo Sasarate charged: “The Estado Novo propaganda 
filled the Nordestino with fantasies of all sorts and made him be-
lieve in so many claims and promises that even we journalists, not 
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just the sertanejos, let ourselves be deceived by that colossal sweet talk.” 
Amidst lurid press coverage, the Congress conducted a special parlia-
mentary inquest between July and September of 1946 into the Battle 
for Rubber.4 For decades, the accusations have stuck. In 2000, historian 
Marco Antonio Villa argued that during a devastating wartime drought 
in the northeastern backlands, the Vargas regime had its “hands free to 
lead as it wished the workers to Amazonia.”5 In 2006, the New York Times 
contended that the Brazilian government had “dragooned” labor for the 
rubber campaign.6 And migrants have bewailed the siren song of official 
propaganda to journalists, documentary filmmakers, and on websites.7
Since nordestinos were critical in the making of the Amazon, this 
chapter revisits wartime migration to the region. In the annals of migra-
tion, detractors often blame unscrupulous recruiters for hoodwinking 
peasants, draining local labor, and unleashing moral disaster.8 Indeed, 
since the nineteenth century, prominent Cearenses denounced the en-
ticers who entrapped their compatriots in the Amazon forest.9 Alterna-
tively, commentators have cast northeastern migration to the Amazon as 
an atavistic instinct.10 In Mobilidade, Caráter e Região (1959), Gonçalves 
Fernandes argued that nordestinos’ wartime get- up- and- go derived from 
the “very mental structure” that they had inherited from their peripatetic 
Portuguese and indigenous ancestors, which propelled them to the Ama-
zon to relive ancestral heroism.11 Whether glossed as coercive, guileful, 
or instinctual, northeastern migration never emerges as a mechanism 
of household reproduction, a form of protest, a personal decision, or a 
transformative process for peoples and places.12 Rather, the backlands of 
northeastern Brazil, as historian Durval de Albuquerque notes, has been 
represented as “space without history, hostile to change.”13 So too has the 
Amazon.14
This chapter situates wartime relocation from the northeast to the 
Amazon in the political economies, microsocial networks, and inter-
locking histories of these regions rather than in the realms of dictatorial 
treachery and peasant gullibility. Focusing on Ceará, the northeastern 
state that furnished the preponderant number of wartime migrants to 
the Amazon, I analyze how longstanding patterns of inequitable land dis-
tribution collided with rapid demographic growth, a rise in agroexports, 
and a crisis in smallholding. A drought in 1942–43 and the steep wartime 
increase in the cost of living exacerbated deep- seated social inequalities. 
Thousands relocated to southern Brazil, but with a new rubber boom and 
an expanding labor market, the Amazon beckoned as well—an option 
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sweetened by the offer of subsidized transport with per diem. Nordes-
tinos’ decisions to migrate to the Amazon were shaped by diverse factors: 
environmental disaster, socioeconomic status, accessibility to informa-
tion and transportation, age, gender, and health.
The deep historical ties linking Ceará and the Amazon further nur-
tured a distinct set of historical experiences and social expectations for 
local households and communities. Between 1870 and 1910, during the 
great rubber boom, hundreds of thousands of Cearenses and other nor-
destinos had migrated to the Amazon.15 Through the trail of financial 
remittances, the first- hand accounts of returnees (paroaras), the verse of 
popular poets, and the lore of families and communities, images of the 
Amazon long circulated in the northeast outside of official institutional 
channels. Thus, for some wartime migrants, “the Amazon”—or, more 
precisely, “the north” or “Amazonas,” in the local parlance of the north-
east—conjured rubber tapping, or remuneration and refuge of any kind. 
Others had a specific geographic region or property in mind. Many were 
poor, younger men, but the demographic pool was not homogeneous, 
and individuals possessed varied resources and motives in embarking 
for the valley during World War II. Although some migrants envisioned 
a long- term stay, most imagined a brief sojourn. “I came to earn money 
on the seringal and then to return home,” one new arrival in Manaus in 
1943 noted. “I came to get some change to buy a pump for my banana 
trees,” stated another; “I will go back when fate allows, and luck as well,” 
remarked his colleague.16
As historian José Moya notes, migrants respond to larger macrostruc-
tural forces over which they have little control, but in the process they 
become active participants in the shaping of history.17 Impelled by global 
warfare, social inequalities, and family dramas, northeastern migrants 
struggled for decent work, fair pay, or a plot of land in the Amazon. Mi-
grants were neither dupes nor passive victims but agents of change in 
their sending and receiving communities. Their varied appropriation of 
Amazonian resources served to shape the nature of the region.
the political economy and ecology of wartime drought
In just a few words, Joaquim Moreira de Souza recounted in 1998 why he 
had trekked thousands of miles as a teenager from his home in Ceará’s 
Jaguaribe Valley to the Amazon during World War II: “Drought nudged 
me along.”18 Drought long afflicted a large part of the agricultural and 
pastoral pursuits of the northeastern interior (particularly in the states of 
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Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, and Pernambuco), occurring at ran-
dom intervals (averaging one in ten years) and of varying duration (one to 
three years).19 Although migrants often blame climatic adversity for their 
odysseys, drought may function as well in such testimonies as shorthand 
for the larger, punishing socioeconomic forces over which they likewise 
had little control, or as a narrative shield for family intrigues too intimate 
to affirm publicly. The misery wrought by drought originates anyway in 
the political as much as the natural landscape: like other “natural” dis-
asters, drought must be understood as a social phenomenon, mediated 
by existing political, socioeconomic, and cultural networks, in which cli-
matic conditions exacerbate deep social inequalities.20 Put another way, 
drought does not kill people or force them to leave their homes: hunger 
and disease do. This in turn raises broader questions about unequal ac-
cess to food, water, credit, transportation, medical care, and government 
assistance in weathering the effects of drought. Drought migration to the 
Amazon during World War II must be assessed in the context of the dif-
ferential impact of environmental disaster on backland populations, the 
diverse political strategies by Cearense elites and federal officials to man-
age social crisis, and the constrained options of the rural poor in coping 
with both privation and opportunity.
In 1940, 77 percent of Ceará’s population of 2.1 million was rural, 
and over 78 percent of the state’s population illiterate.21 Like neigh-
boring states in northeastern Brazil, Ceará suffered from a paucity of 
schools, hospitals, industry, and skilled labor.22 The extraction of xerophi-
lous plants such as carnauba palm (wax), oiticica (oil), castor seed (oil), 
and caroá cactus (hemplike fiber) complemented cotton as the state’s 
leading export commodities, which were controlled by a small group 
of larger landowners. Most agriculturists were subsistence farmers, 
whether smallholders or sharecroppers, although peasant households 
might also engage in cultivation or gathering of a cash crop.23 The family 
labor of peasant households—drawing upon the physical strength of all 
able- bodied members; extensive knowledge of crops, soils, and cyclical 
seasonal patterns; and utilization of local flora and fauna spread over a 
range of microenvironments—sustained the backlands population (see 
map 4.1).24
The 1940 census data reveal the widespread poverty and social in-
equalities in Ceará (see table 4.1). Properties over 100 hectares, which 
comprised less than 20 percent of total landholdings, controlled over 76 
percent of the land. And while many small farmers maintained direct 
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access to the means of production, rapid demographic growth strained 
family units. From 1920 to 1940, the population of Ceará increased from 
1,319,228 to 2,091,032, nearly 32 percent of whom were under the age 
of ten.25
With an agricultural sector largely devoid of irrigation, machinery, in-
puts, pesticides, and storage facilities, rain acquired supreme importance 
for peasant households and the broader economic life of Ceará.26 News-
papers dedicated special reports to rainfall. Rural dwellers entreated 
patron saints for water. And popular lore held that in the absence of suf-
ficient rain by St. Joseph’s Day on March 19, subsistence farmers had to 
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Ceará experienced drought during 1941 and 1942, and a partial 
drought in 1943.28 By April 1942, tens of thousands of smallholders and 
sharecroppers had lost their crops and livestock, and scores of drought- 
related deaths had occurred, primarily of children.29 According to the 
state’s secretary of agriculture and the director of public works, twenty- 
five counties faced a calamity, with droves of ruined farmers and their 
families on the move in search of assistance.30 In November 1942, U.S. ob-
servers estimated that 300,000 people had been affected by the drought 
in Ceará, albeit in varying degrees; approximately 100,000 concentrated 
in the vicinity of small towns, living from occasional jobs and begging, 
while 18,000 men (supporting 80,000 people) were working on public 
road construction.31 Thousands of flagelados, or drought evacuees, congre-
gated near commercial establishments, churches, and municipal offices 
in backland hamlets in search of food, work, or alms, overwhelming local 
resources.32 Francisco Menezes Pimentel, the federally appointed gover-
nor in Ceará, pressed the Vargas administration to construct public works 
in the region, but also endorsed state- subsidized transport to the Ama-
zon as a measure for drought relief.33
The history of drought in the Brazilian northeast and the efforts to 
combat it are well documented.34 Covering a heterogeneous region of 
some 650,000 square kilometers, the sertão of northeastern Brazil con-
tains drought- free elevated and mountainous areas, where rainfall is 
much higher than average in the region, as well as six major river sys-
tems. The caatinga, or semi- arid region of the sertão, starts in the valley- 
sides and extends over the surrounding hills and is characterized by xero-
table 4.1
land tenure patterns in ceará in 1940
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Over 1,000 0.551 25.53
Source: Anthony Hall, Drought and Irrigation in North- East Brazil, 34.
1The total does not add up to 100 percent due to rounding of numbers.
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philous vegetation, such as cacti, shrubs, and small trees.35 A long dry 
season from June to December, high temperatures, thin surface soils, 
rapid evaporation, and sparse vegetation all contribute to the severity of 
drought.36
Until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the sertão 
attracted few Portuguese settlers given the region’s harsh climate, chal-
lenging soils, and hostile Indians. During the late colonial period, how-
ever, settlers began to push inland, establishing large cattle ranches to 
supply the coastal plantations with meat and cattle by- products, while a 
mid- nineteenth- century cotton boom, favored by the plunge in U.S. ex-
ports during the Civil War, attracted large numbers of small farmers.37 As 
a cattle and cash- crop economy took hold in the sertão, a variety of land- 
use arrangements emerged. Landowners granted tenant farmers and 
sharecroppers the right to occupy land in return for payment in cash, or 
more typically a stipulated share of the crop, while a stratum of workers 
earned petty wages for random chores performed on estates. But many 
small landowners had their own plots where their families mixed subsis-
tence farming with small cash- crop production, albeit at substantial risk 
in a drought- prone region.38
Euclides da Cunha pithily described the drought cycles as “an eter-
nal and monotonous novelty” rousing the incorrigible sentimentalism of 
the national soul, but whose intermittence undermined enduring solu-
tions.39 Following the great drought of 1877–79—in which hunger and 
epidemic disease claimed as much as one half of Ceará’s population of 
one million in Brazil’s worst “natural” disaster to date—the federal gov-
ernment undertook the first of many studies to prevent future catastro-
phes.40 The Inspetoria Federal de Obras Contra as Secas (IfOCS), created 
in 1909, endorsed technical solutions to solve the problems of northeast-
ern drought—creation of dams and storage reservoirs (açudes), establish-
ment of meteorological and pluviometric stations, geological surveys, 
and construction of railroads and roads to assist in future relief efforts.41
Under Vargas, the federal government greatly expanded public works 
in the northeastern sertão. Between 1931 and 1944, the regime oversaw 
the construction of thirty public reservoirs, while an increase in the num-
ber of private (state- subsidized) açudes boosted water storage capacity 
more than tenfold.42 The northeast’s road network also grew by over six 
thousand kilometers during this same period.43 Although technological 
fixes diminished drought’s lethality, they failed to stem its disparate im-
pact on backland populations. State- funded reservoirs and dams, con-
134 Chapter 4
structed without simultaneous preparation of an irrigation network 
(which would have required expropriation of estates), principally bene-
fited large cash crop producers and a handful of adjacent smallholders, 
while new roads often rewarded influential landowners.44 As Manoel 
Taigy de Queiroz Mello of Taperoá, Paraíba, wrote to Vargas in Febru-
ary 1944: “Roads only serve to ‘richen’ (enricar) truck owners, reservoirs 
are very good for the mayors and their cronies, and even so need rain to 
fill up.” After three years of drought, his neighbors resembled “veritable 
skeletons,” forced to beg or steal barbed wire to sell for food.45
The plight of Mello’s neighbors was sadly familiar. Sharecroppers 
and smallholders—hobbled by restricted access to water, lack of storage 
facilities, chronic indebtedness, limited market insertion, and precari-
ous land claims—were far likelier to be devastated by drought than the 
owners of cattle herds or plantations of cotton and carnauba palm. With 
minimal cash income garnered from the sale of their produce or from 
wage payments, smallholders depended primarily on meager stocks 
of staple foods to survive droughts, yet these precisely were most hard 
hit.46 Indeed, the risks and uncertainties bearing upon the northeastern 
poor’s preparedness for environmental calamity flowed from the every-
day conditions of work and social security that consumed their energies, 
or what one social scientist has termed “the myth of ordinary life.”47 At 
the mercy of merchant capital for loans and marketing of goods, small 
farmers rarely had the motivation or the means to invest in input or tech-
nology, even under “normal conditions.”48 A 1939 study of forty- six fami-
lies living at the IfOCS agricultural post in São Gonçalo, Paraíba, for ex-
ample, found an illiteracy rate of 75 percent for the population over ten, 
and an infant mortality rate of 31 percent for children less than one year 
old. All of the families had debt ranging from 50$00 to 250$000 mil- réis, 
representing a deficit of one to two months of work.49 “Living badly and 
dressing worse,” recalled a local historian of Quixadá, “when one got sick, 
the remedy was to search for medicinal plants. Only rarely could some-
one pay for a doctor or medicine from the pharmacy.”50
Large landowners, more directly linked to the market economy, could 
rely on cash and other liquid assets in times of need, while their ability 
to store staples poised them to take advantage of spikes in food prices.51 
They also brokered considerable political power across the northeastern 
backlands: in Ceará, prominent clans included the Feitosas of Inhamuns, 
the Montes of Sobral, the Queiroz of Quixadá, the Gouveias of Iguatu, 
and the Távoras of Jaguaribe.52
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The commodity booms of the 1930s and early 1940s most likely deep-
ened social inequalities in Ceará and the vulnerability of the poor to 
drought and famine. Cotton was a case in point. In 1938–39, Brazil’s 
northeast produced 122,000 tons of cotton for export primarily to Europe 
and Japan.53 It was grown on large plantations such as São João, compris-
ing alluvial land within reach of water channeled from Quixadá’s Cedro 
reservoir, and held by an individual “whose family has owned property in 
Ceará for generations and has been influential in domestic affairs.”54 But 
cotton also served as the “poor man’s crop,” cultivated by tens of thou-
sands of smallholders and sharecroppers on plots ranging from twenty- 
five to sixty hectares under primitive methods.55 With drought halving 
cotton production in Ceará from the previous year (see table 4.2), the 
U.S. consul noted in November 1942: “At what is generally the height of 
the cotton ginning season many gins in the sertão region are already pre-
paring to close down for the year. The poorer farmers and laborers in this 
district are in desperate straits, due to the lack of employment and have 
no means of providing for themselves and their families.”56
The boom in carnauba wax in the late 1930s and early 1940s en-
gendered similar socioeconomic disparities. Carnauba wax served as a 
base for polishes and in the manufacture of lubricants and phonograph 
records, but its price more than doubled between 1938 and 1944 when 
its application as a surface wax was found to increase the speed of air-
table 4.2
production of cotton in ceará in kilograms, 1937–1944









Source: Walter W. Hoffmann, Ceará Cotton, Fortaleza, August 10, 1944, NA, RG 166, 
Foreign Agricultural Service, Narrative Reports (1942–45), Brazil: Cooperatives- Cotton, 
Box 56.
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planes.57 Carnauba led Ceará’s exports by 1939, bringing the trappings 
of modernity to towns in the Jaguaribe valley, the state’s main producing 
region, and involving some 20 to 30 percent of the state’s population.58 
Extracted from the leaves of palm trees near the principal rivers of the 
northeast, carnauba wax was compromised by the drought of 1942, com-
pounding the trade’s uneven dividends. Most palm “cutters” earned less 
than two cruzeiros daily in a harvest that lasted less than two months at 
the end of the dry season. During the winter months, thousands worked 
on small agricultural clearings, sought temporary employment in town, 
and assumed credit advances from landowners and merchants to acquire 
food, clothing, and other incidentals.59 On the other hand, João Ivo Xavier 
and other “donos das várzeas” (owners of the river banks where the car-
nauba palm grew), were well equipped to withstand drought. Xavier, a 
former mayor of Russas, owned a large carnauba property, a mill for re-
fining the wax, and an “enchanting” country house with an electrical gen-
erator; like other wealthy landowners in the 1940s, he resided in the capi-
tal, where he could educate his large brood.60
The rise in northeastern agroexports provoked a drop in food crop pro-
duction. In a 1942 survey of rural Ceará, engineer Dulphe Pinheiro Ma-
chado noted that agriculturists in the Jaguaribe valley had profited from 
the extractive industries of carnauba and oiticica prior to the drought.61 
The latter commodity, a pecan- sized nut of the large evergreens found in 
the grasslands bordering the Jaguaribe and other rivers in the sertão, sup-
plied the surging U.S. demand for drying oils following the disruption in 
traditional Asian exports.62 Yet whereas Ceará exported 24 million kilos 
of manioc flour in the 1920s, the state imported 84 million kilos during 
the following decade.63 As in the cataclysmic nineteenth- century drought 
that triggered Brazil’s “late Victorian Holocaust,” the pre- war expansion 
of agroexports in the northeastern backlands compromised food produc-
tion and security (see table 4.3).64
With the cost of living in Ceará tripling in 1942 due to reduced food 
supplies and commercial speculation on imports, the U.S. vice consul in 
Fortaleza requested a raise from the secretary of state.65 But for the rural 
poor, who had slight chance of securing credit or getting a raise, drought 
meant getting by on perhaps one meal per day of farinha and piabá (a 
goldfish- sized fish eaten dried), and a desperate search for work or assis-
tance.66 As anthropologist Charles Wagley, who oversaw the Amazon mi-
gration program for the OIAA, noted on a five- day field trip through east-
ern Ceará and western Paraíba in November 1942, the problem was not 
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the absence of food per se, since imported food was found in all small 
stores, but the lack of money to purchase it.67 Indeed, in a desperate tele-
gram to Vargas in 1942, agriculturist Joaquim Alves de Freitas denounced 
the socioeconomic factors that had weaponized drought, assailing the 
“magnate and usurer” Antonio Freitas Nobre for rejecting new terms for 
loan repayment and seizing his only property “below cost.”68 Another 
ruined farmer, José Pires Ferreira, implored Vargas to provide for three 
sickles, three axes, and three hoes: “I am a worker. We have had 3 years of 
draught [sic] in Ceará and my family and I are now in mizery [sic]; winter 
is arriving and I don’t have one tool left. I have turned to the state interven-
tor Dr. M. Pimentel and have not received a reply.”69 Ferreira had reached 
rock bottom: small farmers sold their tools and livestock typically as a last 
recourse during drought, only to fetch below- market prices.
In a primarily rural state such as Ceará, drought inflicted suffering 
across the board. Rivers and smaller reservoirs dried up, crops withered, 
livestock perished, and state revenues and commercial credit contracted. 
But the impact of drought, mediated by socioeconomic and political fac-
tors, rendered starkly differential options and outcomes for residents of 
Ceará. From her ranch in Tauá, Dondon Feitosa wrote a friend on July 
10, 1942: “Here, aside from a situation of absurd shortages, we are living 
through a terrible drought due to the great lack [of rainfall].” But, she 
noted, “our friends remain firm, as if suffering has the capacity to unite 
us even further.” As a member of the storied Feitosa clan—with one son 
in high school intent upon attending the military academy in Fortaleza 
and another living in the south of Brazil (whom she had just returned 
table 4.3
crop production in ceará in pounds, 1940–1944
CROp 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
Rice 54,238,140 40,626,696 33,000,000 17,600,000 26,243,000
Corn 249,301,536 197,016,468 111,012,000 123,200,000 275,000,000
Beans 117,685,688 114,977,280 29,040,000 33,300,000 61,146,400
Manioc 953,431,600 857,054,000 792,200,000 880,000,000  1,100,000
Cotton 35,200,000 68,200,000 41,905,600 48,400,000 55,000,000
Carnauba  7,696,359  7,738,654  4,511,712 11,000,000  9,900,000
Source: S. B. Fenne, chief of Region IV, Division of Food and Nutrition, OCIAA, “Ceará,” July 25, 1944, 
NA, RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Brazil, Fortaleza Consulate, 1944.
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from visiting)—Dondon could better afford to “stand firm” in the face of 
“absurd shortages.”70 She and her “friends” certainly would not have to 
suffer the indignities of begging in town, internment in concentration 
camps in Fortaleza, underpay on public works projects, or relocation to 
the Amazon as a method of drought relief. Feitosa’s very ability to lament 
her plight in writing is in itself telling: a survey of fifty- four release forms 
of SEMTA, the Brazilian state agency entrusted with transporting nordes-
tino men to the Amazon, reveals that twenty- eight of the prospective re-
cruits could not even sign their name.71 In this sense, although drought 
may have prompted wartime migration to the Amazon, its impact on 
backland populations was neither “natural” nor neutral.
drought migation: peasant Strategies and public policies
Refugees from the 1942 drought, noted IfOCS engineer Paulo de Brito 
Guerra, showed a definite order of preference: they asked for land first, 
then employment, and “avoid begging whenever possible.”72 Burdened 
with the historical memory of drought, sertanejos developed their own 
understandings and methods for mitigating its effects. Many viewed 
drought as divine punishment for sin: faith gave meaning to human suf-
fering, even if it failed to stem it, at least in this life.73 They also drew 
upon experience with prior environmental calamities, most recently in 
1915, 1919, and 1932. As a peasant strategy to cope with the effects of 
drought, wartime migration to the Amazon must be seen as a somewhat 
selective process, since most did not or could not make the long journey.
Wartime evacuees generally roamed closer to home than the Ama-
zon to await the winter rain. They favored the humid enclaves and water 
reservoirs of the sertão, but these soon became overrun.74 For example, 
over 5,000 people had planted gardens on damp soil at the Cedro reser-
voir—where in nondrought times there might be 2,800—forcing the 
caretaker to turn away new arrivals.75 Public works provided another out-
let: building roads and reservoirs in the backlands, these “anonymous 
heroes,” in the words of an IfOCS engineer, deserved “a bronze statue in 
the Northeast. One in each State.”76 Such laborers were colloquially called 
cassacos: arriving at work sites toting young children in slings, they were 
said to resemble the small marsupials of the northeast. Others have con-
tended that they were referred to as animals because they were treated 
that way.77 Wielding pickaxes or shovels during the day and sleeping in 
hammocks and sacks near the job site at night, cassacos earned meager 
salaries for backbreaking labor—a mere 4 milréis per day (20 American 
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cents)—payable in scrip and redeemable with the unregulated purveyors 
of food and merchandise.78 Yet notwithstanding miserable conditions, 
employment on public works failed to accommodate overwhelming de-
mand.79 Workers shipped by the mayor of Quixadá to one road- building 
project, for example, were turned away because 5,000 people had already 
enlisted.80
Evacuees also flocked to Fortaleza, Ceará’s political and commercial 
center, and a hub for maritime and overland transport. By January 1943, 
an estimated 5,000 people in “terrible physical conditions” clustered in 
camps and public grounds in the capital.81 Some had arrived by railroad, 
while another observer noted “long lines of countless ‘flagelados’ fleeing 
from their parched fields, [who] pitifully dragged themselves hundreds 
of kilometers towards Fortaleza, where they hoped to find some work 
or relief from their tribulations through public or private assistance.”82 
Between 1930 and 1940, the population of Fortaleza had grown from 
111,651 to 182,158, with the agroexport boom fueling the expansion of 
the city’s public utilities and educational and cultural institutions.83 But 
on his 1942 visit, Good Neighbor “ambassador” Waldo Frank noted that 
Fortaleza was “full of sertanejos driven in by thirst and starvation.” In the 
town plaza, Frank observed one sertanejo in a broad straw hat, ragged 
shirt, and leather breeches, who went from bench to bench while his 
wife stood by with a baby in her arms. Accosting Frank, he pleaded: “My 
family is here from the sertão. We had to leave, and nothing was alive 
when we left. I need the fare to take us to Acre. There’s work there in the 
seinguals [sic].” Frank offered the man “more than the average contribu-
tion” for a voyage of more than 3,000 miles.84
In an effort to expedite the “decongestion” of Fortaleza and backland 
towns and to fulfill the broader geopolitical aims of the Estado Novo, 
Governor Menezes Pimentel urged mayors to promote Amazon migra-
tion.85 The archbishop likewise counseled parishioners to get up and go. 
And local newspapers cheered that a new rubber boom had Cearenses 
“getting ready to wash their horses again with beer and to light their ciga-
rettes with 500 mil- réis bills.”86 By fall of 1942, state authorities in Ceará 
had begun coordinating with representatives of U.S. and Brazilian fed-
eral agencies the construction of migrant camps in Fortaleza and back-
land towns.87 In Fortaleza, evacuees were put to work widening the ac-
cess road to the city’s port and building a migrant camp and hospital at 
Alagadiço to facilitate mass labor transfers to the Amazon.88 Whereas the 
Brazilian government had relocated only 435 nordestinos to the Amazon 
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in April 1942, U.S. funding following the signature of the Washington 
Accords allowed the dNI to transport 14,484 persons by February 1943, 
of which slightly more than half were adult men.89
Given high- ranking Cearense officials’ endorsement of Amazon mi-
gration, their postwar accusations that the Vargas regime had lured their 
countrymen to a jungle deathtrap smack of revisionism. Facing a public 
emergency, Ceará’s leaders exhibited a mix of compassion and skittish-
ness. In a society colored by paternalistic bonds and the moral dictates 
of Catholicism, Cearense elites mobilized to offer on- site assistance to 
the dispossessed.90 In April 1942, for example, mayors and clerics of sev-
eral towns beseeched Vargas for humanitarian aid and the construction 
of roads and reservoirs in the backlands.91 The Catholic Church and its 
charitable organizations distributed alms, funded public works, and ap-
pealed to dioceses in southern Brazil.92 Residents of the capital donated 
money, clothes, and even beds, while the Retailers Union of Fortaleza 
protested that “dispatching Cearense workers to Amazonia does not 
remedy the problem as it benefits only the few [physically] sound workers 
selected.”93 (To be sure, U.S. observers detected a substantial dose of self- 
interest among critics who demanded that the Brazilian government 
spend more money on local relief measures, thus securing “added extra 
works and added commerce.”94) But the upheaval straining public order 
in the backlands and urban centers of Ceará also alarmed elites. Fortaleza 
dailies demonized evacuees as vectors of crime and epidemic, and stoked 
hysteria with reports of commandeering of trains and armed robbery in 
backland towns.95 Incidents of “looting” of food—which historian Frede-
rico de Castro Neves correctly views as less a spasmodic, chaotic response 
to hunger than a calculated measure by the rural poor to negotiate the 
defense of moral economy with backland elites and the state—led back-
land merchants to shutter their stores and mayors to panic.96 Archbishop 
Antônio Lustosa denounced the segment of the poor “habituated to idle-
ness, acquiring thousands of vices, and learning how to exploit the good 
faith of those from whom they ask help.”97 And droves of ragged peasants 
descending upon Ceará’s political center subverted Vargas- era narratives 
of modernization and progress.98
Yet it is also misleading to portray nordestino migrants as having been 
dragooned or duped by government authorities. During his 1942 visit 
to Ceará, Dulphe Machado noted that emigration to Amazonia was the 
“anxiety” of the sertanejo.99 Similarly, Archbishop Lustosa asserted that 
drought evacuees from Ceará and the neighboring states of Rio Grande do 
Northeastern Migration to the Amazon 141
Norte and Paraíba who came to Fortaleza “naturally seek the port where 
they might embark most easily for Amazonia.”100 Indeed, a Fortaleza 
newspaper reported in May 1942 that evacuees housed on the grounds 
of the Maritime Police opposed relocation to an inland camp because 
they feared losing their opportunity to embark at once from Ceará.101 
Conversely, the refusal of other sertanejos to migrate to the Amazon— 
because they purportedly feared being shipped off to the North African 
battlefront, “devoured by Indians,” sold “for the weight of gold” in the 
Amazon, or parting from their “beloved mothers”—stemmed not only 
from wartime rumors (some of which were spread by anti- emigrationist 
municipal officials) or sentimentality. Rather, it suggests that longstand-
ing northeastern jeremiads against the Amazon informed popular per-
ceptions of the region.102 In this sense, Cearense migration to the Ama-
zon reflects the constrained options and measured calculations of the 
rural poor to cope with extreme privation.
Beyond drought evacuation in a hemisphere on the move
Natural disaster narratives have served to advance humanitarian and po-
litical interventions in the semi- arid northeastern backlands, but may 
also flatten the historical dimensions of out- migration. During the war, 
Ceará’s economy was roiled not only by diminished harvests but also 
by disruptions in trade and transportation. With German attacks on the 
merchant marine, a naval blockade, and the dearth of commercial ship-
ping hobbling cotton exports to trans- Atlantic markets and southern tex-
tile mills, only strategic war material purchased by the United States, 
such as carnauba wax and vegetable oils, fared well.103 Ground transport 
also came to a crawl as locomotives of the Rede Viação Cearense suffered 
from overload, disrepair, and lack of replacement parts, and gasoline 
rationing limited road transportation.104 Cotton and vegetable oil seeds 
filled warehouses in the interior, often taking up to six months to reach 
Fortaleza, only several hundred kilometers away.105 Unable to dispose of 
their crops, producers from the state’s rich agricultural southern regions 
could receive only one- tenth of the market price in the capital, or had to 
incur heavy expenses, interest payments, and the threat of deterioration 
if they opted to hold on to them for future sale.106
The wartime collapse of Ceará’s transport system and export trade 
provoked a sharp rise in the cost of living, particularly in the north of the 
state, while profiteering compounded the woes of the poor population. 
In April 1943, for example, monthly expenses for a working- class family 
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of five in Fortaleza were more than quadruple the minimum wage of 
CR$150.107 Male heads of household who joined the rubber campaign— 
including Antonio Moreira da Silva, Manoel Ferreira da Silva, and 
Antonio Batista de Souza, who identified themselves as “three fothers 
[sic] of families who are sining [sic] up with the Americans,” and whose 
family members were “in great need”—had an average of four depen-
dents; and since the recruitment agency only admitted men between the 
ages of 18 and 45, they conceivably stood to have more children in the 
future.108 Thus, as Charles Wagley correctly noted, with a wage scale in 
Ceará of 3 to 4 cruzeiros per day, as opposed to 6 to 10 cruzeiros in Pará, 
and prices nearly equivalent in both states, many would be attracted to 
the opportunities in the Amazon “come rain or shine,” particularly when 
they learned of the offer of free passage.109 Since third- class fare on the 
Lloyd Brasileiro line from Fortaleza to Belém and Manaus cost 103$480 
and 184$800, respectively, in 1939—or between one and three months’ 
salary at four cruzeiros per day—ship passage represented a significant 
expense or credit advance for migrants.110 (According to Amazonian mer-
chants, it cost a total of 350$000 to transport a worker from the north-
eastern backlands to an upriver seringal.111)
If low wages and the rising cost of living dimmed economic prospects 
in Ceará, the rubber boom and contemporaneous expansion of public 
works in the Amazon beckoned workers of all stripes. In August 1942, 
the Conselho de Imigração e Colonização complained that many “un-
desirable elements employed in petty urban trade” had migrated to the 
Amazon.112 In Samuel Benchimol’s 1942–43 study of fifty- five recently 
arrived nordestino migrants in Manaus, thirty identified themselves as 
agriculturists, eight as artisans, three as ranchers, two as cowboys, four as 
employees, two as businessmen, and six without a specific profession.113 
Among the twenty- two skilled northeastern laborers who relocated to 
Manaus in March 1943 to work for the Rubber Development Corporation 
were José Correia Lima, a mechanic whose garage had been closed due 
to the lack of private cars to service; Luiz Correia de Souza, a machine 
operator and IfOCS employee who complained of a meager salary; and 
Luis da Cunha Mendes, a college- educated accountant from Fortaleza 
who wanted higher wages to provide “greater comfort” for his wife and 
eleven children.114 And in his study of Itaituba, Pará, Darrel Miller found 
that three of the four major merchants in the town had arrived from the 
northeast during World War II.115
Migration to the Amazon also served as a strategy for social mobility for 
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peasant households. José Carlos Ribeiro, a SESp physician, noted that as 
rural conditions stabilized in late 1943, families “in better conditions” than 
the first wave of drought evacuees came to the migrant camps “seeking to 
improve their lives” in the Amazon. They frequently sent forth “a small 
branch [of the family], often armed with capital collected from numerous 
relatives, as advance troops.” After gathering information and even begin-
ning to work in the Amazon, the migrant(s) “either returned home to serve 
as a guide for the rest of the family or wrote with the necessary instruc-
tions . . . to try their luck in another region.” Thus, many migrants who 
arrived in Fortaleza demonstrated “a will to move on and a firm resolution 
to leave home,” giving “precise indications right away as to where they in-
tended to go.”116 Oral histories corroborate Ribeiro’s report. When Clovis 
Barreto left his home in Tapuiará, Ceará, in 1943, his father, a muleteer, 
had already lost many animals to the drought. But Clovis also had a very 
specific destination in mind: at the behest of his mother, who had lived in 
Amazonas prior to marriage, he headed to his great- uncle’s seringal on the 
Purus River to lay claim to an inheritance from his deceased grandparents. 
He would remain on the seringal until 1948, ultimately settling in Ma-
naus.117 Challenging dualistic typologies that have defined northeastern 
migration as motivated by either a search for food or a search for fortune, 
historical sociologist Lopes de Andrade has aptly noted: “The truth is both 
have occurred, simultaneously, since the beginning of colonization, with 
one ultimately taking predominance over the other.”118
Indeed, northeastern migration in the early 1940s conformed to a 
hemispheric trend in which the production of war materials—organized 
by governments and encouraged by private employers—brought about 
significant dislocations in national and continental labor markets. The 
exodus of nordestinos to the Amazon occurred alongside the movement 
of Bolivians to tap rubber in the Beni; of Hondurans to rubber projects 
in Panama; of Peruvians to Bolivian mines; of Central Americans to the 
Canal Zone; of Anglophone Caribbeans to U.S. farms; and of Mexicans 
to work in U.S. agriculture, canneries, packing plants, and railroads. 
Throughout the Americas, inflation and ineffective price controls often 
eroded increased wartime wages.119
“a free ticket from getúlio Vargas”: Subsidized transport  
in the making of the amazon
Cearense migrants were drawn to the wartime Amazon not only by so- 
called push and pull factors. In the 1930s, 640,000 people emigrated 
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from the northeast, and another 940,000 in the 1940s, but most headed 
south.120 Between 1934 and 1939, for example, approximately 212,000 
nordestinos entered São Paulo—mainly from Bahia (151,236), and fewer 
from Ceará (5,195)—and even during the war (see table 4.4) spontaneous 
migration to São Paulo far outpaced directed flows to the  Amazon.121
Moreover, while countless nordestinos may have dreamed of trying 
their luck in the Amazon, population transfers varied significantly by re-
gion. Wartime workers in Recife, the capital of Pernambuco, for example, 
expressed interest in the Amazon after learning of the rubber campaign 
through the local media, but fewer came than from Ceará.122 But as Bra-
zil’s third largest city at the time, Recife had a modest industrial base, 
while drought refugees in southwest Pernambuco most likely trekked 
southward: from Petrolina, they could sail up the river to Pirapora, Minas 
Gerais, connect to the terminus of the Estrada de Ferro do Brasil, and ob-
tain free passage to work in São Paulo agriculture.123
The greater availability of transport from Ceará to the Amazon, in con-
junction with the social ties linking the regions, was decisive in contour-
ing labor flows. Residents of Ceará and the abutting regions of Paraíba, 
Rio Grande do Norte, and (northern) Pernambuco could travel by truck, 
rail, or foot to Fortaleza or to backland camps to await transport to the 
Amazon. Indeed, Fortaleza’s position as a maritime and overland trans-
table 4.4
migration of nordestinos to São paulo, 1941–1945
STATE 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 TOTAL
Piauí — 63 393 1,005 95 1,556
Maranhão — 15   3   101 48   167
Ceará 616  3,846  2,074 4,441  3,010  13,987
R.G.d.Norte 147  600 129   423  137 1,436
Paraíba 126  530 200   935  146 1,937
Pernambuco  1,202  2,448  3,099 3,522  1,400  11,671
Sergipe 412  688 560 1,308  1,929 4,897
Alagoas  2,118  1,180  1,653 4,535  3,538  13,024
Bahia  8,847  4,556  6,467  19,147  7,757  46,774
Total  13,468  13,926  14,578  35,417  18,060  95,449
Source: Lopes de Andrade, Forma e efeito das migrações do nordeste (Paraíba: A União 
Editora, 1952), 17.
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port hub explains its primacy as a shipment point. Thus, of the 15,030 
unaccompanied male workers enlisted by June 1943 for the Amazon rub-
ber campaign, the largest chunk (4,667) came from Fortaleza, as did a 
significant number of families.124 Since government officials focused on 
head counts rather than life stories, the documentation does not indicate 
whether migrants from Fortaleza were predominantly recent arrivals or 
longer- term residents—although, for what it is worth, Amazonian bosses 
complained that many wartime arrivals to the rubber zones were not 
“from the interior” of Ceará but “coastline riffraff.”125
Regional transportation networks also help to account for the large 
number of migrants from the Jaguaribe valley, who comprised nearly 
half of the 6,937 individuals transported by the dNI to the Amazon dur-
ing the latter part of 1943 (see table 4.5). For example, Iguatu, located in 
the southern portion of the valley on the Fortaleza- Crato rail line at the 
junction of roads linking Ceará with neighboring states, netted 10,800 
migrants for the Amazon between March and December 1944, or an 
average of 1,200 people per month.126 Ceará’s lone statewide highway, 
which ran from the southeast corner of the state to Fortaleza and on to 
the western border, also tapped the Jaguaribe valley.127 Cars and trucks 
began to appear in the larger towns of the lower Jaguaribe in the late 
1920s, and transportation to Fortaleza, including bus service, would lead 
a prominent economic historian of the state to assert “so long as the ser-
tanejo was unaware of the beauties of Fortaleza and did not travel with 
ease and comfort in automobiles, he was tied to the countryside, raising 
and planting.”128 The “ease” and frequency of motorized travel in Ceará 
table 4.5
migration of families from ceará to amazon by geographic region, 1943
GEOGRAphIC REGION pOpULATION NUMBER Of MIGRANTS
Jaguaribe Valley 426,916 3,414
Serra Grande 537,868   304
Cariri 388,200   313




Source: José Carlos Ribeiro, Relatório de 1943, SESp, Projeto de Migração, NA, RG 229, 
Records of the Department of Basic Economy, Health and Sanitation Division, Monthly 
Progress Reports of Field Party (E- 143), Brazil, March–December 1943.
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should not be exaggerated—in 1945, there were only 764 automobiles, 
659 trucks, and 194 buses in the state—but roads facilitated emigration 
to the Amazon, serving as a conduit for information and a thoroughfare 
to the capital.129
In 1998, Lourenço Canário da Silva, who emigrated from Aracoiaba 
during the war at the age of twenty, reminisced from his shack in Cru-
zeiro do Sul, Acre: “I won a ticket from Getúlio Vargas and in return 
I gave my life. Everything changed.”130 But Aracoiaba’s location on the 
railway line of the Rede Viação Cearense certainly facilitated da Silva’s 
voyage, as the alternative trajectory of Pedro Alberto de Lima Valverde 
from Santo Amaro da Purificação, Bahia, suggests. Valverde, a twenty- 
three- year- old army reservist, had been unemployed for one year—“not 
due to laziness as numerous writers have often said of Brazilians, but 
because I do not have anything to do here”—when he wrote to Vargas in 
January 1944. “I heard that the Rubber service, there in the Amazon re-
gion, is in need of labor,” Valverde stated, requesting passage to join the 
campaign. Valverde did get a free ticket, but the rigmarole of coordinat-
ing the operations of various ministries to effectuate his circuitous itin-
erary from Bahia to the Amazon meant that he would be the exception 
to the rule.131
health and Biotypes
Migrants to the Amazon were a select group in other ways. The Vargas 
regime barred migration on the basis of physical incapacity, subjecting 
potential recruits to extensive medical tests and vaccinations against 
smallpox, typhus, yellow fever, and tetanus (see figure 4.1).132 As one 
newspaper headline announced: “Migration to the North: Only Serta-
nejos in Good Health Can Go.”133 The statistics on rejectees—roughly 
10 percent of examinees according to monthly data for one camp in 
the northeast—are themselves quite revealing.134 Of the 119 nordes-
tinos turned down during the month of January 1944, for example, the 
largest single reason (46 cases) was “somatic hypoevolutism,” or stunted 
growth, typically caused by malnutrition during fetal development and 
early childhood.135
During the mandatory health examinations, SEMTA medical person-
nel also conducted biotype studies, recording data on skin color, cranial 
measurement, hair type, nasal index, thoracic circumference, pannicu-
lus adiposus, and height. Indeed, by 1940 nearly 38,000 biotype studies 
had been conducted in Brazil for “military ends.”136 In line with the Lom-
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brosian notion that physiognomy reflected personal character, the SEMTA 
manual instructed physicians that “from a biotypological viewpoint what 
must be analyzed is the relationship between the cranium and the face, 
the former as a representative element of the system of relation and 
the latter as a representative of the vegetative nervous system.” It also 
urged doctors to undertake cranial measurements to identify “dolichoce-
phalics,” purportedly found among black populations of Africa but rarely 
in Brazil, and to classify hair by color and by type, whether straight, curly, 
wavy, or “kinky.” For racial classification, the medical staff employed cate-
gories devised by anthropologist Edgar Roquette- Pinto, which consisted 
of leucodermos (“individuals of white, milky, or wheat- colored skin”); faio-
dermos (“brown skin,” “mestiços of whites with blacks [mulatos]”); melano-
dermos (“black skin”); and xantodermos (“tanned skin, mestiços of whites 
with Indians”).137 Posters of nordestino biotypes designed by the director 
of SEMTA’s publicity division (per physicians’ guidelines) aimed to assist 
medical personnel with their work.138 Needless to say, doctors most likely 
culled such “scientific” data without the consent or the understanding of 
their naked subjects.
If medical exams determined who could go to the Amazon, bioty-
figure 4.1 Vaccination of northeastern migrants by SESp health officials. Source: National 
Archives.
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pology offered a “scientific” explanation why they should. Anthropolo-
gist Lúcia Arrais Morales has argued that SEMTA’s biotype studies aimed 
to whiten the Amazon, but none of the extant medical records list race 
as the basis for exclusion, which typically owed to physical incapacity 
or, less frequently, an enlistee’s change of heart.139 And while Brazilian 
elites did hope to whiten the Amazon, this end was anticipated through 
postwar European immigration as well as cultural transformations of the 
rural population. Vargas- era officials, in any event, were more fixated on 
mass labor transfer to decompress the northeast, colonize the Amazonian 
hinterland, and fulfill the labor quotas stipulated in bilateral agreements 
with the U.S. government.
Rather, Brazilian proponents of biotyping touted scientific under-
standing of the social, psychological, and physiological tendencies of dif-
ferent ethnic groups. Such insights would offer guidelines for sociolo-
gists, physicians, educators, criminologists, and army officials in carrying 
out forensic investigations, military recruitment, athletic training, and 
professional orientation, “whether manual or intellectual.”140 Thus, 
Brazilian authorities could apprise the International Labor Organiza-
tion of the “great qualities” of workers in the Amazon rubber campaign 
“in whom the indigenous Indian blood is largely mixed with European 
blood,” but decry their “fierce sentiment of individual independence” 
that made them “unstable as wage earners and explains the measures 
taken by the Government for the purpose of ‘settling’ the workers of Bra-
zil.”141 And doctors could ruminate on sertanejos’ lanky [longelíneo] phy-
siques as the purported product of genetics combined with the lifestyle 
adaptations demanded by cattle- raising, rather than on malnutrition that 
stunted growth.142 In sum, biotype studies reinforced the notion that the 
genetic origins, anatomical forms, and cultural mindsets of the nonwhite 
and the poor explained their social standing and destinies, rather than the 
biases, shortcomings, and omissions of state policies.143
“the historian of amazonas must write in part the history of ceará”
As an orator at the Instituto Histórico do Amazonas noted in 1944: “The 
historian of Amazonas must write in part the history of Ceará.”144 Indeed, 
socioeconomic ties, family histories, gendered matrices, and the commu-
nity lore binding Ceará to the Amazon are also fundamental to explain 
wartime migration.145 Between 1870 and 1910, an estimated 300,000 to 
500,000 nordestinos went to the Amazon, with some 225,500 persons 
from Ceará alone migrating in the last three decades of the nineteenth 
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century.146 Their preponderance led Amazonians to denominate nordes-
tino migrants indiscriminately as “Cearenses,” much as residents of São 
Paulo have labeled all northeasterners in their metropolis as “Baianos.” 
And since identities in the sending regions of the northeast were highly 
localized, some migrants from Ceará may have only come to think of or 
represent themselves as “Cearenses” as a result of their experiences as 
transplants in the Amazon.
During the great rubber boom, trade with the Amazon had buoyed 
the Cearense economy. Given the Amazon’s distance from markets in 
southern Brazil, Ceará’s livestock sector provided cheese, soap, and even 
canned meat, while mules driven in packs overland to Pará or shipped 
in small boats from Fortaleza or Camocim were used for transport on 
the rubber properties. Ceará exported hammocks and men’s cotton 
clothing to the Amazon as well, the latter offering a source of income 
to poor women in the state’s interior.147 A substantial infusion of capital 
also came in the form of consignations, remittances, credit orders, and 
small allowances. Rodolpho Theóphilo calculated that by 1910 the state 
of Ceará received more than 30,000 contos de réis (8 million cruzeiros) 
from migrants returning from the Amazon or their remittances.148 Suc-
cessful paroaras who “came down” from the Amazon brought back start- 
up capital for ranches, businesses, and homes.
Indeed, local histories of the sertão recount tales of native sons—few 
mention daughters—who prospered in the Amazon: whether paroaras 
who returned home exultantly, or those who remained in the north (al-
though often sending their older children to be educated in Fortaleza). 
Among the former were José Jeronimo and Manuel Carneiro da Silva, 
who acquired large properties in Limoeiro with the money they earned 
in the Amazon at the turn of the century; “Coronel” Vicente Albano, who 
became the first person in Quixadá to own an automobile; and Francisco 
Maciel of Icó, who bequeathed upon his death “a fine patrimony through 
hard work and the resources brought from Amazonas,” and whose son 
still lived in the 1990s off the ranch that his father had purchased.149 
Moreover, the financial records of J. G. Araújo show that the Manaus firm 
routinely sent remittances on behalf of seringalistas, and even their “cus-
tomers,” to family members in the northeast.150 In this spirit, Antonia 
Telles de Mendonça proudly noted in 1941 that her deceased husband, 
José Sobreira de Mendonça, had migrated as a young man from Ceará to 
Codajás on the Solimões River, where he had “triumphed,” acquiring land 
with Brazil nut trees. In addition to raising his children in the Amazon, 
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Mendonça had “never for one moment forgotten or forsaken” his family 
in Ceará, supporting “old and sickly parents, uncles, siblings, nephews, 
and many other relatives.”151
Buarque de Holanda and Graham have offered various explanations for 
nordestinos’ preference for the Amazon over the southern coffee planta-
tions during its concurrent economic boom between 1870 and 1910: stiff 
competition from European immigrants who secured state- subsidized 
transport to the São Paulo coffee plantations (based, in part, on the racial 
bias of government officials and planters against Brazilians of color); the 
autonomy of rubber tapping compared to the labor regimentation of cof-
fee plantations and its associations with chattel slavery prior to abolition 
in 1888; the greater facility of transportation from northeastern ports 
to the Amazon and the softening of oligarchic opposition to emigration 
with successive cycles of drought; and the lure of El Dorado.152 Nordes-
tino migration to Amazonia became so commonplace through the first 
decade of the twentieth century that the verb embarcar took on exclusive 
meaning in backland parlance: travel to the Amazon.153 Migration fever 
was spread by the rubber property operators or their labor recruiters in 
the backlands, by paroaras sporting new clothes, gold chains, umbrel-
las, and their trademark Panama hat, and by local lore and gossip.154 Of 
course, the impetus to get up and go could also arise during drought, 
from a family dispute or desire for reunification, from a run- in with the 
law, or from political persecution, as was the case of Eduardo Angelim, 
the leader of the nineteenth- century Cabanagem revolt.155
Relocation to the Amazon typically comprised a strategy for the so-
cial reproduction of Cearense households. In his early twentieth- century 
folklore collection, José Carvalho recounted a compatriot’s relief that the 
Amazon served as the northeastern state’s safety valve: “Compadre, if God 
wanna punish the Cearenses, He’s gonna have to invent somethin’ else: 
cause drought don’t do it no more—everyone goes to Amazonas!”156 But 
more well- to- do Cearenses also came to invest in seringais or urban busi-
nesses, while the scions of traditional families, confronting fierce compe-
tition for government jobs and the subdivision of wealth- holdings under 
Brazilian inheritance law, sought employment in mercantile firms, white 
collar professions, or the public sector in the Amazon. Antonio Carlos 
Sabóia, for example, born in 1882 into a traditional ranching family in 
Santa Quitéria, arrived in the Amazon at seventeen and started out as a 
clerk in a commercial firm. He would come to head the firm, as well as 
to own several seringais in Acre, a steamship, and residences in Manaus 
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and Belém.157 Among the Távoras, a prominent family from Jaguaribe, 
four siblings went to the Amazon during the great rubber boom: Ana 
Ajuricaba and Idalina became postal agents in Acre, Waldomiro worked 
as a clerk, and Manoel served as an itinerant physician on the Juruá River 
between 1904 and 1916 before returning to Ceará, where he was elected 
federal deputy and later appointed state governor in 1931.158
Northeastern migrants to the Amazon, comprising single men and 
families, charted rural as well as urban pathways, reflective of their 
varied objectives and the region’s multifarious resources. Penetrating 
the rubber- rich upland western and southwestern frontier, Cearenses 
populated the banks of the interfluvia of the Tapajós, Madeira, Purus, 
and Juruá rivers, establishing seringais and small towns, often baptized 
with hometown toponyms.159 The Cearense occupation of Acre was also 
decisive in the annexation of the Bolivian territory to Brazil.160 Historian 
Robin Anderson estimates, however, that one- third of northeasterners 
who arrived before 1910 remained in Pará, the principal point of entry to 
the Amazon and home to nearly two- thirds of its population at the time. 
Many migrated in family units, particularly during periods of drought, 
and settled in nonrubber regions.161 Thus, according to an 1897 report 
by Pará’s secretary of state, the eastern half of Belém (which included a 
number of rural parishes) had “an almost exclusively Cearense popula-
tion,” as did the city’s commercial sector and skilled trades.162 Cearenses 
also congregated in the Bragantina zone, an area of roughly 11,600 square 
kilometers between Belém and the Atlantic coast where the government 
of Pará decades earlier had subsidized colonization by European and nor-
destino migrants in the hope of creating an agricultural belt linked by 
railroad to the capital. And Cearenses from the coastal county of Aracati 
played a central role in settling Santarém, Pará’s second largest city.163
Due to ecological contrasts between the semi- arid northeast and the 
wet Amazon lowlands, many commentators have emphasized the chal-
lenges of environmental adaptation for migrants. This may have been so, 
to the extent that geography and climate mark human experience. How-
ever, in a class- based historical analysis, Weinstein provocatively argued 
that since the vast majority of nordestinos were peasants or small pro-
ducers who endured a precarious, subsistence- oriented, semi- migratory 
lifestyle in the northeast, they might not have found the social and eco-
nomic relations in the rural Amazon so unfamiliar: While working on 
a more marketable commodity, part of their time would still be spent 
in subsistence, fishing, hunting, and small- scale cultivation.164 Indeed, 
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on a 1935 field trip to the Colônia Zeunn, at the confluence of the Negro 
and Solimões rivers, geographer Robert Platt encountered a fishing vil-
lage at a natural levee of a floodplain that had been recently settled by 
Cearenses. Before migrating, he noted, most had been “miscellaneous 
laborers,” and not jangada [raft] fishermen, but in the Amazon they had 
made use of resources accessible with small capital. They built canoes 
from forest timber; utilized nets made by the leading citizen of the vil-
lage, who specialized in this equipment and shared in the catch; cast 
timbó (barbasco) into small pools or streams to stupefy fish; and took 
advantage of the low- river period between June and December when 
waters receded and fish become concentrated in flood- plain lakes and 
channels.165
To be sure, mass migration to the Amazon declined after the mid- 1910s 
with the plunge in rubber prices.166 In Rachel de Queiroz’s O Quinze, in-
spired in part by the Cearense novelist’s first- hand observations of the 
impact of the drought of 1915, one of the characters dismisses reloca-
tion to the Amazon as unpalatable, even for evacuees.167 Indeed, between 
1920 and 1940, the Amazon region had a 14 percent index of negative 
migration.168 The population of Pará, for example, declined from 983,507 
inhabitants to 944,744, and Acre’s dwindled from 92,379 to 79,768. 
Amazonas’s population increased from 363,166 to 438,008 during this 
period, with growth concentrated in Manaus. Many nordestinos came 
back to their region of origin, although we lack precise statistical data on 
interwar returns.169
Notwithstanding the post- boom reduction in the aggregate volume 
of northeastern population flows to the Amazon, emigration never fully 
abated. During droughts, the Amazon still promised refuge: in 1915, in 
fact, some 30,000 nordestinos went to the Amazon, and another 20,000 
in 1919.170 And even during the interwar period, depressed conditions in 
the northeast conjoined with occasional upswings in rubber prices (due 
to the Stevenson Act) favored nondrought migration.171 Thus, a 1928 ac-
count of an upriver Amazon voyage described 150 Cearense bravos, or 
first- timers, seeking work in Acre, and traveling in the third- class deck 
“in a jumbled mess.”172 Moreover, since migration was also bound up 
with ties of kinship, the decision to relocate to the Amazon could never 
boil down simply to macroeconomic factors. A 1967 study of attitudes 
toward migration in four different counties of Ceará, for example, found 
a marked preference for the Amazon only among residents of Aracati, 
most likely due to its historic position as a seaport from which thou-
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sands had embarked for the region since the great drought of 1877.173 
More broadly, the social ties of Cearenses to the Amazon help explain 
why this particular northeastern state (followed by Rio Grande do Norte) 
witnessed heavier outmigration to the region than the states of Piauí and 
Maranhão, notwithstanding their greater geographic proximity.174
gender, age, and migration
The Amazon’s place in the northeastern imaginary also varied according 
to gendered and generational perspective. Although tapping rubber was 
no more an innate talent of northeastern men than women, gendered 
ideologies normalized the odysseys of male household members to the 
seringais.175 In his survey of the Muru River from the 1920s, for example, 
Father Constant Tastevin reported a population of 915 men, 345 women, 
and 719 children, while in the upper Tarauacá, out of 1,500 adult men, a 
scant 400 lived in families.176 Indeed, as late as 1950, Acre’s population 
was composed of 62,612 men and 52,143 women, reflecting gendered 
migratory patterns.177 For younger nordestino men, the particular appeal 
of rubber tapping may be understood in terms of its alternatives: unlike 
agriculture, which entailed longer- term investment in planting and har-
vesting, rubber tapping, requiring great physical endurance, offered the 
promise of quick gain and geographic mobility.178 As one wartime mi-
grant headed to tap rubber stated: “Work that’s like an inquisition is no 
good. I like my freedom.”179
For single men, migration to the Amazon was often a gateway to mar-
riage. Father Tastevin noted that many nordestinos migrated “only in 
order to return home and marry after acquiring a small capital in Acre”; 
geographer Gilberto Osorio de Andrade sardonically deemed the “case 
of the Cearense brides” who “grew old awaiting their betrothed who 
had ‘gone to Amazonas’” as something “historic in the annals of human 
patience.”180 Often, in fact, Cearense bachelors (and some husbands pre-
sumably as well) ended up marrying or cohabiting in the Amazon and 
staying put. Thus, in nineteenth- century genealogies of Sobral, we find 
that native son Domingos Carneiro da Silva “married in Amazonas”; sub-
sequently, three of Domingos’s nephews followed in his footsteps, also 
“marrying in Amazonas,” illustrating nordestino patterns of inter- and 
intragenerational integration into Amazonian society.181
Youth, in particular, engendered a distinct mix of ascribed social obli-
gation and restive personal ambition in nordestino men that found an 
outlet in the Amazon. The former apparently was the case of twenty- two- 
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year- old Espedito Pimentel, who accepted passage to the Amazon from 
a labor contractor in order to support his widowed mother and sisters in 
rural Ceará.182 Likewise, João Amaro recalls how his schoolboy dream of 
becoming a lawyer was dashed upon the murder of his father, a police 
officer, in Sobral in 1937. Forced to quit school at twelve, Amaro worked 
as a tailor’s apprentice and other jobs to support his family, until SEMTA 
recruiters rolled into town five years later, enlisting him in the rubber 
campaign. Amaro spent the war on the property of Otávio Reis, although 
it is unclear if he was ever presented with the seringalista’s aforemen-
tioned rulebook.183 On the other hand, the braggadocio of youth resonates 
in letters from Jorge Gurgel do Amaral, scion of a prominent Cearense 
clan, to friends back home. “I’m staying until I get rich or die,” he wrote 
in 1919, and although twelve years later, he was still not rich (or dead), 
having “met cats that were sharper than I and that got one over on me,” 
he held out faith: “fortunately I am still young, strong, healthy (they say 
even handsome) and full of courage to go into the forest. Because of this 
I go about happy and content with everything and everyone. Nothing 
frightens me. Not even the things that they say rack the interior, espe-
cially in Amazonas.”184 The quest for adventure also permeates Alfredo 
Lustosa Cabral’s autobiographical Dez anos no Amazonas (1897–1907). 
Cabral tells of the return of his twenty- four- year- old brother, Silvino, to 
their hometown of Patos, Paraíba, in 1897 after a five- year stint in the 
Amazon. Regaling family and friends with his adventures in the north 
and a Cosmorama purchased in Belém, Silvino captivated fourteen- year- 
old Alfredo, who jumped at his brother’s invitation to return with him to 
the Amazon.185
In the patriarchal society of the northeast, filial revolt also drove young 
men to the Amazon. Recounting his decision to leave home as a teenager, 
Waldemiro Távora wrote to his brother from Rio Acre, Bolivia, in 1917: 
“I’ve wasted my whole youth without joy or pleasure; when I was in the 
company of my parents, I was nothing but subordinate to paternal power. 
I left them, as you know, when I was 18 years old, stripping them illicitly 
of their claims on me.”186 Although Távora hailed from an elite Cearense 
family, his frustration may have mirrored that of his poorer compatriots. 
Allen Johnson’s research among Cearense sharecroppers in 1966–67 re-
vealed that because unmarried men over fifteen were expected to contrib-
ute fully to their families by turning over wages and crops to their fathers, 
the idea of becoming the “head of household” appealed to both young 
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men and women of marriageable age.187 Johnson’s fieldwork took place 
two decades after the war, but his description of the tensions in peas-
ant households jibes with oral testimonies of wartime migrants.188 Inter-
viewed in Manaus in 1944, for example, Edgar Pereira da Silva explained 
his decision to leave the northeast: “I fled from my house and followed 
destiny. I left my cotton growing and my father’s house and picked up 
and left with some buddies . . . I hope to return in time to pick the cotton 
that I left growing there on my father’s land.”189 Da Silva’s framing of his 
journey as flight from his father’s house and land is revealing. Indeed, the 
Ceará census of 1940 sheds greater light on the potential for such inter-
generational friction in peasant families. Of the 260,504 males between 
the age of ten and thirty who worked in the primary sector, 96,719 were 
occupationally defined as “family members,” or subsidiary members of 
the household: 77,346 were between ten and nineteen, and 19,373 be-
tween twenty and twenty- nine.190 We can only wonder how many young 
men who ran off to the Amazon were left pondering, like Waldemiro Tá-
vora: “Maybe the torture and suffering that I have experienced ever since 
I parted company with my progenitors is a reparation for the suffering I 
caused them.”191
Visions of the amazon: migrants’ Information networks
During the classic rubber boom, Weinstein postulated, the longstand-
ing presence of nordestinos in the Amazon probably led few migrants to 
imagine that they could get rich effortlessly in the region. Rather, rubber 
tapping was viewed as a means to earn some cash to send back to family, 
or at the very least, ensure a family’s or individual’s subsistence.192 In 
fact, the historical ties spanning Ceará and the Amazon sustained vast, 
informal networks of information. Northeastern returnees served not 
only as sources of information about the Amazon but potential recruits. 
According to the census of 1940, 5,613 residents of Ceará had been born 
in the Amazon (3,001 in Amazonas, 2,009 in Pará, and 603 in Acre), 
but the data do not indicate when these individuals, presumably descen-
dants of Cearenses, arrived in the state; they do show that the highest 
number of Amazonian- born residents in the state in 1940 were between 
the ages of 20 and 40.193 This represents a small fraction of a population 
of over two million, yet the census does not capture the short- term and 
back- and- forth interregional migration that eluded state record- keepers 
but sustained networks of information for nordestino families and com-
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munities. In his 1943–44 study of wartime migration to the Amazon, for 
example, Samuel Benchimol found that eighteen of the fifty- five men 
that he interviewed in Manaus—nearly one third—were “mansos,” nor-
destinos who had already tapped rubber in Amazonia. Although Ben-
chimol did not systematically analyze the dynamics of return migration, 
he recorded the testimony of two such returnees. One stated that he had 
never readapted to life in Ceará: “Everyone called me a paroara, and hated 
me. I found everything so strange. I couldn’t get used to things there. 
So I picked up once and for all.” Another noted the animosity he con-
fronted when he returned to what had once been home: “We come back 
and can’t walk the walk or talk the talk of the sertão . . . No one speaks 
to us because they say we are filthy rich.”194 Similarly, an account of an 
April 1944 ship voyage from Fortaleza to Belém described one group of 
migrants comprising an elderly widower between 55 and 60, traveling 
with his “six strong sons,” who had been upriver and returned to Paraíba 
to bring his children back with him.195 The numerous returnees battling 
malaria, beriberi, and other infirmities presumably had their own cau-
tionary tales.196
Indeed, stories relayed from fathers to sons, uncles to nephews, and 
between cousins or siblings helped shape decisions to migrate. Thus, 
in 1943, Fortaleza resident Antonio Fernandes de Albuquerque recalled 
how his father, who transported livestock from Ceará to Pará and Acre 
during the great rubber boom, had told of tappers who were brutalized 
and enslaved by bosses. Albuquerque did not migrate during the war—
although he insisted that under the leadership of Getúlio Vargas, pro-
tector of the “great worker of the Brazilian Nation,” such abuses would 
never happen again.197 Otávio Carlos Monteiro, however, did follow in his 
father’s footsteps from Ceará to the Amazon. Tapping rubber for six years 
during the great boom had enabled Monteiro’s father to construct a new 
house in rural Ceará upon his return, but he struggled to sustain a family 
of ten. With the outbreak of war, thirty- two- year- old Otávio jumped at the 
opportunity to migrate to the Amazon alongside his cousin, leaving be-
hind his brothers, who feared German submarine attacks and the solitari-
ness of the seringais. Radio broadcasts in the Jaguaribe valley trumpeted 
the opportunities in the Amazon, but Otávio most likely had already been 
influenced by his father’s stories. When I interviewed him in Manaus, 
ninety- one- year- old Otávio listed an additional reason for opting for rub-
ber tapping over military conscription—the former was potentially more 
lucrative.198
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Literate migrants, moreover, might report in their letters on condi-
tions in the Amazon. Reduced to poverty on his small seringal following 
the crash in rubber prices, Leonidas Moreira appealed in 1931 to influen-
tial friends back home to help him find work in the public sector either 
in the Amazon or “our Ceará.”199 Another émigré wrote from the Seringal 
Juruá in 1930: “I am in this inferno of mosquitoes, exposed to the plague, 
suffering because I lack 300 mil- réis for my voyage,” which he had been 
unable to acquire, despite having “skimped in all different ways.”200 On 
the other hand, Delsuite Felipe Carlos, who arrived in the Amazon as an 
infant with her family in 1943, claimed that her father had received let-
ters from a brother- in- law in the region, boasting of the fertility of the 
land and the abundance of fish. In 2001, from her modest home in Ma-
naus, she bemoaned the “hard life” that her family initially experienced 
in the Amazon, but “thanked God” that they had resettled.201
Finally, popular depictions of Amazonia circulated in the northeast 
through literatura de cordel, pamphlet stories in verse that offered lis-
teners news and entertainment and drew heavily on oral tradition.202 
During the early twentieth century, a number of northeastern bards 
traveled to Belém and Manaus in search of work.203 Editora Guajarina, 
founded in Belém in 1914 by Pernambucano Francisco Rodrigues Lopes, 
published hundreds of cordéis that were sold and distributed in the north-
east, the urban centers of the Amazon, and even on the seringais. Other 
chapbooks with Amazonian themes were produced in the northeast.204
Many cordéis highlighted both the risks and opportunities in the Ama-
zon.205 One of the verses recorded in Pedro Calmon’s História do Brasil na 
poesia do povo laments that
Cearense vai ao norte
Sonhando áureos castelos
Sai daqui robusto e forte
Volta magro e amarelo.
The Cearense goes to the North
Dreaming of golden castles this fellow
Robust and strong he leaves
Returning skinny and yellow.
Yet another poem celebrates:
Vai de camisa e ceroula
As vezes rasgada em tiras
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E volta de lá, pachola,
De chapeu de sol, cartola
E terno de casimira.
Ofttimes tattered and torn
In a shirt and underpants he leaves from here
And he returns a dandy reborn
With a sun hat, a top hat adorned
And a suit of cashmere.206
Similarly, in “Grande Peleja de Josué Romano com Antonio Mulatinho na 
Cidade de Manaus” (“The Big Battle between Josué Romano and Antonio 
Mulatinho in the City of Manaus”), an old- timer’s admonitions are disre-
garded by a recently arrived northeastern migrant:
M. Josué quem te deu tão mau conselho?
Como é que tuas terras abandonas,
Para vai arriscar a tua vida
Neste clima terrível do Amazonas,
Onde mais de dois mil Paraibanos
Se acabaram aqui, por estas zonas.
J. Mulatinho, eu só vim ao Amazonas
Conhecer esta terra tão falada
Onde vivem o martírio e a doença,
Onde a peste do mundo fez morada;
Eu, porem, que não morro de careta,
Tudo enfrento e não me sucede nada.
M. Josué, eu lamento a tua sorte,
Pois vieste morrer longe dos teus;
Eu também, faz dez anos que cheguei,
Nunca mais pude ver parentes meus.
Meu colega quem chega nesta terra
Tem até que perder a fé de Deus!
J. Mulatinho, Você repare bem
que não tenho caráter de pajé
O castigo maior que houver no mundo
Inda não amedronta Josué.
O punhal esta dentro, porém eu
Morro e não arrenego a minha fé.
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M. Josué, who gave you such bad advice?
How can you leave your home,
To risk your life this way
In this terrible Amazon climate to roam,
Where more than two thousand Paraibanos
Ended up here in these zones.
J. Mulatinho, I only came to the Amazon
For its famed lands have called
Martyrdom and disease go hand in hand,
Where the world’s plagues are installed;
But I won’t die from grimaces,
I’m not scared, for to me nothing will befall.
M. Josué, I pity your fate,
Cause you came to die far from kin;
I’ve been here too for ten years,
I never saw my relatives again.
My friend, whoever comes to this land
Has to even lose faith in Him!
J. Mulatinho, look here
I’m no shaman, no way
The worst punishment in the world
Does not scare Josué.
The dagger is inside, but I
Die and do not renounce my faith.207
Most poignantly, popular literature bemoaned the stark inequalities 
that impelled northeastern men to leave their homes for the Amazon. As 
Juvenal Galeno recited in “O emigrante”:
Vou deixar a minha terra,
Vou para os matos d’além . . .
Que aqui não acho serviço
Para ganhar meu vintém
Vou soluçando saudoso
Do Ceará do meu bem! . . .
Que importa a febre—as maleitas?
Perigos . . . onde os não há . . . ?
Só morre o homem na hora!
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Mas quantas fartura lá!
Quem não se arrisca não ganha . . .
Sem ganhos, quem viverá? . . .
E é dever de quem precisa,
Por longe alcançar o pão
Se o não tem dentro de casa,
Se o não tem no seu torrão . . .
Deus ajuda a quem procura
Cumprir sua obrigação.
Vou, pois, às outras paragens,
Como vai o passarinho
Buscar comer para os filhos,
Que choram dentro do ninho . . .
Como volta ele contente
Trazendo cheio o biquinho!
Agora, adeus ó meus campos
Adeus, brancos areais,
Que vou lutar pela vida
Nos desertos matagais . . .
Que eu vou enxugar meus prantos
Com choros dos seringais!
I will leave my land,
To go to a wilderness far away . . .
As here I find no work
To help me earn my way
I will go sobbing with longing
For Ceará in my heart to stay! . . .
What of the fever—the diseases?
Danger . . . where is it not found . . . ?
Man only dies when it’s his time!
But how much plenty there abounds!
One who does not risk does not win . . .
Without earning, who can stay around? . . .
And it’s one’s duty for those in need,
To go far away to earn his bread
If he cannot at home,
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If not in his land instead . . .
God helps those who seek
To fulfill their obligations, it is said.
I will go, then, to other whereabouts,
As the birds do attest
Finding food for their chicks,
Who cry inside the nest . . .
How happy does he come back
With his beak full for the rest!
Oh farewell now to my fields
Goodbye, white sand,
I will fight for my life
In the deserted forests at hand . . .
I will dry my tears
With cries from the rubber trees’ land!208
northeastern family affairs in the amazon
Wartime migrants, of course, did not undertake or understand their jour-
ney to the Amazon merely as sharecroppers, artisans, drought evacu-
ees, or first- timers, but as family members. Inflected by gendered and 
generational norms, migration to the Amazon constituted a household 
affair pulsating with an emotional intensity and conflict that official 
documents conspire to numb. The husband and father who embarked to 
provide a better life for his wife and children; the son who hoped to send 
home money to assist his parents and siblings; the families that came to 
weather the drought or to start anew represent the flesh and blood, sub-
jective drama of thousands of nordestinos in the Amazon during the war. 
“I’m mad with saudades for you and my daughter,” wrote Antonio Fereira 
Amâncio from Belém in 1943 to his wife and child in Ceará, attempting 
to bridge with several words an immeasurable absence.209 “Don’t forget to 
write me,” penned Sebastião Felix de Oliveira to his wife while en route to 
Manaus, enclosing 40 cruzeiros (most likely his per diem payments) as 
a sign of his devotion to her.210 “A blessing for an obedient son who has 
not forgotten you for even a minute,” Inácio Epifanio Souza asked of his 
mother, enclosing 100 cruzeiros and his photograph in his letter from 
Belém.211 “My main enterest [sic] is for them to learn to read someting 
[sic] so that they do not turn out ignorant like I am,” Manuel Francisco 
da Silva wished for his two sons prior to embarking for Belém in July 
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1943.212 But if wartime migrants took pride in the money they sent home 
and the familial ties they hoped to strengthen, separation also strained 
household incomes and bonds of loyalty. The Amazon also offered an es-
cape for the malcontent husband, a hideout for the deadbeat dad, and a 
refuge for rebellious youth.
At the Porangabassu camp in Fortaleza, which housed the dependents 
of men transported to the Amazon (for those who selected this form of 
family assistance under the SEMTA recruitment contract), the letters ex-
changed between migrants and their families brimmed with gestures 
of solicitude. Given the high levels of illiteracy in the northeast, Regina 
Frota Chabloz, a social worker at Porangabassu, served as an important 
intermediary in writing, reading, and undoubtedly censoring many of the 
letters—as well as retaining several for the historical record. The corre-
spondents’ errors in spelling and syntax, or very inability to write, reflect 
the scant educational opportunities that constrained personal options 
(see figure 4.2). Yet they also reveal how husbands and fathers struggled 
to uphold or transpose their traditional patriarchal roles as protector 
and enforcer, even as geographic distance broke down communication 
and chains of authority. Leopoldo Casimiro Lucena, who had left behind 
figure 4.2 Migrant reading letter at government camp while in transit to upriver Amazon 
rubber zones. Source: National Archives.
Northeastern Migration to the Amazon 163
seven dependents in Fortaleza, jotted off a note to Regina Chabloz before 
embarking from Belém: “I ask that you put the children in school. When I 
arrive in Acre I will send another letter. Don’t forget about my family.”213 
Juca Cassindé, who had requested that his pregnant daughter, Macbete, 
be treated with “all the necessary comforts” at Porangabussu, expressed 
delight upon learning that she was “enjoying better health and chubbier 
and less palid.”214 Alfredo Mesquita de Oliveira, who left a family of five, 
inquired whether his beloved wife, Antonia Luciana de Araújo, had re-
ceived the 25 mil- réis that he had dispatched in a previous letter. And 
when he learned that women at the camp had been sent to hoe, make 
bricks, and perform other “jobs that were meant only for men,” Mes-
quita pleaded with Chabloz to spare his wife, particularly since he had 
been assured that women would only do “light work” like “lace- making, 
starching clothes, and raising chickens.”215 Manoel de Souza Viana wrote 
in August 1943 with an identical complaint, threatening to remain in Ma-
naus unless his wife received “easier tasks.”216
Yet the emotional and financial strain of male migration often took its 
toll on those left behind. In April 1942, Sebastiana de Abreu, a twenty- 
two- year- old domestic in Fortaleza “of brown skin with rudimentary edu-
cation,” was eight months pregnant with the child of José de Oliveira, a 
shoemaker. The couple was not married, and José apparently decided to 
try his luck, or flee from impending fatherhood, by embarking unaccom-
panied for the Amazon. Bereft, Sebastiana asphyxiated her newborn after 
giving birth in her backyard, and was soon arrested.217 While Sebastiana’s 
recourse to infanticide represents an extreme act of desperation, its very 
exceptionalism in many ways underscores the vulnerability that women 
and children faced when husbands and fathers departed for the Amazon.
During the war, the U.S. consul in Fortaleza estimated that migrants 
had left 8,000 dependents, mostly in their homes in the interior of 
Ceará.218 How many women lived in “sadness,” like Elcidia Galvão, “cru-
cified” by saudades, longing to hear “comforting news” from husbands 
who had not sent any word from the Amazon?219 Or suffered like Maria 
Emília Ramos Câmara, whose husband had left her with twelve children 
in Paraíba, and whom she had not heard from in five months?220 How 
many children, like Galvão’s son, prayed every night to receive news from 
their fathers, fearful that “daddy seems to have forgotten us because 
everyone else writes to their families but daddy doesn’t?”221 How many 
agonized over whether their menfolk were “alive or dead?”222
In the letters of wives and children, declarations of love and longing 
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vie uneasily with feelings of dread and abandonment, with the mercy 
of divine providence often beseeched. “It’s with my eyes raised to the 
heavens that I pray to God that you read this message of my loneliness 
and longing (saudades) for you and that it finds you enjoying the twin 
blessings of Health and happiness,” Joana Abreu wrote to her husband, 
Guilhermino. Their young daughter had once boasted that “Daddy went 
to Amazonia to earn money for Suzete.” But lacking a response from her 
husband to her five letters and two telegrams, and unable to afford even 
a cigarette, Joana now insisted that Guilhermino “better have someone 
come get me.”223 And Edith Dionisio de Oliveira, who had not received 
word from her father in two months, implored Regina Chabloz to send 
a telegram to discover his whereabouts.224 The fact that these women’s 
letters remained in Regina Chabloz’s possession suggests that they were 
undeliverable not so much due to content, since other migrants in transit 
received equally alarming reports. Rather, SEMTA could no longer keep 
track of migrants’ whereabouts once they had decamped in Belém or Ma-
naus. Given workers’ geographic mobility, the difficulties of long- distance 
communication, and the tenuousness of state power in the Amazon, mi-
grants to the upriver rubber regions lost contact with their loved ones. 
For family members torn asunder, the Amazon assumed disparate, and 
often incommunicable, meanings.
migrants and tappers: the long haul
Between August 1942 and November 1943, the Vargas government sus-
pended the maritime route between Fortaleza and Belém because of 
German submarine attacks on Brazilian coastal shipping, which sank 
twenty- three vessels during 1942. In place of the standard 3–4 day jour-
ney, Brazilian officials devised an overland trek from Fortaleza to São 
Luís. The transportation bottlenecks that vexed U.S. and Brazilian gov-
ernment officials eyeing time- space compression had more direct con-
sequences for migrants. In a convoy of six pickup trucks, each holding 
thirty- five workers, migrants departed from Fortaleza on a sun- drenched 
or rain- soaked journey of 600 kilometers to Teresina, Piauí, with rests en 
route at two newly constructed way stations (see figure 4.3). Of the next 
leg of the trip, a freight train from Teresina to São Luís (see figure 4.4), 
one migrant recalled: “There was no air inside. To breathe, you had to 
open all of the doors, and some passsengers preferred to risk their lives 
by clinging to the outside of the train.”225 In the final stretch from São 
Luís to Belém, a distance of approximately 250 miles, migrants traveled 
figure 4.3 SEMTA recruits departing Fortaleza by truck. Source: Departamento de 
Patrimônio Histórico e Cultural do Estado do Acre.
figure 4.4 Transport of migrants from Teresina to São Luís via railroad. Source: National 
Archives.
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by ship.226 Due to lack of fuel, the breakdown of the railway, and a short-
age of vessels, the alternate route from Fortaleza to Belém lasted any-
where from 16 to 42 days. Journeys up the Amazon River were further 
stalled by the lack of shipping, bosses’ reluctance to contract untested 
labor, and low water levels during the dry season.227
Brazilian officials claimed that the overland, coastal, and fluvial jour-
ney of some 5,000 kilometers from the northeastern backlands to up-
river seringais averaged two months, but the trip often took far longer.228 
Clovis Barreto recalled that his voyage from Ceará to the seringais of 
Amazonas lasted six months, two of which were spent at the Tapanã camp 
in Belém awaiting transport upriver.229 Under the SEMTA contract, mi-
grants received a daily wage en route to the rubber properties, yet no 
matter how much migrants passed the time playing cards and dominoes, 
conversing with old and new friends, playing guitar and singing, having 
endurance matches, or peering from river boats at the Amazon’s majestic 
sky, the voyage was trying. Crowded and unsanitary conditions in tran-
sit facilitated the outbreak of disease, petty crime, melees, and deser-
tions. At Teresina, for example, migrants waited sometimes for over one 
month for the train to São Luís. A nutritionist who inspected the camp at 
Teresina denounced the unhygienic conditions at the kitchen (see figure 
4.5); the “deplorable” quality of the food, served in troughs “as if it were 
food for pigs,” nearly incited revolt.230 Government officials also blamed 
delays at Teresina for a spike in venereal disease, which men reportedly 
contracted from local prostitutes, and which doctors had a tough time 
treating due to patients’ mistrust of Sulfathiazol and their inventiveness 
in stashing unused pills under bed sheets.231 In general, the “violent man-
ner by which the administration sought to resolve” acts of “indiscipline” 
only aggravated the situation at the camp.232 In São Luís, government 
delays in insuring ships, authorizing transport, and securing naval escort 
held up migrants; some who grew tired of waiting, or who feared Ger-
man U- boats, even trekked overland to Pará, hitching a ride on the Bra-
gança railroad to reach their destination.233 And reporting on the migrant 
camps at Belém and Manaus (see figure 4.6), a U.S. journalist noted in 
November 1943: “Some of these men had been idle behind these fences, 
fighting among themselves and with their guards for as long as seven 
months. The men are disgusted and eager to go home.”234
From late 1943 onward, absent the threat of German attacks, migrants 
once again made their way from Fortaleza to Belém on Lloyd Brasileiro 
ships, but the vessels were often overcrowded and the voyages drawn- 
figure 4.5 Mess hall for male migrants at government camp in Manaus. Source: National 
Archives.
figure 4.6 Men at government barracks at Ponta Pelada, Manaus. Source: National Archives.
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out.235 Ships equipped to carry 280 passengers sailed with over 800, 
while way stations constructed to house 600 migrants typically held no 
less than 800, and sometimes as many as 1,200 people.236 In June 1944, 
an epidemic of spinal meningitis spread in a Belém labor camp, claim-
ing ten lives and leading health authorities to establish a strict quarantine 
for fifteen days.237 On another ship en route from Fortaleza to Belém, 44 
passengers were stricken with measles, and several children died.238 And 
doctors reported in July 1945 that on the river boats of the Purus River, 
passengers were treated like “veritable animals, lodged in horrifying con-
ditions,” and afflicted by a diphtheria epidemic.239 As U.S. government 
officials lamented, the “complete neglect of the individuals and agencies 
charged with their transportation and welfare” probably destroyed many 
migrants’ morale.240
The saga of northeastern migration to the Amazon was supposed to 
have been different this time under the aegis of the government. In some 
ways it was. In light of the slapdash relocation of tens of thousands across 
regions with precarious infrastructure, mortality rates in the northeast 
and in transit might have been considerably higher in the absence of 
medical care at camps and way stations. During 1943, for example, over 
20,000 people passed through the government camps maintained in 
the northeast and the Amazon: 80,000 physical examinations were per-
formed; 100,000 treatments, 40,000 medical consultations, and 26,000 
vaccinations administered; and over 5,000 people hospitalized.241 Yet the 
tumult or tedium of the trip also bespeaks the shortfalls that upended 
public policies and personal journeys. The Brazilian government under-
took mass population transfers notwithstanding the well- known inade-
quacy of housing, transportation, and food supplies in the Amazon.242 
Alternatively, we might argue, because high- ranking officials in the Var-
gas administration recognized such limitations, they harnessed Ameri-
can financial and technical assistance and northeastern surplus labor to 
spearhead the transformation of the Amazon.
In 1956, journalist José Stenio Lopes charged that his northeastern com-
patriots had been led by Vargas to the Amazon like “cattle to the slaughter-
house or Jews to the Nazi gas chambers.”243 The Vargas regime did fail to 
uphold wartime promises to reform the Amazonian rubber trade and to 
assist migrant labor. Yet during World War II, nordestinos who migrated 
to the Amazon had not been stupefied by drought or government propa-
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ganda. And while migrants could not control the myriad of forces that 
bore down on them, their struggles to eke out a living in the Amazon or 
to return home often confounded bosses and bureaucrats in search of a 
pliant workforce. At a way station in Manaus, for example, migrants told 
U.S. officials in September 1942 that they sought “fair conditions and fair 
pay” in the Amazon.244 Or as another transplanted nordestino affirmed: “I 
came to earn money in the rubber properties and then return home.”245 
If U.S. officials subsidized labor transfers to boost rubber production, 
and the Vargas regime promoted frontier colonization as a geopolitical 
strategy to fill so- called demographic voids, nordestinos who sought out 
the Amazon demanded a chance to improve their lot.
Enveloping populations at the margins of the Brazilian nation- state 
and Allied military theaters, northeastern migratory flows to the Ama-
zon during World War II reflect the interplay among local, national, and 
global forces that shape personal decisions, political outcomes, and cul-
tural landscapes. Individual odysseys to the Amazon, in fact, were struc-
tured by macroeconomic conditions, public policies, and informal social 
networks. Amidst deep- seated social inequalities, drought and wartime 
economic dislocations meted out uneven punishments on backland 
populations, influencing which sectors would migrate to the Amazon, 
and under what terms. State- subsidized transportation, rather than des-
potic wile, served to channel workers to the Amazon, as did government- 
administered medical exams. And familial and communal pathways of 
migration, patterned by gendered and generational norms, molded Cea-
rense wartime journeys. Possessing distinct understandings of the Ama-
zon, derived from historical experiences, social expectations, and cultural 
norms, nordestino migrants would chart varied courses in and for the 
region.
ChApTER 5
war In the amazon
Struggles over Resources and Images
during World War II, a multinational, cross- class set of actors battled to remake the Amazon. Although formally allied 
against the Axis, their common mission was fractured by subjec-
tivities of class, gender, profession, and nationality. A forest cov-
eted by U.S. wartime policymakers for its rubber trees loomed for 
Brazilian statesmen as a vast hinterland clamoring for national 
integration. Migrants and tappers contemplating varied patterns of 
land use and market insertion clashed with merchants and bosses 
angling to profiteer. Progressives in the Northern and Southern 
Hemispheres championing rural uplift sparred with conservatives 
who decried redistributionist policies. And the immediacy of the 
forest in sustaining livelihoods cleaved locals from geographic out-
siders. These competing wartime visions engendered disparate 
productive and ideological spaces in the Amazon.
This chapter analyzes the interlinked struggles over resources, 
representation, and power in the Amazon. Each of its four sections 
examines a discrete set of mediators—U.S. policymakers, Brazil-
ian officials, rubber bosses, and migrants and tappers—whose 
regional designs left varied imprints on lives and landscapes. In 
spotlighting transnational processes, I contend that although 
Amazonian history cannot be shoehorned into the mold of depen-
dency theory—which attributed Latin American underdevelop-
ment to the predatory demands of wealthier nations for primary 
products—neither was the regional impact of U.S. wartime poli-
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cies inconsequential.1 In foregrounding class tensions, I underscore so-
cial inequities in the Amazon, but highlight as well the agency of tappers 
and migrants in challenging dominant structures and ideologies. A focus 
on multiple and interpenetrating scales reveals how the landscapes of the 
Brazilian Amazon have been shaped by hard- pitched battles that have 
raged and ranged over diverse geographies.
I. U.S. mediators and the Uses of amazonian nature
During the war, Americans viewed the Amazon through multiple 
lenses. The military relished access to bases and raw materials; bureau-
crats found a mission and a paycheck in agencies committed to rubber 
procurement; doctors, sanitarians, engineers, nutritionists, and inves-
tors dreamed of reaching new publics; the media prowled for titillating 
stories; and drivers may have pondered the forest’s importance when 
they got a flat. Faith in technological fixes and the malleability of nature 
in the Amazon jostled with cultural prejudice and condescension. Yet ir-
respective of ideological tenor, the sustained, broadscale investment by 
the United States in the Amazon pivoted on the forest’s rubber trees.
To increase rubber production, U.S. policies favored the formaliza-
tion of labor, the sale of low- priced goods, and improved health care and 
transportation in the Amazon Basin. As noted in chapter 2, the April 
1943 accord between the RdC and the Superintendência de Abasteci-
mento do Vale Amazônico (SAvA) promoted the cash sale of tapper sup-
plies to bosses at discounted prices in an effort to undercut commercial 
monopolies. Moreover, to transport supplies and ferry out rubber, U.S. 
agencies introduced five oil- burning steamers, forty- eight Higgins light 
draft boats, and twenty- three landing barges with twin diesel engines.2
American and Brazilian officials further projected the modification or 
circumvention of Amazonian waterways. The proposed Casiquiare canal, 
for example, would have linked the Amazon with the Orinoco River, offer-
ing rubber production a second outlet to the sea when submarine attacks 
endangered the existing route, and connecting Brazil to Venezuelan oil 
fields. A joint U.S.- Brazilian initiative, the prospective inland waterway 
mobilized a team of engineers, surveyors, and medical officials from the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Comissão Brasileira Demarcadora 
de Limites, who undertook aerial photographic surveys and hydrographic 
and terrestrial studies in the region in January 1943.3 The RdC also intro-
duced water alighting equipment, such as flying boats and amphibian 
aircraft (see figure 5.1). Between September 1942 and April 1943, for ex-
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ample, amphibian planes transported a total of 299,801 pounds of rub-
ber from Manaus to Miami in a thrice weekly air service.4 In addition, the 
RdC planned the construction of twenty airfields in the Amazon Basin to 
increase rubber output and reach inaccessible zones in Mato Grosso— 
although the project may have been devised at the behest of the U.S. 
army, preoccupied with defense of the Brazilian bulge and the Panama 
Canal prior to the defeat of the Nazis in North Africa in May 1943.5
Notwithstanding significant U.S. investment in the Amazon, rubber 
yields lagged. In 1940, Brazil had produced 16,135 long tons of rubber. 
Wartime output increased to only 17,854 tons in 1942; 20,875 tons in 
1943; 22,350 tons in 1944; and 17,973 during the first eight months of 
1945.6 In testimony before the U.S. Senate in December 1943, RdC presi-
dent Douglas Allen estimated that his agency had spent nearly $60 mil-
lion on the Amazonian wild rubber program since 1941. Based on such 
expenditures (which included the purchase of rubber, development costs, 
capital investments, loans, operating and administrative expenses), the 
U.S. government had paid $1.12 per pound for Amazonian rubber.7 This 
figure 5.1 Flying boats (pBys) were used by the U.S. government’s Rubber Development 
Corporation to deliver supplies upriver and to take out rubber from the Amazon. Source: 
National Archives.
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calculation excluded the budgetary allocation of other agencies active in 
the region, such as the OIAA.
To be sure, U.S. officials faced considerable obstacles in supplying the 
Amazon, including preparing inventories and forecasts, undertaking 
purchase orders, and furnishing and warehousing goods. Lack of coastal 
steamer space and seasonal fluctuations in river levels necessitated par-
ticular care in coordinating transport. Yet U.S. officials often blamed 
locals for the shortfall, faulting the “general attitude of non- cooperation” 
of Amazonian merchants and commercial firms toward increased gov-
ernment regulation of the rubber trade.8 “The war means nothing to 
these people, and they have only a secondary interest in supplying rub-
ber to the United States,” fumed one government official. “The methods, 
the quarrels and the manner of thinking of these peoples are fantastic. 
The situation in all respects resembles a third- rate musical comedy, ex-
cept in the deadly seriousness of its implications.”9 The Amazon trade, 
once seen by some Americans as an antidote to rubber dependency, a 
laboratory for scientific innovation, a foundation of inter- American co-
operation, and even a firewall against corporate trusts, now epitomized 
tropical degeneracy.
As we will explore, Amazonian bosses and merchants did divert sub-
sidies for rubber production to rig debt merchandising. At the very least, 
their fiscal conservatism hamstrung production and confounded mi-
grants who traveled thousands of miles in search of work. Exploited or 
abandoned on the rubber properties, workers did flee, fall back on sub-
sistence, or seek employment in urban centers in the Amazon.10 Yet U.S. 
diplomatic and historiographical indictment of Amazonian noncompli-
ance is not so much incorrect as one- sided. Once an isolationist illusion 
had been shattered, the challenges of extractivism exposed, the synthetic 
industry launched, the Nazis halted in North Africa, and the advocates of 
inter- American economic cooperation marginalized, little could sustain 
or explain long- term U.S. government investment in the Amazon rubber 
trade. The particularistic claims on tropical nature that anchored U.S. 
wartime initiatives in the Amazon now unmoored them. As Bunker and 
Ciccantell have noted, when the lag between global demand and local 
supply becomes too great, states and firms in the core regions mobilize 
science, commerce, imperialist or colonial forces, and debt finance to 
resolve problems of rising cost and scarce or inconsistent supply. The 
alternatives include finding sources of the raw material in other locations 
(and arranging transport systems to accommodate them); domesticating 
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and converting the natural sources of the raw material to plantation cul-
tivation worked by a cheap and stable labor force; or finding natural, 
technical, or synthetic substitutes for the raw material in question.11 The 
Amazon wartime rubber boom would fall prey to the triad.
As noted in chapter 2, the Rubber Survey Committee had prioritized 
the development of a synthetic rubber industry under the aegis of the 
rubber director, an appointee of the chairman of the War Production 
Board. The $700- million government initiative, which brought together 
state officials, industrialists, scientists, and academics, proceeded with 
astonishing speed. By 1944, private corporations leased and operated 
fifteen synthetic rubber plants on a “cost plus management fee basis,” 
manufacturing four grades of rubber (the principal known commercially 
as Buna S), and producing over 773,000 tons during the following year. 
By the end of the war, the rubber facilities operated at an annual capacity 
of 830,780 tons, or 87 percent of domestic use, nearly inverting pre-
war consumption patterns of synthetic and natural rubber.12 The United 
States had also gone from the largest global importer of rubber to its chief 
exporter.13 Thus, borrowing from geographer Neil Smith, we can assert 
that, in transforming rubber from a raw material tethered by geogra-
phy into an industrial product determined by the location of productive 
forces, capital had remade society and nature.14 Moreover, with Ceylon 
and India meeting annual raw rubber quotas—at a mere 28 cents per 
pound—the Amazon still lagged as runner- up to its few remaining Asian 
competitors (see table 5.1).15
Waning U.S. commitment to Amazonian development also reflected 
the conservative upswing in domestic politics. In November 1942, Re-
publicans captured an additional forty- four seats in Congress and nine 
in the Senate. By 1943, dollar- a- year business executives held over 800 
posts at the War Production Board, and the nation’s top 100 companies 
filled 70 percent of all war and civilian contracts.16 And in February 1943, 
the rubber director restored sole jurisdiction over natural rubber develop-
ment and procurement to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, de-
priving the Board of Economic Warfare of policy- making responsibilities 
with which Vice President Wallace had hoped to remold postwar politics 
in the Americas.17 In July 1943, following a mortifying high- profile pub-
lic duel between Jesse Jones and the vice president, Roosevelt abolished 
the BEw, dropping Wallace as his running mate the subsequent year.18


























































































































































































































































































































































hooed airport network shrank to one airfield at Manaus and another at 
Iquitos, Peru, while the proposed Casiquiare canal was shelved. The RdC 
withdrew staff, restricted its aviation department to delivering supplies 
upriver, canceled orders for millions of dollars in goods, and amended 
existing agreements with the Brazilian government.19 A September 1943 
accord, for example, liquidated RdC responsibilities relating to the re-
cruitment of workers and assistance to their families.20 An agreement of 
February 1944 extended a premium of 33.33 percent above the 45 cent 
per pound for Acre fine rubber until March 31, 1945, but disavowed fur-
ther responsibility for stockpiling and distributing discounted foodstuffs 
and tapper supplies as of June 30, 1944.21 These activities were turned 
back to private trade under the responsibility of the Brazilian govern-
ment.22 “We have found the Brazilian agencies are performing so effi-
ciently,” claimed RdC’s Maurice McAshan to a Manaus daily in August 
1943 in justifying the U.S. pullout, notwithstanding significant evidence 
to the contrary.23
While the twenty- first- century agro- ranching boom in the Amazon 
attests to the capacity of capital, technology, and politics to defy (and de-
file) its ecosystems—including many of the legendary challenges of river 
navigation—the wartime overhaul of the Amazonian landscape required 
financial resources, consumer demand, and government backing that 
proved untenable in the United States.24 In its stead, U.S. officials crafted 
narratives to cut and run from the forest, distancing themselves from an-
other messy intervention in Latin America. If the launch of the synthetic 
rubber industry represented a feat of scientific know- how and national 
can- do, the Amazon came to embody the nature of underdevelopment 
and the underdevelopment of nature.25
“OUR dEEp dARK SECRETS IN LATIN AMERICA”
With Rubber Development’s retreat from the Amazon, the canard of the 
benighted jungle rebounded in U.S. political discourse. A tug- of- war in 
which tropical huns triumphed over American do- gooders, and where 
socioenvironmental factors vanquished political reform, offered a con-
venient explanation for getting rid of domestic opponents and a foreign 
policy imbroglio. Following a month- long trip to the Amazon in Sep-
tember 1943, W. N. Walmsley of the State Department pronounced: “No 
darker picture exists anywhere of what in more progressive countries we 
choose to call corruption and exploitation.” Walmsley assailed the debt 
merchandising system, with its “century- old tentacles stretching up all 
War in the Amazon 177
the thousands of tributaries feeding on the body of the seringueiro,” but 
was no less sparing of U.S. policymakers for blindsiding local merchants 
with long experience and advancing social welfare policies that aimed 
to instill a profit motive in indentured tappers. Insistent on the “futility 
of reform by outsiders” in the Amazon, he recommended rapid scaling 
back of Rubber Development’s operations and devolution to Brazilians 
of the remaining developmental, financial, and commercial functions of 
the rubber program.26 U.S. author Henry Albert Phillips assailed Brazil-
ians’ failure to create rubber plantations in the Amazon as reflective of 
national character as a whole: “Brazilians,” he affirmed, “are not realists, 
and never will be, to anything like the same degree that Anglo- Saxons 
can be and often are.”27
Similarly, following a two- month “fact- finding” tour to Latin America 
in 1943, Republican senator Hugh A. Butler of Nebraska alleged that the 
United States had spent $500 a pound for rubber in a “sordid picture of 
waste and disappointing results.” In one radio address, he charged: “Has 
any Government agency ever put out an official release describing our 
rubber fiasco in the Amazon Valley, where Washington sent millions of 
tin cups, millions of atabrine [anti- malarial] tablets, millions of dollars 
worth of supplies for tens of thousands of men, but failed to get men to 
go into the valley to work. . . .” And in a broader swipe at Roosevelt’s Good 
Neighbor policies, Butler’s article in Reader’s Digest, “Our Deep Dark Se-
crets in Latin America,” denounced the “hemispheric handout” of six bil-
lion dollars on a “whole collection of imported ideas” that Latin Ameri-
cans would “throw out the window as soon as the spending stops.”28
There were, in fact, many “deep dark secrets” in the wartime Amazon. 
According to one American author’s estimate, the Vargas government’s 
agreement to sell rubber at a fixed price to the United States rather than 
on the open market—where it might have sold at one to four dollars a 
pound—resulted in a financial loss of between $66 and $264 million 
for Brazil.29 Another “fiasco” entailed the RdC’s admitted failure to place 
purchasing orders early enough in 1943 to take advantage of the high 
water levels to stock adequate goods at the upriver points “so as not to get 
caught short” during the dry season.30 Thus, although by June 30, 1943, 
the RdC had imported about 58,232 short tons of supplies and equipment 
for the Amazon rubber program, and another 15,632 metric tons of staple 
foodstuffs and supplies from southern Brazil, stalled transport between 
Belém and Manaus and the rubber zones left many seringalistas empty- 
handed, and forced tappers to spend more time hunting and fishing.31 As 
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U.S. technicians bluntly stated, “No food, no shotgun shells, no cups, no 
basins = no work, no rubber.”32
Another not so open secret in Washington acknowledged that the 
Brazilian government instrumentalities responsible for the rubber pro-
gram had been created not to ensure their effectiveness so much as to 
“make it possible for RdC gradually to turn over its activities in Brazil to 
these agencies.”33 Numerous internal memoranda of Rubber Develop-
ment detailed the inability or disinclination of SAvA to coordinate upriver 
food shipments, or to enforce price controls for tappers, since municipal 
prefects served as the agency’s representatives in upriver towns.34 One 
Amazon mayor who did respond in November 1944 to complaints about 
high resale prices called for evidence of excessive charges, such as sales 
notes, but given that tappers feared losing credit with suppliers if they 
came forward as claimants, the investigation went nowhere.35 Muffled as 
well in official U.S. pronouncements were protests from tapper José Cân-
dido Ramos and hundreds of extractivists and bosses in Eirunepé that 
the RdC’s discontinuation of subsidized goods had resulted in “exorbi-
tant prices for merchandise in this region that eliminated the advantages 
from higher rubber prices and impaired increased production.”36
Perhaps one of the most symbolic wartime cover- ups, however, sur-
rounded the circuitous voyage of an Amazon rubber péla to Washington. 
In October 1944, seringalista João Lopes da Silva from the Purus River 
delivered a thirty- kilo ball to RdC field technician John Wilde as a gift to 
President Roosevelt. Wilde carried the ball downriver to Manaus (more 
than a monthlong journey, since he made over 140 stops to inspect rub-
ber properties along the way), and conveyed Silva’s request to RdC presi-
dent Francis A. Truslow. In his letter to the White House, Truslow wrote: 
“The fact that a seringalista 2,000 miles up the Amazon River has viewed 
rubber production as his part in war and has wished to symbolize it by 
the preparation and presentation of a special ball to the President is de-
scriptive of the type of relationship between our two countries essential 
to the conduct of our extremely difficult rubber procurement program.” 
Truslow offered to have Wilde deliver the rubber to the president, or even 
to bring the seringalista to the White House to present his wartime offer-
ing.37 But upon the State Department’s recommendation that such pub-
licity was unbecoming in view of “existing uncertainties over long- range 
plans for rubber development in this Hemisphere,” the White House de-
murred.38 Tucked away in a corridor of the RdC in Washington, Amazo-
nian rubber had been literally relegated to the sidelines of U.S. politics. 
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The slapdash foray into the forest, spurred by perilous overreliance on 
Asian markets to sate mass rubber consumption, fit poorly with the tri-
umphalist narratives of an industrial superpower. The dialectic model 
arraying the United States and Latin America at opposite poles of a pur-
ported universal historical continuum consigned dependency and under-
development to the nations south of the Rio Grande.39
As Fernando Coronil notes, dominant historical narratives have cast 
modernity as emanating from the United States and the “West,” rather 
than recognizing the role of “peripheral societies” in the constitution of 
the West as a participant in global capitalist development, and the role 
of capitalism as a global process that mutually forms centers and periph-
eries.40 Shifting U.S. industrial demand for Amazonian rubber would 
shape the wartime histories of both regions, albeit in profoundly unequal 
measure. Government investment in the wartime Amazon would not 
redress the inequities of the rubber trade or upend patterns of extractiv-
ism and subsistence that derived from local systems of knowledge and 
management of natural resources. But it would introduce new modes of 
politics, technology, and investment into the Amazon. If during the war 
Brazil emerged as the darling of the United States in Latin America in 
exchange for its multilateral collaboration—netting more than 70 per-
cent of the total Lend- Lease aid to Latin America, $74 million in Export- 
Import Bank loans, and achieving an annual growth rate of exports of 12.1 
percent between 1940 and 1945—the consequences for the Amazon were 
likewise significant.41 In conjunction with the Brazilian government, the 
United States invested $10 million to boost infrastructure alone in the 
Amazon—the equivalent of $110,490,000 for the year 2000.42 U.S. finan-
cial and technical support paved the way for the establishment of a state 
bank committed to regional development. It also enabled the creation of 
a vast public health network and sanitation of the Amazon’s larger cities, 
construction of an airport in Manaus, the influx of tens of thousands of 
workers, and set a precedent for postwar development aid and social wel-
fare programs. These were small steps in a giant region, but they por-
tended that the nature of the Amazon would never be the same as before, 
notwithstanding old- time perceptions of timeless landscapes.
II. Bosses and the Battle for rubber
During World War II, U.S. officials carped that despite the availability of 
public credit, discounted goods, and subsidized labor, Amazon bosses 
showed reluctance to “meet our war needs” and “lack of foresight, or any 
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ideas involving change for the better.”43 Yet what outsiders lambasted as 
cultural blinders, bosses understood as the risks and opportunities of for-
est trade. Socioenvironmental constraints in rural Amazonia had condi-
tioned seringalistas to financial risk aversion, and to time- tested revenue- 
earning strategies and methods of social control.44
With cold calculation, for example, bosses long linked the cost- 
effectiveness of contracting northeastern rookies to the challenges of ac-
climatization. Due to death and illness, migrants’ first- year rubber yields 
were projected at 30 percent below average; inexperienced tappers were 
also faulted for damaging tree bark.45 Among the naysayers were M. A. 
da Silva Retto, who seethed that four months after installing thirty- five 
nordestinos on his seringal on the lower Juruá, five had died, eight were 
sick, seven had fled (stealing two canoes and some equipment), and only 
a handful of those remaining were earning their meager rations of dried 
fish and farinha.46 Likewise, Cirilo Rodrigues complained that nine of 
the twenty nordestino migrants placed on Seringal Bom Futuro refused 
to cut rubber upon arrival, returning the same day to Porto Velho; of the 
remainder, five subsequently ran away (two of whom carried off shot-
guns).47 Of course, it behooved rubber bosses dodging creditors to blame 
production shortfalls on their workforce. Yet as the RdC noted of bosses’ 
prospective labor costs: “A laborer who has been transported to a serin-
gal, assigned a house and two estradas, advanced food and equipment 
totaling CR$1,500 [$75] to CR$3,000 [$150] may decide after a short period 
of time that he cannot produce sufficient rubber to liquidate his cred-
its and acquire a cash surplus. In such a case, he either stopped work, 
voluntarily left, or was asked to leave the seringal.”48 Thus, as early as 
September 1942, RdC field technicians reported that notwithstanding a 
labor shortage, many bosses refused to place migrants on existing rub-
ber trails.49
Gender factored into the labor selection process as well: not the virtue 
of rubber “soldiers,” but the specter of bandits, city- slicking bucks, and 
vagabonds rounded up by the Ceará police.50 On the Jutaí River, seringa-
listas complained that over eighty men from the migrant labor camp at 
Fonte Boa “took the town,” drinking, brawling, and terrifying the locals.51 
Other bosses deemed the sign of “good labor and good relations” on the 
seringais “when a man will take his woman, whether it is his wife or not, 
[because] it is a pretty good indication that he will stay and that he will 
work.”52 Although U.S. officials had pressured the Brazilian government 
to recruit unaccompanied men in order to boost rubber production, they 
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subsequently conceded its “fundamental error,” since bosses mistrusted 
them and migrants “missed their families, wives, sweethearts, and fian-
cées.”53 Whether partnered migrants would have been more acquiescent 
workers is questionable, but bachelors’ perceived propensity for mis-
chief only reinforced their potential liability in bosses’ minds.54 Tellingly, 
bosses never spoke of wartime migrants as rubber “soldiers,” but rather 
in traditionally pejorative terms—bravos [wild ones] or arigós [migratory 
birds]—and even begrudged that “the government had dignified them 
with the title of ‘soldados da borracha.’”55
Rubber bosses appear to have favored local laborers and former hands 
as tappers. Seringalista Albino Henriques’s help wanted ad of October 
1942, for example, stated that he “preferred persons experienced in this 
type of work who are already residing in the [upper Madeira] region.”56 
And on the Rio Negro, Sebastião Nilo Guerra noted that two years earlier 
he had dismissed his workers, “counting that I might go fetch them, as is 
customary.”57 Moreover, numerous documents allude to locals drawn to 
the seringais by higher wartime rubber prices and a rising cost of living 
exacerbated by disruptions in transportation, diminished agricultural 
production, and the influx of government officials and northeastern mi-
grants.58 In Manaus, which experienced frequent shortages of food and 
electricity, employers groused that the rush to the seringais left behind 
“only those workmen of the poorest caliber” (see figure 5.2).59 Likewise, 
the director of the Madeira- Mamoré Railroad slammed “unscrupulous re-
cruiters” for luring 250 rail workers to the seringais during the previous 
six months, disrupting train service.60 Waldemar de Almeida, born on a 
seringal on a tributary of the Jaci River in 1922, was one such worker: he 
left his job on the Madeira- Mamoré in 1942 to tap rubber on the Abunã 
with his father. Nearly a half- century later, Almeida recalled that as an 
experienced tapper he had produced a large yield at Abunã—which made 
“the few women who were there also interested in me”—but was forced 
to flee after one year by a pugnacious colleague resentful of his success 
with the opposite sex.61
To be sure, “local” seringueiros were often nordestinos, but many had 
been brought to the Amazon under individual contracts with established 
commercial firms rather than by the federal government.62 Nor were 
local tappers necessarily more compliant than newly arrived migrants. 
As seringalista Henrique de Oliveira Bastos griped in November 1942, 
with higher wartime prices for rubber enabling earnings in half the stan-
dard work time, not even “ingenious” threats of military conscription 
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could induce additional tapping.63 Conversely, bosses on the Iaco River 
had few complaints with the hundreds of newcomers from Ceará and 
Rio Grande do Norte, while migrants on the Curuça River reportedly 
were “turning out to be even better seringueiros than some of the older 
ones”64 (see figure 5.3). Nevertheless, some technicians believed, because 
migrant labor was “better informed” than old- timers and might destroy 
the “present profitable system” on the seringais, bosses only wished to 
contract them in “small doses,” and “unmixed with old seringueiros.”65 
In this sense, employers did not worry so much about compliance with 
figure 5.2 Due to the wartime scarcity of male laborers in the urban centers of the 
Amazon, women and girls found employment in the rubber cleaning mills in Manaus, 
where conventional female dress gave way to shorts and overalls. Source: National 
Archives.
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the official tapping contract—which they violated with impunity—as 
the prospect of hiring new, untried labor recruited through government 
channels.66 By February 1944, U.S. officials glumly concluded, “sooner 
or later some Agency in Washington will demand an explanation as to 
the failure to place recruited labor on rubber producing properties in the 
Amazon Division.”67
Even a budding entrepreneur, however, might have been deterred from 
expanding rubber production by wartime conditions. Bosses received 33 
percent of the net price of rubber, but since they were often lessees, and 
had to pay for interest on loans, freight costs, taxes, commissions, and 
start- up costs for new tappers, their profit upon sale to the Banco de Cré-
dito da Borracha might amount to as little as 4.5 cents per pound.68 Pre-
miums of 33.3 percent that had been added to the official rubber price 
in February 1944 were guaranteed for only two years.69 Moreover, the 
turnaround in the Allies’ favor by mid- 1943, publicity on the synthetic 
rubber industry, and closure of RdC warehouses in the Amazon in 1944 
gave bosses additional pause.70 As one U.S. technician observed: “These 
men recall the collapse of the old rubber boom. They can visualize the 
figure 5.3 Migrant workers embarking upriver for the rubber areas. Source: National 
Archives.
184 Chapter 5
same thing happening again and they cannot be blamed for being cau-
tious. They are not in the rubber business for patriotic reasons. They are 
after the ‘Almighty Dollar’ and, if we want rubber as urgently as we say, 
we had better give it to them.”71 Rubber bosses had conducted business 
in the Amazon too long to be swayed by the entreaties of wartime inter-
lopers to overhaul its very nature. Contemporary crusades against Ama-
zonian deforestation that offer scant or short- term material incentives to 
local residents confronted with economic opportunity or need risk meet-
ing the same fate.72
wAR pROfITEERING IN ThE fOREST
The Amazon forest, indeed, meant something else to wartime bosses: 
Hevea trees offered new opportunities for financial gain, both lawful and 
illicit. In 1943 alone, smugglers transported an estimated 1,500 tons of 
rubber into Bolivia on small boats for resale in Argentina (left empty- 
handed by the global crisis) at 100 percent more than the official price 
in Brazil.73 Loans from the Banco de Crédito da Borracha (BCB) for rub-
ber production financed debt- merchandising, and unlawful mark- ups on 
state- subsidized goods generated handsome revenues.74 Workers were 
fleeced for transport upriver, fined, assaulted, and shortchanged on their 
contractual percentage of rubber proceeds.75 Vast distances, remote loca-
tions, and government inaction enabled infractors to act with impunity.
By August 1944, for example, the BCB had extended to rubber bosses 
more than 700 loans totaling over $183 million cruzeiros.76 Credit was 
proportional to the size of the workforce, with bosses typically eligible for 
an average of two to three thousand cruzeiros per seringueiro working on 
existing trails, and three to five thousand for seringueiros involved in the 
expansion of existing properties.77 The bank officials’ inability to monitor 
compliance over extensive territory, however, facilitated fraud.78 (Bosses, 
on the other hand, complained that the bank’s conservative lending poli-
cies stymied production.79) Thus, in the Portel region, only three of eight 
borrowers had reopened trails with their loans; the other five had used 
them for refinancing, to purchase merchandise, or to buy boats to oper-
ate as peddlers.80 Similarly, technician Harold Gustin slammed “pseudo- 
seringalistas” who diverted bank loans to build up trading businesses and 
then blamed alligator hunting for compromising tappers’ output—even 
though the nighttime undertaking did not compete with latex extraction 
and served to supplement paltry diets and earnings.81
Shunting new tappers to less productive trails for their forest appren-
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ticeship was another tried and true recourse of bosses.82 On the Japurá 
River, Romano Barosa claimed in his loan application to run a serin-
gal with 86 men and 300 open estradas, but RdC technicians reported 
that Barbosa only had 33 seringueiros at peak production—all migrant 
workers who had been underfed, overcharged, and forced to open their 
own trails in violation of the official tapping contract.83 Likewise, on the 
Seringal Santa Cruz on the Candeias River, RdC technicians reported 
that four Cearenses who lacked tapping experience or on- site training 
had been placed on trails with exhausted Hevea bark, requiring the use 
of ladders to reach higher up on the trees. Another had gotten lost in the 
bush for four days, cut his hand, and suffered from a serious infection. 
As their debt mounted, the men asked the manager to open up new trails 
for them.84 Opening estradas was customarily done by a mateiro, who 
located the trees—marking out perhaps four trails per month—and two 
toqueiros, who hacked the brush and cleared the crooked loop that con-
nected them.85 While an experienced seringueiro might be able to open 
a few estradas close to a river, a mateiro’s services were essential inland 
and hard to come by during the war.86
Price gouging, however, offered the standard method to maximize in-
vestment returns. Wartime accords barred traders from charging more 
than a 15 percent markup on RdC goods, but neither the large urban com-
mercial firms nor seringalistas distinguished between the sale of state- 
subsidized materials and those from other sources. On the upper Acre, 
for example, only two seringalistas abided by the RdC list price, while in 
regions of Pará, government- supplied goods sold at prices of 200 to 400 
percent of wholesale, with nothing under a 100 percent markup. As an 
RdC senior field technician quipped: “For a long time we used to quote 
the prices we encountered on the river until I finally told the field men 
not to bother. Affidavits and sales slips are articles which are not given by 
people who have to remain on a river. My opinion is that SAvA and Rub-
ber Development Corporation both know that nothing can be done but 
for the sake of appearances continue to go through the motions. I recom-
mend that we now dispense with the motions.”87 While wartime profi-
teering pervaded Brazil as a whole, often involving high- level govern-
ment officials, bosses and traders in the Amazon had married traditional 
methods of natural resource management with new- found openings for 
economic gain.88
For bosses, wartime opportunism and patriotic fervor were not mutu-
ally exclusive. As the Trade Association of Amazonas (ACA) affirmed in 
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1943: “Linked to the seringueiro by a profound human solidarity, and by 
an understanding of the effort that both must expend on behalf of the 
economy of the State and the cause of the Allies, the seringalista plays an 
exceptional role in the move to increase rubber production.”89 Indeed, 
at the ACA ceremony in June 1944 to award the state’s top producing 
tappers, many seringalistas were in attendance, along with local politi-
cians, army officials, clergy, and foreign diplomats.90 Yet whether born of 
conviction or convenience, bosses’ participation in the rubber campaign 
aimed to reinforce their political power and social standing in the Ama-
zon amidst tenuous control over labor and the natural environment.
In the aftermath of the war, Amazonian elites rallied in defense of 
their region. Yields had fallen short of expectations, Luiz de Miranda 
Corrêa wrote in a short history of the rubber campaign, but he could af-
firm that “we clearly achieved the objectives of rubber production vital for 
the needs of war and Allied industry.” Moreover, the episode confirmed 
that “an organized and well planned effort can modify the Amazon re-
gion,” once more demonstrating that “ever since the colonial period, the 
European had shown a capacity to adapt to the Brazilian tropics. . . .”91 
With similar resolve, Amazonian politicians fended off congressional in-
quiries in 1946 into the fate of the “rubber soldiers”: since many serin-
galistas were of northeastern stock, receiving their “brethren” with open 
arms, migrants who remained incommunicado were either living the 
high life or had been undone by their own indiscretions.92 Where local 
pride swelled, and yearnings for federal assistance ran deep, elite admis-
sions of misdoing in the “Battle for Rubber” were unbecoming.
The true victim, the ACA charged, was the Amazon region, whose re-
sources had been “sacrificed” to opportunistic outsiders.93 Manaus dailies 
blasted the RdC for wasting millions of dollars and doing little for long- 
term rubber output.94 And in the national congress, representatives from 
the northern states denounced “semi- colonial” economies that were con-
signed to furnish cheap primary goods and consume high- cost industrial 
products from the United States and southern Brazil.95 But Amazonian 
elites particularly blamed northeastern migrants. Agnello Bittencourt, 
president of the storied Instituto Geográfico e Histórico do Amazonas, 
lambasted the “vagabonds and unadaptable ones who were mixed in 
with the honest men willing to work . . . It is not with the former ele-
ment, those of the worst type, that Amazonia needs to be populated.”96 
And Agesislau Araújo, of the J. G. Araújo firm, claimed that the problem 
boiled down to northeastern men misbehaving during the war. Thou-
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sands of single men had ravaged the region and then retreated, depriv-
ing the Amazon of a “permanent population” that would “take pride in 
improving the resources, not merely tapping them.”97
Such narratives exhibited considerable casuistry. Agesislau Araújo, for 
one, surely knew that speculation, rather than connubialism, was the key 
to economic success in the Amazon: during the war, the U.S. consul in 
Manaus noted that Araújo had diverted funds from rubber production 
to rosewood oil, stockpiling a hundred tons of the perfume for postwar 
markets. As the diplomat noted, Araújo was not anti- American; he had 
merely ignored U.S. officials’ exhortations to remake the forest at their 
behest.98 Yet the defamation of migrants’ character has proven an en-
during explanation for the Amazon’s woes. Although state- directed colo-
nization of the Amazon in the 1970s and 1980s often collapsed due to 
smallholders’ lack of credit, social services, and market access for crops, 
officials blamed migrants for their own misfortunes.99
Whether clad as wartime victors or victims, Amazonian elites tailored 
narratives to secure long- term government subsidies.100 The efforts bore 
fruit. To stave off collapse of the wild rubber trade upon the expiration of 
the fixed wartime prices in 1947, the Brazilian Congress created the Co-
missão Executiva de Defesa da Borracha. The commission, comprising 
representatives of the rubber goods industry, seringalistas, and the Rub-
ber Bank, established a minimum price of eighteen cruzeiros per kilo-
gram for rubber until December 1950.101 Government subsidies for Ama-
zon rubber producers would be extended for decades in conjunction with 
a raft of federal initiatives in the region. The Amazon “question” had be-
come deeply federalized in Brazil, even as local elites continued to claim 
the bragging rights to exclusive understanding of its nature.
III. migrants and tappers: work in nature
His body weakened by years of forest labor, João Monteiro de Souza 
began an interview with me in 2001 recounting how he had contracted 
malaria at the Seringal Porto Alegre. “Everyone got sick,” he noted, “even 
the seringalista.” Souza also told of a recent operation to correct his eye-
sight, damaged by smoking rubber and tapping in the wee hours; showed 
me the marks from a snakebite on his pinky, sustained while clearing 
brush on a trail, that left him permanently unable to bend the finger; 
and pointed to the scar on his foot from a hatchet that had slipped from 
his hand as he was cutting cavaco (palm nuts) for his smokehouse.102 
His body map chronicles how the struggle over Amazonian resources as-
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sumed distinct forms and meanings for the region’s laboring classes.103 
For tappers working in nature, life and livelihood hinged on the vicissi-
tudes of the tropical forest; the availability of food, supplies, and medical 
care; the productivity of rubber trees and access to peddlers and urban 
markets; and relationships with bosses and peers. Off the seringais, indi-
vidual histories were contoured by patterns of subsistence agriculture 
and insertion into urban labor markets, and by migrants’ willingness or 
capacity to return home.
For bodies exposed to nature’s furies, mortality rates were staggering. 
Although we lack official data for casualties in the Battle for Rubber, War-
ren Dean claims that between 17,000 and 20,000 migrants died, a per-
centage of 30.9 to 36.3 that jibes with wartime reports of newcomers’ 
attrition rates in Acre owing to death and illness. Other wartime observers 
estimated a mortality rate of 10 percent for migrants during their first year 
in the Amazon.104 Many migrants succumbed to malaria, particularly the 
most malignant form caused by the plasmodium falciparum protozoan 
parasite, transmitted by the female Anopheles darlingi mosquito. Virulent 
in populations lacking previous immunity and chronic among survivors, 
malaria’s signature symptoms of high intermittent fevers, chills, and ex-
haustion augment sufferers’ vulnerability to malnutrition and hunger, as 
well as other pathogens. Malaria represents a difficult epidemiological 
challenge in the Amazon not only because of its highly variable expres-
sion in human populations, its relation to mosquito vectors, and its geo-
graphical dispersal but also because of its relationship with human agency 
amidst conditions of great socioeconomic precariousness. Poor living con-
ditions, the influx of thousands of newcomers without previous immu-
nity, and the mobility of the workforce linked to extractivist cycles and 
flight from infected areas have contributed to the spread of the disease.105
Consonant with the colonial practice of tropical medicine, U.S.- backed 
malaria control programs in the Amazon aimed to increase labor pro-
ductivity, and to protect troops and government officials in insalubrious 
zones.106 Prior to the advent of ddT, an insecticide developed during the 
war and first applied in the Amazon in the town of Breves in 1945, ma-
laria control efforts in the valley focused on disruption of the reproduc-
tive cycle of the anopheles mosquito and the distribution of antimalarial 
medication. The former strategy, which entailed drainage projects, in-
door spraying, and rigorous application of Paris green larvicide on water 
surfaces where insects deposited their larvae, was adopted by SESp in 
urban centers in the Amazon.107 In Belém, for example, where U.S. mili-
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tary officials prioritized malaria control due to the stationing of Ameri-
can marines at the airbase at Val de Cans, SESp spent over $500,000 
to install ditches, dykes, and automatic tide- gates to control flooding of 
low- lying zones, sharply reducing the breeding of mosquitoes in and 
around the city and incidence of the disease (see figure 5.4).108 Likewise, 
in Porto Velho, whose calamitous rates of malaria gained international 
notoriety earlier in the century at the time of the construction of the 
Madeira- Mamoré railroad, SESp would make strides in sanitary engineer-
ing, undertaking municipal drainage works, demolishing small hills, and 
filling in extensive depressions.109
In the countryside, however, malaria control was bedeviled by the 
widespread distribution of anopheles, the impracticality of draining or 
figure 5.4 Official from SESp spraying oil to eliminate mosquito larvae  
near Belém. Source: National Archives.
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larviciding immense floodplains, and the futility of indoor spraying in 
the open- air, thatched roof huts of tappers. Thus, the SESp focused on free 
distribution of atabrine, a synthetic antimalarial that served as both a pro-
phylactic and curative. Atabrine was manufactured and distributed by the 
U.S. government in the wake of Japan’s seizure of Javanese cinchona plan-
tations, the quinine- producing trees that had furnished the traditional 
antimalarial.110 By October 1943, SESp had given out 12.5 million atabrine 
pills in the Amazon.111 A staff of 2,893 Brazilians and 65 Americans ran 
the agency’s thirty health centers and medical posts in the region, which 
received an estimated 170,000 visits during their first year, and operated 
over forty boats as floating dispensaries.112
Nevertheless, tappers’ geographic remoteness and mobility, the diffi-
culties of river transport and shortages of health personnel, and seringa-
listas’ illegal sale of tablets stymied the rural distribution of atabrine.113 
Atabrine’s gastrointestinal disturbances, exacerbated by administration 
on an empty stomach, undoubtedly also discouraged experimentation 
or long- term use, as did users’ development of yellow pigmentation (al-
though clinical tests deemed this side effect harmless and not associated 
with disturbance in liver function).114 Popular perceptions of medicine 
and disease may have also played a role in compromising the pills’ effi-
cacy: doctors sneered at patients’ “suspicions” and misuse of the medi-
cation, or their preference for injections, purgatives, or a “good woman 
(or good man) who knows a magic prayer and blessing which will offset 
all physical troubles for a few cruzeiros.”115 Health officials were loath to 
acknowledge the efficacy of native pharmacopeia and the chronic paucity 
of Western medicines that may have prompted such “suspicions”; or the 
fact that malaria was but part of an everyday range of diseases that resi-
dents of the Amazon battled (with tuberculosis, in fact, the leading cause 
of death among adults in Pará during the previous decade).116
Ultimately, rubber workers’ very potential to receive atabrine dimin-
ished with U.S. downgrading of the Amazonian campaign after mid- 
1943. From 12.5 million atabrine tablets given out between June 1942 
and October 1943, the SESp distribution of atabrine dropped to 5.2 million 
pills between October 1943 and December 1946.117 At the SESp health 
center in Porto Velho, for instance, the distribution of atabrine tablets fell 
from 348,831 in 1943 and 228,119 in 1944 to 28,790 in 1945.118 The pre-
cipitous decline also reflected the demotion of a prophylactic medication 
deemed by health officials as unlikely to have a lasting preventive impact 
on local conditions in favor of broader- based public health and sanitation 
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measures, such as improving water supplies, food sanitation and nutri-
tion, and excreta disposal.119 Amazon towns, with greater demographic 
concentrations and availability of medical personnel than the country-
side, posed fewer logistic challenges for public health programs, as well 
as greater payback for politicians.
Yet among the 1,462,429 residents of Amazonas, Pará, and Acre reg-
istered in the 1940 census, three- fourths of the population lived in small 
communities dispersed along the region’s rivers, where they were highly 
vulnerable to a range of diseases.120 One such victim was José Alfredo 
Leite Araújo, who came to the Amazon from Rio de Janeiro at the age of 
thirty- six with the first SEMTA dispatch in January 1943. Six months after 
being placed at the Seringal Pacaás Novas, he contracted malaria. Araújo 
made his way to the SESp clinic in Porto Velho, joining scores of fellow 
sufferers: half of the 3,002 patients treated at the town’s dispensary in 
1943 had contracted the disease, while another 30 percent battled para-
sitic infections.121 Returning home to Rio, Araújo leaned on his brother 
for financial support, imploring Vargas (with apparent unsuccess) for 
state assistance in return for his “patriotic duty.”122
Countless others suffered in obscurity. In 1945, of the 2,160 migrants 
that the dNI shipped back to the northeast, 804 had been stricken by 
malaria; the following year, of the nearly 3,000 nordestinos sent home, 
80 percent were sick.123 As one wartime migrant recalled of the lack of 
Western medical care on the seringais: “We cured illnesses with a pill 
named the ‘safe bullet,’ which served for fever, worms, itches. We had no 
penicillin, we had nothing.”124
STRUGGLES IN ThE fOREST
Amidst widespread conflicts over access to resources in the forest, ten-
sions racked the wartime Amazon. For example, after two months work-
ing at Seringal Santa Cruz upon their arrival from Ceará, Raimundo 
Rodrigues de Sousa and Francisco Alexandre da Silva demanded to see 
their balance. The manager, Roberto de Sá Nogueira, ordered them back 
to work “even if he had to force them.” When Sousa retorted that “he had 
never met a man who had forced him to work,” Nogueira fatally shot him 
in the chest. Da Silva fled to Porto Velho where he denounced the mur-
der to the police. Nogueira died shortly thereafter, although the cause was 
not listed on the death certificate.125 Similarly, technician Frederick Vogel 
noted of the upper Purus in July 1944: “On several seringais the laborers 
spoke seriously to the writer about armed revolution but this was quickly 
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talked down with explanations of its fatal consequences, its adverse effect 
on the war effort, and its futility.”126 The revolution did not occur. But 
workers on the rubber properties tangled with bosses, voted with their 
feet, strained government instrumentalities, and invoked patriotic and 
legal claims for social justice, striving to shape nature and society in the 
Amazon according to their visions.
Knowledge of flora and fauna, whether homegrown or newly ac-
quired, ensured physical survival, while traditional forms of forest re-
source management and subsistence practices condemned by govern-
ment bureaucracies compensated for high- priced or scarce supplies. As 
RdC functionary Francis Rebelo noted, the exorbitant price and shortage 
of consumer goods on the Purus River gave tappers a “natural reason” 
to turn to agriculture, hunting, and fishing.127 Or as another technician 
commented: “The seringueiro, illiterate but no dummy, has figured out 
his own answer” to price gouging: “he goes fishing.”128 And as technician 
Harold Gustin observed of the Negro River’s workforce, which hailed pri-
marily from the Solimões and even Manaus: “They seem perfectly aware 
that if they go into debt there is nothing that the patrão can do to collect it 
and in the meantime as long as he provides them with food, they will pro-
duce as much rubber as conveniently possible. Last season they all ended 
up in the hole. If they get out of debt this year, fine, if not, they can end 
up the season owing money which they know their creditor cannot col-
lect and in the meantime they had room and board, such as it was.”129 In 
other words, workers had imparted distinctive meanings to Amazonian 
nature based on long- held practices and adaptations.
More than half of migrant workers also left their properties (or were 
presumably evicted) after a brief stint, according to wartime bosses.130 As 
nordestino Alcidino dos Santos recounted his trajectory: “The boss came 
to get us in Manaus. I went to the Rio Tarauacá, Vila Seabra. There were 
four shacks. I stayed there only three months because the boss wanted 
to humiliate us, making us carry excessive weight, like an animal. I said 
no, I am not a donkey or a mule.”131 Notwithstanding the exhortations of 
RdC labor advisor Georges Rabinovitch that Brazilian officials enforce 
migrants’ “strict obligation to work” in light of exemption from mili-
tary duties, or technicians’ insistence that tappers might be “induced or 
forced” to tap more regularly since “Brazil is also in this war,” the Es-
tado Novo lacked such coercive power in the rural Amazon, which would 
have been anathema in any event to progressives in both nations.132 Thus, 
while revisionists have decried the Vargas regime’s nonenforcement of 
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protectionist labor legislation in the Amazon as symptomatic of an oligar-
chic pact, there is also no indication that migrant- tappers who violated or 
voided their contracts were prosecuted.
To be sure, tapping remained a viable livelihood for those blessed with 
more favorable conditions. Reluctance to suspend tapping during the dry 
season, for example, may explain why only four of Amazonas’s twenty- 
eight top producers came to Manaus in June 1944 to collect their cash 
prize from the ACA.133 Antonio Carolino, who amassed a hefty 1,065 kilos 
of rubber on the Seringal Manarian on the Juruá River, turned down the 
trade association’s “distinguished invitation” because he was “produc-
ing rubber” and did not “wish to leave the seringal.”134 Manoel Paulo 
too stayed put on the Seringal Redenção, hoping to double his whopping 
record of 1,848 kilos the following year.135 And Mayor Nelson Noronha 
noted that the rubber fever gripping the region of Benjamin Constant 
had “most of them [seringueiros] ready to dispute the new prizes that 
they hope the Association will award the champions of rubber production 
in the current harvest.”136
Although Francisca Nobre de Melo’s husband did not win a prize, in 
her eyes he too was a champion. Migrating from Ceará to the Amazon in 
1943, her husband “came here to work to see if he could earn something. 
He came here, he earned. He was here for 10 years . . . and earned money, 
that was a seringueiro! A worker! But it was six days a week that he used 
to tap. A worker that sent chills up your spine.”137 Likewise, Otávio Carlos 
Monteiro achieved a balance at the Seringal Sobral during the war. Twice 
weekly, for over a year, Monteiro toted a 40–50- kilo ball of rubber on a 
3- to 4- hour walk to Sobral’s riverside trading post, before moving on to 
tap in the Abunã region. Decades later, living in Manaus, he reminisced 
that the geographic distance of his encampment [colocação] at Sobral from 
river peddlers imposed an obligatory thrift. Praising the Lord for having 
protected him, and Getúlio Vargas for granting free passage from Ceará, 
he insisted that only those migrants who had imagined they would get 
rich quick had been disappointed tapping rubber.138
Such modest success stories clash with dominant representations of 
the populations and landscapes of the Amazon and the northeast, which, 
like other narratives of peoples and places at the margins, traffic in tales 
of dysfunction and disaster. The protagonists’ accomplishments are little 
known outside family circles, lacking the requisite flash for rags- to- riches 
legends, critical documentaries, or telenovela storylines.139 They are also 
difficult to quantify for migrants, since notions of success or failure were 
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relative to their conditions and expectations in the sending region. What 
we might affirm is that although personal grit and divine intervention 
headline tappers’ own understandings of success, the ability to earn a 
surplus on the seringais hinged on an ungainly combination of methodi-
cal extraction and measured consumption, health and epidemiological 
conditions, productive trees and tapping supplies, opportunities for trade 
and geographic mobility, and fair treatment. Wartime technicians, for ex-
ample, noted that operators supplied by large importing firms typically 
fared better materially than smaller seringais furnished by local mer-
chants.140 Moreover, on the lower Amazon, an area better served by both 
aviadores and regatões, tappers had greater trade options and more in-
formation on the price of goods in Manaus.141 Even on the upper Acre, 
one report noted, where peddlers circulated “the rubber cutter has a 
chance, but where there is no competition and where control and pub-
licity present such a geographical problem, he had little choice but to re-
sort to basic subsistence.”142
SUBSISTENCE fARMERS, BUILdERS Of RAINfOREST  
CITIES, ANd fAMILIES LEfT BEhINd
Migrants’ varied pathways in the Amazon reflected divergent strategies 
of resource appropriation. While many struggled on the seringais, some 
had never intended to tap rubber. Long delays in government camps, 
mistreatment by bosses, rumors of Indian attack, encounters with in-
firm returnees, or alternative employment opportunities might also have 
prompted a change of heart. In early 1942, for example, U.S. and Brazil-
ian officials reported that drought refugees were being sold like “human 
cattle” to the “highest bidder” in the Amazon.143 Or as a newly arrived im-
migrant to Manaus stated: “I was getting some information from some 
mansos there in Ceará, and they told me about this business of tying the 
customer to the [tree] trunk just because he asked [the boss] for his bal-
ance. I don’t like oppression, and they told me that the rifle rules there. 
I am an honest man. I am not going to those [upriver] places.”144 The 
U.S. consul in Belém even reported a first- hand encounter with one such 
“deserter”: a plumber that he hired turned out to be one of the “rubber 
workers” recruited in Rio de Janeiro.145
Indeed, of the 10,123 workers transported to the Tapanã camp in 
Belém by September 1943, only 32 percent had been directly placed by 
SAvA on seringais, and another 29 percent through “other mechanisms.” 
Similarly, a 1943 SESp report estimated that of the 10,396 men delivered 
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to SAvA at Belém only 4,140 had been placed on the seringais; another 
12 percent had deserted at Belém, with 3 percent returning to the north-
east.146 And an RdC survey taken from March 1943 through June 1944 
found that of a total of 16,894 arriving at the camp in Belém, 13,812 had 
been shipped upriver, yet the agency could only confirm that 9,416 had 
gone on to Manaus, 1,212 had entered Guaporé territory, and the remain-
der had presumably scattered among points in Pará and Amazonas.147 In 
his confidential report of April 1943 to Vargas, Reinaldo Reis conjectured 
that the number of migrants shipped upriver might have been consider-
ably higher—perhaps 10,000—if some of the workers had left Belém and 
Manaus on private boats.148
The wartime economic boom spawned great demand for labor 
throughout the Amazon Valley. Of the 9,173 nordestino families trans-
ported by the dNI to the Amazon through March 15, 1943, for instance, 
more than half (4,888) reportedly went to the Bragança agricultural re-
gion near Belém, where many once lived or had relatives.149 Similarly, on 
the Rio Tapajós, technicians reported in December 1943 that not more 
than 20 percent of the 250 or so workers brought in were cutting rubber: 
at least one- fifth had purportedly left the region, while the remaining 60 
percent worked in agriculture and public works.150 In view of wartime 
food shortages in the Amazon, U.S. officials reasoned, the diversion of 
workers to agriculture was not entirely out of keeping with the general 
rubber program, but little could be done anyway to deter such deter-
mined agriculturists.151 The dNI office in Manaus, for example, reported 
that newly arrived migrants had insisted upon farm work, notwithstand-
ing their contractual obligations to tap rubber, and while authorities con-
vinced some to head for the seringais, others simply deserted the camps 
“without giving us the slightest warning.”152
Aside from agriculture, local business, and industry, workers were 
needed in the construction activities of the RdC; at the U.S. army base 
in Belém (a key hub in the aerial network linking Miami to Natal and 
the city’s single largest employer of manpower); at the city’s wharfage, 
cranes, tugs, floating dry docks, repair shops, and marine railways; in 
the public utilities of Belém and Manaus; on the Madeira- Mamoré rail-
road; and in public health and drainage projects.153 For example, in Porto 
Velho, whose population of four thousand witnessed a boom in construc-
tion and sanitation projects under Governor Aluízio Ferreira, migrants 
furnished much of the labor: according to a local history, the SAvA camp 
in Porto Velho received 4,961 workers (see figure 5.5), placing 1,786 on 
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seringais, 1,002 on public works, 434 in agriculture, and 503 in “other 
services.”154 One such migrant was José Mariano de Souza who, in Feb-
ruary 1943, at the age of eighteen, left behind his thirteen siblings in 
Quixeramobim, Ceará. After a month- long delay in Belém, Souza em-
barked upon a twenty- eight- day journey upriver to Porto Velho, learning 
en route about the “work of the soldados da borracha when we [the boat] 
stopped to get firewood, and didn’t like it.” Souza found work on a SESp 
drainage project in Porto Velho and later enlisted in the newly created 
Guarda Territorial of Guaporé in Guajará- Mirim in 1944 at a monthly 
figure 5.5 Migrants arriving at Porto Velho. The inscription under 
the bust reads: “In Porto Velho every worker is a soldier and every 
soldier is a worker with the common objective of working for the 
greatness of the nation.” Source: National Archives.
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salary of 600 cruzeiros. He married there, fathered three children, and 
worked for the constabulary for the next eighteen years.155
The competition for common and skilled labor in the Amazon led war-
time workers to shop from one government agency to the next, fueled a 
steady rise in the pay scale, and provided an outlet for tappers inclined 
to void their contracts. In May 1943, representatives of U.S. and Brazilian 
agencies involved in the Amazon (including the Airport Development 
Project, the U.S. Engineering Department, the Navy, RdC, SNApp, and 
SESp) called for sharing information on labor requirements, coordinating 
pay scales, and reducing demand for labor so as to preserve workers’ pri-
mary interest in the collection of rubber and avoid disorganization of the 
local economy.156 Yet as the U.S. consul in Belém noted, since labor and 
materials in the Amazon were also needed for Brazilian organizations, 
public utilities, construction, and local businesses, U.S. officials could 
only go so far in their demands.157 And while U.S. agencies aimed wher-
ever possible to use migrants’ services, many workers understood their 
relative bargaining power. At the SAvA camp in Manaus, for example, 
workers awaiting placement upriver received a wage of six cruzeiros daily 
and an additional three cruzeiros when they worked on construction of 
the airport nearby; yet some demanded twelve to fifteen cruzeiros per day 
for labor outside the camps, informing government officials that their 
contracts did not oblige them to work while in transit.158 “Since our only 
sanction against them would be to dismiss them (which would not be in 
our interests),” a U.S. official concluded, “we recommend that migrants 
employed for work other than rubber- tapping be paid whatever salary is 
consistent with local conditions.”159
Northeastern migrants laboring on public works in Manaus, Belém, 
and smaller towns had become cassacos in the Amazon. Their physi-
cal labor propelled the expansion of urban infrastructure, sanitation 
projects, ports, and airfields in the region (see figure 5.6). Although just 
as in the northeast (or in Brazil’s southern metropolises) there are few 
official monuments to honor their hard work, they were modernizers of 
the “rainforest cities” that today account for nearly three- fourths of the 
Amazon’s population. Through self- help housing, they also gave rise to 
new neighborhoods in these urban centers, typically in marginal or ma-
larial zones. In Porto Velho, which today boasts over 400,000 people, 
the neighborhood of Arigolândia, as its name suggests, was founded by 
wartime migrants—and has since become considerably more upscale. In 
Manaus, wartime migrants settled in the neighborhood of Educandos.160
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We need not romanticize as “resistance” the alternative pathways of 
wartime migrants in the Amazon. Work off the seringais could be just 
as demanding and dangerous as on them: at times as many as half of 
the laborers on the drainage projects in Porto Velho, for example, were 
sick with malaria.161 In the agricultural zones along the Belém- Bragança 
railway, postwar visitors noted the widespread poverty and the rudimen-
tary housing of the inhabitants.162 In Cuiabá, a Brazilian observer in July 
1944 described famished migrants roaming the streets in search of work 
and persecuted by the police.163 And in Amazon cities beset by rising 
living costs and an acute housing shortage, poor women toiled as washer-
women and seamstresses, while countless men hustled in the informal 
sector because, in the words of one migrant, “that’s what one who has 
no protection does.”164 Nor were migrants that worked off the seringais 
less heroic for not having served as rubber “soldiers”: many in the armed 
forces never see active combat duty. What it does mean is that migrants 
struggled in various settings to remake their lives and their surroundings.
For family members who remained in the northeast, the Amazon re-
tained distinctive meanings. It had always haunted residents less as a 
figure 5.6 Migrants erecting radio tower at newly constructed airport in Manaus, February 
1944. Source: National Archives.
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geopolitical specter of empty land than a land that emptied homes of 
loved ones. The official recruitment contract entitled families that did not 
accompany the male head of household to the Amazon to a daily allow-
ance of between two and eight cruzeiros for the duration of the migrant’s 
journey to the seringais. Another option, which fewer families selected, 
was for dependents to be sheltered at government camps in the north-
east, without a daily allowance. Upon arrival at the seringais, migrants 
could opt to remit their tapping earnings to dependents through the 
offices of SAvA in cooperation with competent government agencies.165 
Under a January 1943 accord, the RdC had agreed to set aside special 
monies for the family welfare fund, but subsequent to the midyear deci-
sion to scale back operations in the Amazon, the agency offered a lump 
sum of $2.4 million to the Brazilian government to cover the transporta-
tion of an additional 16,000 workers as well as the maintenance of the 
family welfare fund. In 1944, the Brazilian government suspended pay-
ment entirely to dependents.166
Official documentation sheds scant light on the fate of these family 
members. Since most poor nordestinas were illiterate, few could docu-
ment their plight in writing. In June 1944, Vargas did receive a letter 
from Jovelina Luciana de Souza and other “wives, mothers, fiancées, and 
sisters of workers who left their homes more than a year ago, in order 
to find better opportunities in life in the extreme north of the country.” 
The women protested that the recent suspension of the family welfare 
fund left them struggling with the “high cost of living.” They also com-
plained that the indemnification of one thousand cruzeiros provided to 
widows amounted to less than one- tenth the official payment for work- 
related fatalities under Brazilian labor law.167 But in a stern rebuttal, the 
legal counsel of CAETA insisted that the agency had only been contrac-
tually obliged to support dependents while migrants were in transit to the 
seringais, and had already shown an “elevated spirit of humanity” in con-
tinuing to do so, particularly where men had violated their contracts by 
not tapping rubber. Moreover, he argued, since some migrants had died 
from “natural” causes, rather than work- related accidents, their widows 
were fortunate to have received any indemnity. In his blanket assessment 
of migrants’ trajectories and causes of death, the lawyer dispensed with 
any case- by- case investigation, proposing instead the relocation of family 
members to the Amazon, even though he recognized that the men’s pre-
cise whereabouts were unknown.168
It is unclear how Jovelina Luciana de Souza and her fellow petitioners 
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did get by after the family welfare fund that had been promised to their 
menfolk at the time of recruitment was suspended. The existing docu-
mentation, however, does underscore Brazilian officials’ capricious appli-
cation of legalistic principles to disempower the poor and their assump-
tion that the best place for an argumentative woman was beside her man, 
even if he might have disappeared in the Amazon. In postwar testimony 
to the Brazilian Congress, Valentim Bouças, the president of the Com-
mission to Control the Washington Accords, summed up in three sen-
tences what had happened to family members in the government camps 
in the northeast: “In six months, aside from sending the workers, we 
were able to have the families sent to their respective heads in Amazonia. 
When we had no news of the workers, we returned the families to their 
places of origin. In a couple of months, we no longer had núcleos [family 
camps in the northeast], nor women, nor children, in other words, the 
agglomerations of dependents were gone.”169
CITIzENS IN ThE fOREST
During the war and its immediate aftermath, a number of tappers (or 
their families) invoked patriotic discourse and protective legislation 
to garner social respectability and government support. Tapper Olívio 
Brito de Sá, for example, affirmed that through his individual efforts he 
fought “for the victory of the United Nations and the sacred ideals of our 
shaken Nation.” His colleague, Antonio Carolino, characterized his work 
as “more precious than any other, in collaborating with our effort to assist 
the United Nations, to defeat our enemies who have been barbarously 
and miserably murdering innocent women and children.”170 Similarly, 
Arlinda Lopes da Costa described her departed husband as “a poor sol-
dado da borracha, who during uncertain times for our freedom, amidst 
the bloody swords of NAzI- fASCISM, fought fearlessly, not on the fields of 
Italy, against the savagery of Hitler, but instead in the dangerous Amazo-
nian forests, facing terrible beasts and fearsome malaria, which claimed 
the life of my husband. . . .”171 And in their petition to ACA President 
Eurico Dutra in 1946, seringueiros of the upper Jamari and Ji- Paraná 
regions of Guaporé asserted their right to “assistance” from the govern-
ment as former soldiers in the “Battle for Rubber.”172
Indeed, wartime politics, linking forest labor to the rights of citizen-
ship, provided new avenues for rubber tappers to challenge oligarchic 
privilege. Governor Luis Silvestre Gomes Coelho of Acre, for example, 
received numerous complaints from seringueiros that price gouging 
War in the Amazon 201
and short- changing had undermined “our cooperation in the current war 
effort.”173 And even a powerful seringalista like Alfredo Vieira Lima—a 
lead producer in the upper Iaco valley who had marketed 125,746 kilos 
of rubber in 1943—found himself challenged by Francisco Praia and João 
Valério, two “rubber soldiers deep in the forest in defense of the Nation.” 
In a letter to Vargas, they alleged that Lima illegally charged migrants 
for transport and atabrine, and traded adulterated latex, notwithstanding 
that “Your Excellency has cited [it] as critical to the country’s defense.”174 
The duo also decried that when “we claim the rights extended by Your 
Excellency, he [the seringalista] insults us by saying that Your Excellency 
is in charge in the Palácio do Catete, and he on his seringal,” and had 
ordered them to leave his property. Lima retorted that the two were “fA-
MOUS SERINGUEIROS, accustomed in their systematic way to tricking all 
of those whom they have worked for, from the Iaco to Acre, including my 
firm, and from where their disgruntlement originates.”175 Most likely, the 
tappers’ denunciation came to naught: the government of Acre claimed 
to have opened an investigation, but the Banco de Crédito da Borracha, 
one of Lima’s creditors, seemed to anticipate defeat in assessing “the 
challenges of communication that we struggle with in this region.”176
In several instances, tappers even filed suits against bosses in the 
labor courts. In May 1943, RdC technician Paul Warner fumed that there 
were approximately two hundred lawyers in Cuiabá, Mato Grosso’s capi-
tal, who “spend their time looking for Seringueiros who desert Seringa-
listas and want to square their accounts with their employer if they feel 
that they have money coming to them.” In testimonies before the Labor 
Tribunal, he noted, tappers might deny that their signatures appeared 
on sales slips, thereby obliging bosses to come to town, hire a lawyer, 
and call witnesses to the sales in question. Warner also charged that the 
Labor Ministry failed to enforce repayment of debt by tappers who “de-
serted,” but held bosses contractually accountable for providing tappers 
with 60 percent of the value of the rubber yields.177 Warner’s dismay at 
tappers’ “desertion” was rather disingenuous. By his own admission, the 
heavily indebted firm of Alfonso, Junqueira & Cia. had taken to paying 
workers in vouchers.178 Yet the report hints at bosses’ outrage that tap-
pers had challenged their authority through litigation and, more broadly, 
calls for state regulation of systems of labor and exchange in the forest. In 
April 1948, for example, fourteen seringalistas complained to the court 
in Guajará- Mirim of tappers “who seek out the Labor Court to protect 
their rights,” while bosses were granted only twenty- four hours to comply 
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with judgments for payment or faced seizure of assets. Unless the court 
dismissed all “labor- related suits,” they despaired, “the moral [stature] of 
the patrão that we need to enjoy vis- à- vis the employee in order to main-
tain our authority as boss would suffer a blow.”179
Indeed, wartime politics had served to reshape popular understand-
ings of the state’s role in ensuring social justice, laying new foundations 
for workers’ struggles in the Amazon, as elsewhere in the Americas.180 
Thus, in the war’s aftermath, tappers initiated legal action for damages 
for breach of the official labor contact and the Consolidated Labor Laws of 
1943. For example, Edmilson Ximenes, a native of Amazonas who arrived 
at the Seringal Parati in 1943, sued his boss four years later for 7,000 cru-
zeiros for charging a 20 percent commission on a credit advance when he 
began tapping, and for unjust enrichment on property improvements ef-
fected prior to his eviction. The suit was dismissed when Ximenes failed 
to show up on his court date.181
Francisco Assis de Oliveira, however, had greater success bringing 
suit against his boss in 1949. After tapping for two years on Manoel 
Moreira Lima’s Seringal Bananeiras, the 22-year- old Cearense’s balance 
exceeded 1,000 cruzeiros, but Lima, blaming Oliveira for the death of a 
donkey years before, retroactively debited 3,000 cruzeiros from his ac-
count. Oliveira admitted that he shot the donkey by accident—startled by 
something that brushed against his hammock in the middle of the night 
(which he thought was either a “jaguar or Indians”)—and had nursed the 
wounded animal for two months until it disappeared. According to the 
lawyer for the labor court, the boss’s actions were illegal because he could 
not prove that the tapper’s gunshot had caused the animal’s death; even 
if it had, Brazilian labor law barred employers from fining workers for 
damages so long as they were not caused by willful negligence. As the 
attorney concluded, the Consolidated Labor Laws “augment the rights 
and advantages of labor and circumscribe those of employers.” The judge 
ruled on behalf of the plaintiff.182
Waldemar Resende Rios also sued his former boss, José Pereira da 
Silva, in the Guajará- Mirim court in 1948 for 5,000 cruzeiros. Rios al-
leged that Silva had charged for transport from town to the seringal (in 
violation of the employment contract), levied fines, overcharged for trans-
port of goods, and doctored account books. Silva branded Rios a trouble-
maker who had picked fights, stolen from other tappers, and mutilated 
trees, for which he had been fined 2,000 cruzeiros. In advocating for the 
plaintiff, Paulo da Silva Coelho, the lawyer for the labor court, argued 
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that such fines violated the Forest Code of 1934, which required parties 
seeking indemnification for damage to private forests to file suit in civil 
court. And resting his case with a reference to a São Paulo court decision 
that scoffed at those expecting the etiquette of “the poshest salons” amid 
the gritty conditions of the workplace, Coelho quipped: “What would 
the [Labor] Tribunal of São Paulo say if it saw up- close the soldado da 
borra cha, exposed to the constant danger of wild beasts, making his way 
through swamps in the middle of virgin forest, hounded by fever, mal-
nourished, in a thankless struggle of a hard- knock life?”183
Such litigation was unusual, of course, in the Amazon. Most serin-
gueiros, toiling for at least half of the year far from urban areas such as 
Cuiabá or Guajará- Mirim, would have been hard- pressed to seek legal 
redress in a courtroom. Moreover, the judicial system’s emphasis on lit-
eracy, formalism, and fixity, not to mention its attendant pecuniary ex-
penses and reputation for favoring the powerful, were sure to alienate 
prospective working- class complainants.184 In fact, many migrants trans-
ported under the auspices of the Ministry of Labor were unaware of their 
contractual rights and stipulated earnings, noted one report to Vargas 
in April 1943.185 Even if they were, social conditions soon revealed the 
futility of quibbling. As noted, when Raimundo Rodrigues de Sousa af-
firmed that no one could force him to work, the manager of the seringal 
killed him. When Domingos de Souza Neto, who arrived from Ceará in 
the Amazon in the 1940s, told his boss that he intended to lodge a com-
plaint with the Ministry of Labor, his boss responded: “The seringueiro’s 
minister is the lash.” As Souza recounted years later, “the thing to do 
was to keep quiet.”186 And when Cícero Trajano de Lima left his seringal 
after his boss refused to pay him his balance of 3,807 cruzeiros, he came 
to Manaus and appealed (most likely unsuccessfully) to dNI officials to 
intercede on his behalf.187 Thus, migrants in the Amazon who turned to 
public authorities for assistance most often sought physical refuge rather 
than arbitration of labor disputes—leading SAvA to lower its daily wage to 
discourage the return to agency camps.188
Yet the aforementioned legal cases also shed light on shifting political 
dynamics in Amazonia precipitated by the wartime expansion of state 
power and popular mobilization. Moreover, they conform to a broader 
pattern of political engagement among the rural poor during the Estado 
Novo that historians have only begun to uncover.189 That some tappers 
could even consider the courtroom as a venue to challenge their bosses’ 
business practices reflects another legacy of the Vargas era: new- found 
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understanding of their rights as workers and citizens in the forest. Ama-
zonian landscapes had become newly politicized during the war. In this 
sense, the wartime transformations of the Amazon that helped to under-
gird mass deforestation were also harbingers of contemporary grass roots 
movements for social justice.
ThE SOLdIERS’ LONG MARCh
In the aftermath of the war, rubber tappers faced anew elite disapproba-
tion for their purported mismanagement of forest resources. Survivors 
of the wartime rubber campaign likewise struggled to overcome their 
social marginality. The final report of the Brazilian congressional inquest 
of 1946 called for federal assistance to rubber tappers, subsidized re-
turn of migrants, and aid to dependents in the northeast.190 And the First 
Conference on Immigration and Colonization proclaimed in 1950 that 
“a solution to the problem of the displaced Nordestino constitutes a veri-
table debt of the State to the unsuccessful ex- soldados da borracha.”191 
Yet the veterans of the battle for rubber—economically disadvantaged, 
geographically scattered, politically isolated, and largely illiterate— 
confronted societal indifference and a rising tide of historical oblivion. 
Many migrants themselves may have viewed their wartime odyssey as a 
serendipitous personal journey rather than a grand nationalist epic. Bra-
zilian postwar public policies, calibrated toward achieving political order 
rather than popular empowerment, focused on medical treatment and 
subsidized return for the neediest migrants.
The “soldados da borracha” would only obtain the right to formal 
compensation from the Brazilian government under the Constitution 
of 1988. The initiative had gathered steam during the military govern-
ment (1964–85) with the efforts of the Catholic Church to defend vic-
tims of land expulsion, violence, and social exclusion in the Amazon. 
In 1970, Bishop Giocondo Grotti of Acre endorsed a proposal to the fed-
eral congress for government assistance to wartime tappers. Four years 
later, 1,744 rubber soldiers petitioned congress to obtain the same gov-
ernment benefits as those of Brazilian army veterans. Amazon politicians 
pushed for compensation as well, anticipating potential electoral payoffs: 
in 1982, for example, Senator Jorge Kalume of Acre proposed legislation 
authorizing a monthly pension for former wartime rubber workers.192
Under Law 7,986 of 1989, wartime rubber tappers, or their widows, 
earned the right to a monthly pension of twice the minimum wage in 
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recognition of their service to the nation. The first payments began two 
years later.193 By that point, the youngest surviving veterans of the Ama-
zonian wartime rubber campaign would have been sixty- six. Since most 
lacked written proof of wartime service, Brazil’s social security agency 
ultimately allowed for testimony of two witnesses in lieu of printed docu-
mentation. As Raimundo de Oliveira recounted in “Declaration and La-
ments of a Soldado da Borracha”:




de servir a sua pátria
sem promover questão.
Ainda continuo pobre
Vivendo uma situação dificil
Mas espero aposentadoria
Que será um benefício
Que receberei das autoridades
Em recompensa do sacrifício.
I suffered on behalf of the fatherland
Fullfilling my mission without hesitation,
For every patriot
Has the special obligation
To serve unquestioningly
On behalf of his nation.
I am still poor
In a difficult situation.
But I await my pension
Which will be a compensation
That I receive from the authorities
In return for my sacrifice for this nation.194
Protagonists of the greatest conflagration of the twentieth century, 
the graying rubber “soldiers” joined the ranks of the Second World War’s 
far- flung victims and forgotten homefront heroes that resurfaced around 
the globe demanding monetary compensation and/or official recognition 
for historic wrongs and unfulfilled promises. They included Holocaust 
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survivors, Korean “comfort women,” Filipino veterans, Mexican brace-
ros, Rosie the Riveters, and Japanese- American internees. The political 
reemergence of the rubber “soldiers” also coincided with the reappear-
ance of the rainforest as an endangered biome, a historical turnaround 
explored in the epilogue.
IV. the Vargas regime: designs on “Unoccupied” lands
Under the Estado Novo, political centralization, industrial growth, and a 
burgeoning professional class had placed growing claims on the Amazon. 
Although the Vargas regime christened the Amazon wartime campaign 
the “Battle for Rubber,” state policies never aimed solely to maximize 
latex production—a battle that authorities early on recognized as unwin-
nable in light of the development of the synthetic industry in the United 
States. The lessons of rubber’s gilded age had been sobering for Brazil-
ian statesmen: commodity booms, unharnessed by state policies pro-
moting public health, colonization, agribusiness, and modernization of 
transportation, made for little more than rain forest cities of faded glory. 
Or as Governor Aluízio Ferreira told Vargas: “the March to the West will 
just be a bunch of words” if federal expenditures failed to “valorize the 
human population and the production of wealth” in the region.195
For Brazilian policymakers, the Amazon represented a geographic, 
political, and ideological battleground that required long- term, broad-
scale government measures. Thus, when Amazonian elites griped that 
Brazil’s representatives in Washington had settled for too low a price for 
rubber, southern businessman Valentim Bouças, one of the negotiators, 
countered that “the rational planting of rubber trees, perfecting the tech-
niques of production, medical and social assistance to the worker, sani-
tary defense of the region, a general transportation plan, financing of pro-
duction, stimulation of the production of staple crops, [and] placement 
and affixing of men in their agricultural plots will assure that we never 
go back to the dark days that followed the bust of the rubber trade.”196 As 
chairman of the board of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company in Bra-
zil (which, together with Firestone, consumed more than 50 percent of 
the nation’s internal quota of 10,000 tons of raw rubber), Bouças’s posi-
tion conveniently obscured corporate windfalls: Brazilian tire companies 
paid the same fixed price as the RdC for raw rubber, but in the absence 
of a ceiling price on the sale of manufactured rubber goods resold to the 
Allies at a sizeable profit. Goodyear’s and Firestone’s exports from Bra-
zil topped $100,000 in 1941, but surged to $4,559,100 between January 
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and May 1943 alone.197 Nevertheless, Bouças had outlined the large- scale 
objectives of the March to the West, which would also reap the benefits 
of U.S. compliance: both American officials who favored the use of gov-
ernment aid for economic, strategic, and humanitarian purposes in war-
time (and later Cold War) Latin America and those constrained by the 
imperatives of diplomatic alliance or the dictates of national sovereignty 
from protesting otherwise.
Brazil’s wartime alliance with the United States, in fact, enabled a vast 
increase in public credit in the Amazon. The Banco de Crédito da Borra-
cha, a joint venture of U.S. and Brazilian state capital, became the Banco 
de Crédito da Amazônia in 1950 (at which time the American directors 
stepped down). In 1966, the military government changed the bank’s 
name once more to the Banco da Amazônia (BASA), which would serve 
as a principal regional lending institution, financing the development 
of cattle ranching, agribusiness, mining, and industry. The Amazon 
had come a long way since the turn- of- the- century boom when foreign- 
owned import- export houses dominated local credit markets.198
Wartime policies further underwrote the expansion of public health 
programs in the Amazon. With assistance from the U.S. Institute of Inter- 
American Affairs, the SESp remained a bilateral agency until 1960, and 
an autonomous division of Brazil’s Ministry of Health during the sub-
sequent three decades. The Instituto Evandro Chagas in Belém became 
a center for the study of tropical diseases and training of medical per-
sonnel. Local SESp clinics groomed scores of semiprofessional visiting 
nurses and sanitary guards to improve sanitation and hygiene in Ama-
zonian towns, including insect and rodent control, food inspection, im-
munization, water supply, disposal of excreta, and the construction of 
privies. Postwar engineers trained laborers to work underwater to dig 
out wells in quicksand, locking a rigid slab on the base of a brick and 
cement wall casing, to filter sufficient quantities of water for fair- sized 
communities; the invention, which became known as the “Amazon well,” 
was widely adopted in the region and throughout the world.199 Moreover, 
postwar application of ddT, combined with the introduction of the syn-
thetic drug chloroquine, cut the incidence of malaria in Brazil by 1970 
to 1 percent of its rate two decades earlier, although 70 percent of these 
cases occurred in the Amazon. Amidst the broader failure of global eradi-
cation efforts, however, malaria rebounded in the Amazon in the 1970s 
due to deforestation, mass migration, and the emergence of chloroquine- 
resistant plasmodium. By 1986, over 500,000 cases of malaria were reg-
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istered in the Amazon, accounting for nearly 99 percent of the disease’s 
victims nationwide.200
As historian André Luiz Vieira de Campos points out, SESp’s profes-
sional training, network of clinics and dispensaries, and sanitation works 
in the Amazon provided a postwar model for public health programs 
in Brazil’s less economically developed regions. Furthermore, the dis-
semination of public health practices, a quotidian ritualization of the fun-
damentals of citizenship, also strengthened identification of backlands 
populations with the nation- state.201 Although the human development 
index in northern Brazil continues to lag behind the southern states, pub-
lic health and sanitation in the Amazon witnessed advances over the post-
war period.
Vargas- era officials also proved rather adept in channeling U.S.- 
subsidized labor and technology transfers from rubber production to pro-
mote long- term settlement of the Amazon. Mass relocation of unaccom-
panied men had never pleased officials from the National Department of 
Immigration (dNI) or the Catholic Church, which favored the resettle-
ment of families in the Amazon. After SEMTA fell far short of its contrac-
tual obligation to transport 50,000 male workers to Belém by mid- 1943, 
the U.S. government signed a subsequent agreement with its successor, 
CAETA, to subsidize the transfer of 16,000 male workers to the Amazon 
between October 1943 and May 1944 at a cost of $2.4 million.202 Under a 
February 1944 agreement between CAETA and the dNI, however, family 
recruitment and reunification regained priority; thereafter, Brazilian offi-
cials made no distinction in their tallies between single (or unaccompa-
nied) men and men accompanied by their families. Thus, by November 
1944, CAETA had transported 11,180 workers, as well as 5,955 dependents, 
although the latter were not covered by the original agreement with Rub-
ber Development.203 While U.S. officials contemplated the suspension 
of funds to CAETA for breach of contract, RdC president Douglas Allen 
noted that “in order to avoid diplomatic complications involved in an 
agency of the United States government checking up on an agency of the 
Brazilian Government,” the most that could be done was to alert its au-
thorities to “a situation which appears to threaten non- performance by 
Brazil of its obligations”204 (see figure 5.7).
Similarly, the Fundação Brasil Central (fBC), a federal agency estab-
lished in 1943, undertook to develop the central- west and Amazonian 
regions through the construction of airfields and the implantation of 
agricultural colonies and large- scale cattle ranches interlinked to newly 
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planned towns. Through the proposed building of roads linking São 
Paulo to Cuiabá and Santarém, the fBC aimed to “enrich the nation with 
the effective increase of its territory and create new centers of consump-
tion and sources of wealth.”205 The fBC acquired trucks, medical sup-
plies, radio paraphernalia, office equipment, machinery, and personnel 
from SEMTA after the labor recruitment agency was disbanded, as well 
as hydroplanes, radio stations, motors, fuel, tapper supplies, and fixed 
installations liquidated by the U.S. government.206 Indeed, wrangling 
over the fate of the Manaus airfield, constructed by the RdC for the rub-
ber campaign, exemplifies Brazilian maneuvers to advance long- term re-
gional programs and infrastructural expansion. Upon the RdC’S with-
drawal from the Amazon, Brazilian authorities protested the agency’s 
unwillingness to extend and repave the airfield, which they eyed as a 
facility to expand aviation in the hinterland. The RdC ultimately agreed to 
hand over complete radio and meteorological systems, and to extend the 
tenure of the relevant U.S. technicians in the Amazon to train Brazilian 
personnel to prevent interruption in service. (The decision also honored 
a request of the Weather Bureau in the United States whose functionaries 
had been involved in weather reporting for the area.207) By 1950, General 
Borges Fortes de Oliveira could report on various aeronautical studies 
figure 5.7 Women and children at dNI migrant barracks at Manaus. Source: National 
Archives.
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that the fBC and the Ministry of Aeronautics had conducted between the 
Xingu and Tapajós rivers, including aerial photos taken by the U.S. Air 
Force in the Amazon, to select new locations for airstrips on the route 
linking Rio de Janeiro to Manaus.208
For Brazilian policymakers, the Amazon’s wartime history would 
vindicate the importance of public planning, state subsidies, infrastruc-
tural expansion, and scientific method to transform the region. What 
had wartime disruptions in coastal trade and shortage of goods shown, 
charged João Alberto Lins de Barros, if not Brazil’s folly in failing to de-
velop riverine and overland routes to serve the hinterland?209 What use 
were the wartime migrant way stations, noted engineer Dulphe Machado 
of the Immigration and Colonization Council, but as laboratories where 
government planners could “institute a veritable social policy, gather-
ing magnificent data for a future study of internal migrations, correct-
ing abuses and flaws with the lessons that have been learned.”210 What 
more could the rubber campaign offer, asked the Conselho Nacional de 
Geografia, but the potential to learn from the “sizeable migration of Bra-
zilians, above all nordestinos, to Amazonia,” for future social science 
studies.211 And what had World War II confirmed, insisted Benjamin 
Hunnicutt in 1945 in Brazil Looks Forward, other than that: “In the mod-
ern days of the ‘Have and Have- Not’ theory, so much unoccupied land 
constituted a real danger in international relations. Some nations of the 
world are so densely populated that it is difficult to maintain production 
and commerce sufficient to supply a living for all their inhabitants. . . . 
Brazil became aware of its peril and has prepared for her own defense by 
adopting military measures along with important plans for an effective 
occupation of her surplus lands under lawful and legitimate means of 
protection.”212
In 1946, Brazil’s newly drafted Constitution earmarked a minimum 
of 3 percent of federal revenues for the “economic valorization of Ama-
zonia.” The Superintendência do Plano de Valorização Econômica da 
Amazônia (SpvEA), created in 1953, administered the constitutionally 
mandated federal revenues for the Amazon, subsidizing and coordinat-
ing regional development programs. It was succeeded in 1966 under 
military rule by the Superintendência de Desenvolvimento da Amazônia 
(SUdAM).
In fundamental ways, the Vargas regime laid the groundwork for the 
military government’s public policies in the Amazon. Following the coup 
of 1964, the generals contracted vast loans from multilateral develop-
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ment banks to construct highways linking the Amazon to São Paulo’s 
industrial economy and northeastern labor reserves, and to undercut 
traditional riverine trade. Through billions of dollars in subsidies and 
tax breaks, the military lured corporate investors to the Amazon. And 
through the distribution of public land, the regime encouraged mass mi-
gration and frontier settlement. During the 1940s, the Brazilian state’s 
capacity to remake the Amazon was necessarily fainter given the strain 
on global capital markets, the contentiousness of developmental aid to 
Latin America, the concentration of Brazilian domestic manufactures in 
consumer rather than capital goods, and the limits of technology. Yet the 
Vargas regime seized on geopolitical turnabouts to leverage foreign capi-
tal and technology transfers, establishing the infrastructural and ideo-
logical foundations for subsequent state projects in the Amazon.
Although for U.S. officials the Amazon had only fleeting importance 
for the war, for Brazilian policymakers the war had a lasting significance 
for the Amazon. The varied meanings and mediations of Amazonian na-
ture explain, in part, such divergences.
War is more than the global backdrop for this history of the Amazon; it 
also serves as an apt metaphor for the multifaceted and uneven battle for 
power in and over the region. Although patriotic pronouncements ex-
horted the peoples of the Americas to transcend boundaries of class and 
nation to win the war, the Amazon’s vast territorial expanse, abundant 
natural resources, varied geographies, and charged ideological signifi-
cance could not ensure any such unanimity. Common professional back-
ground or technocratic mindset may have united select Brazilian and 
U.S. policymakers, but national interest and cultural bias often cleaved 
them. Bosses and tappers jousted over resources in the forest, while mi-
grants ranged over varied geographies in the pursuit of livelihoods.
In search of latex, U.S. officials subsidized the Amazon rubber trade 
and orchestrated an extensive publicity blitz to boost production. Dis-
mayed by Amazonian opposition or indifference, a number of U.S. war-
time observers faulted the region’s disadvantaged position in the global 
rubber trade (particularly in light of the development of the U.S. syn-
thetic industry). Yet the primary explanation in bureaucratic, journalis-
tic, and historiographical circles focused on northern do- gooders way-
laid in the forest. It is “difficult to understand this attitude in a class of 
people such as the average seringalista, and it is even more difficult to 
212 Chapter 5
understand just how it is allowed to continue during the greatest war in 
history,” wrote RdC technician William MacKinnon of bosses’ reluctance 
“to meet our war needs.”213 Colonialist outrage at the perceived misuse 
of natural resources is nothing new in the histories of the tropics, nor are 
the limits of moralizing discourse to modify locals’ behavior.
Bosses’ wartime “attitude,” in fact, reflected their intimate understand-
ing of the nature of the Amazon. Veterans of boom and bust cycles, Ama-
zonian bosses eyed the likelihood of a long- term resurgence of the wild 
rubber trade on the international market, or at home, with skepticism. 
They bristled at suggestions to hire untested male laborers, increase 
rubber yields, or refrain from charging workers for putatively legitimate 
business expenses.214 Bosses also comprehended the forest’s power to 
mesmerize state planners, attract capital, and entomb social protest. Ulti-
mately, they stood up to U.S. and Brazilian officials: the former required 
their collaboration in the rubber program, while the latter lacked the ca-
pacity or the will to enforce price controls and labor legislation in the for-
est. Bereft of state assistance in the rural Amazon, migrants and tappers 
pursued time- tested patterns of land and resource management, market 
insertion, social kinship, and geographic mobility. Local knowledge and 
forms of natural resource use persisted, defying the dictates of markets 
and states.
Leveraging the Amazon’s strategic wartime importance, the Vargas 
regime extracted economic and technical assistance from the U.S. gov-
ernment to advance long- term development goals. Brazil’s professional 
classes, military officials, and regional oligarchs had championed colo-
nization, sanitation reform, modernization of transport, and market ex-
pansion in the Amazon prior to Pearl Harbor. Upon U.S. entry into the 
region, Brazilian authorities knew quite well how to resist, or more accu-
rately make the most of, the “internationalization” of the Amazon at its 
historical apex.
The wartime history of the Amazon illustrates how competing uses 
and meanings of nature have shaped landscapes and pathways in the re-
gion. The struggles waged by an array of wartime mediators served to 
define the realms of nature and politics in the Amazon, much as would 
those of their postwar successors, in both historically patterned and un-
foreseeable ways.
EpILOGUE
from wartIme SoldIerS  
to green gUerrIllaS
Under the guise of development, more than 10 percent of the Brazilian Amazon was deforested in the half century follow-
ing the war.1 But something else overtook the region as well in 
recent decades. The Brazilian government demarcated approxi-
mately 22 percent of its Amazonian territory as indigenous lands, 
and another 10 percent as conservation units, including extractive 
reserves for rubber tappers and other “traditional peoples.”2 Rub-
ber tappers, onetime “soldiers” in the Allied war effort, came to 
be hailed as “green guerrillas,” protectors of biodiversity and the 
global environment.3 And the Amazon, once routinely referred to 
as a valley, basin, or jungle, became popularly acclaimed as a rain-
forest.4
One might assert that there is nothing unprecedented about 
the current fashioning of the Amazon. Since the colonial period, 
Amazonian populations have been producers and consumers of 
global commodities, targets of interventionist and assimilationist 
policies, and objects of interimperial rivalries. Export of primary 
products continues to mark the region’s fitful integration into the 
world economy. Moreover, as a morality tale pitting nature against 
culture and laden with heavy racial overtones, the Amazon has 
long accommodated outsiders’ presentiments of apocalypse or sal-
vation.5 The Amazon’s nationalistic significance for Brazilians also 
runs deep, even if its articulation heretofore lacked the jingoistic 
pithiness of the more contemporary slogan, “The Amazon is ours.”
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Yet the scale of things is now quite distinct. While the jungle has always 
made for a sensational tale and sale, the commodification of the Amazon 
in the food, vitamin, entertainment, and tourist industries reached new 
dimensions in mass- consumer societies of the late twentieth century. 
While foreign consumers may have coveted Amazonian rubber, and for-
esters and scientists scrutinized its flora and fauna, this is a far cry from 
the mass panic regarding tropical deforestation. And if conflicts over re-
sources, representation, and power are no novelty in Amazonian history, 
the “greening” of its social movements, reworking local vocabularies of 
class struggle as well as mythical or spiritual perceptions of nature into 
new political identities, is.6
In this epilogue I examine how the Brazilian Amazon came to be re-
framed in (inter)national affairs and the popular imaginary in the latter 
part of the twentieth century, taking as my endpoint the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. 
I explore how transformations in the Amazon during Brazilian military 
rule (1964–85) and its aftermath collided with the popularization of the 
environmental movement in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, 
relegating public policies and local conflicts in the region to new (as well 
as well- trodden) transnational fields. Although these tensions in many 
ways embody the so- called north- south divide in environmental politics 
between conservationism and national development, a strict dichotomy 
is belied by the World Bank’s financing of government projects that have 
accelerated tropical deforestation, and by the advocacy of Brazilian NGOs 
and grassroots movements for environmental conservation.7 Nor does 
this putative Green Curtain tell us much about the historical processes 
and contexts that engendered such geopolitical positions. I examine, 
therefore, the novel scientific disciplines, technologies, and cultural vo-
cabularies that served to remake the Amazon in the popular and politi-
cal imaginary in the North Atlantic and in Brazil. I argue that the con-
temporary fracas bespeaks as well the region’s ongoing entanglement in 
civilizing processes and modernist angst, as well as in longstanding local 
struggles for power.
the amazon and the other green revolution
Like the Vargas regime, Brazil’s military government chafed at the un-
fortified borders, sparse population, and tenuous state control in the 
Amazon.8 Challenged in “developing” the Amazon, the military dictator-
ship too wooed foreign capital for megaprojects and resource extrac-
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tion, particularly hydroelectric dams and mineral exploration. And the 
military likewise cast the giant region as an outsize nationalist agenda: 
a panacea for underdevelopment and social injustice, a marker of Brazil-
ian character and good government, a priority for national security. But 
the concomitant emergence of a mass environmental movement in the 
North Atlantic and Brazil, and the grassroots mobilization of forest dwell-
ers, tugged Amazonia in different directions.
The Brazilian military’s policies in the Amazon have been extensively 
explored.9 The state invested billions of dollars in transportation infra-
structure, telecommunications, and public utilities, and lured private 
capital through tax shelters and exemptions and liberal credit policies. 
Between 1971 and 1987, for example, cattle ranches, owned principally by 
Brazilian investors and multinational corporations, received an estimated 
$5 billion in subsidies.10 The Amazon’s population also grew by almost 
ten million between 1960 and 1980, with migrants from southern and 
northeastern Brazil acquiring thousands of plots through government- 
sponsored and private colonization projects.11 With real estate values 
soaring and land titling marked by carelessness and corruption, the rural 
poor suffered fraud, violence, and eviction. By 1986, 64 percent of all 
land conflicts in Brazil occurred in the Amazon region.12
What most aroused international attention to the Brazilian Amazon 
during military rule and its aftermath, however, was deforestation. The 
causes of deforestation include highway construction (85 percent of all 
deforestation occurs within thirty miles of a road); land use for pasture 
(as of 1989, livestock occupied more than 85 percent of the area cleared); 
hydroelectric projects and construction of dams; colonization, mining, 
and logging; and, more recently, soybean production.13 Whereas in 1975 
less than seven million acres of land in the Brazilian Amazon had been 
altered from its original forest cover, by 1988 an estimated forty million 
acres of forest had been destroyed.14 Using Landsat data and satellite in-
formation from the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration, research scientist Philip Fearnside of the Instituto Nacional de 
Pesquisas da Amazônia estimated total deforestation through 1988 at 
8 percent; a World Bank–commissioned study arrived at a higher figure 
of 12 percent.15
Foreign concern with tropical forest depletion, of course, has a long 
history. In the seventeenth century, for example, the Portuguese Crown 
protected from felling various Brazilian timbers deemed critical for ship-
building.16 Eighteenth- century British officials, alarmed by the perceived 
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climatological consequences of forest depletion in their tropical island 
colonies, reserved tracts of forest land.17 Yet as political scientists Mar-
garet Keck and Kathryn Sikkink point out, the term “tropical deforesta-
tion” gained widespread use among environmentalists only in the early 
1970s; before that, concern with tropical forest loss fell under the rubric 
of habitat protection. The Swiss- based International Union for the Con-
servation of Nature and Natural Resources first took up the issue of 
tropical deforestation in 1972 in response to the Brazilian military’s colo-
nization projects in the Amazon.18 More broadly, we might argue, the pro-
liferation of a global mass environmental movement reframed struggles 
over power and resources in the Brazilian Amazon in new transnational 
terms.19
In the Northern Hemisphere, the origins of a popular “age of ecology” 
have been traced to the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), 
which detailed the toxic effects of pesticides on the environment and the 
fundamental interdependence of humans with other biological species; 
to the 1960s “flower power’s” repudiation of consumerism and militari-
zation; and to the horror of Hiroshima. But the decade of the 1970s, the 
backdrop for the Brazilian military government’s foray into the Amazon, 
represented a watershed in the popularization and global diffusion of en-
vironmentalism. Inaugurated with the launching of Earth Day, the 1970s 
saw the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (1970) and sub-
sequent passage of key environmental legislation in the United States; 
the establishment of UNESCO’s Man and the Biosphere Programme 
(1971), the UN Environment Programme (1972), and the UN Conference 
on the Human Environment in Stockholm (1972); and the founding of 
the Green Party in Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland (1972), in 
Great Britain (1973), and, most importantly, in West Germany (1979). 
The decade also was marked by the publication of influential books fo-
cused on problems of species depletion, catastrophic climate change, and 
human depredation of the environment, including the neo- Malthusian 
The Limits to Growth (1972), commissioned by the Club of Rome. Environ-
mental history emerged as a subdiscipline in the 1970s in North Ameri-
can universities, while the term “environment,” with its social scientific 
connotation, came to replace the more romantic- sounding “nature,” and 
eco- attached as a prefix signaled this new- found consciousness.20
The allure of nature stretched far back in Western thought: deep- rooted 
religious, philosophical, and artistic traditions have viewed “wilderness” 
as a fount of divine revelation, a shelter from political tyranny, a refuge 
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from industrial consumerism, a consolation for mortality.21 But the em-
brace of environmentalism by vast sectors of the middle class since the 
1970s was novel, reflecting, in part, socioeconomic changes in advanced 
industrial nations. In the United States, as the number of educated 
people expanded in the postwar economy and filled the public sector, the 
arts, and the service industries, a larger proportion of the population of 
working age became disengaged from processes of industrial production. 
Moreover, the boom in most economies of the North Atlantic in the 1980s 
meant that fewer objected to environmental protection based on financial 
concerns.22 For the American Left, disillusioned by Vietnam and Water-
gate and demoralized by the Soviet model of socialism, ecological move-
ments sustained the subversive ethic of Marxism in their cross- cultural, 
transnational critique of bourgeois materialism and individualism.23 And 
the increase in automobile ownership, while worsening pollution, also 
broadened urbanites’ access to wilderness areas.24 Others point out that 
environmental degradation, which had long victimized poor people and 
people of color, only became a white, middle- class political concern in the 
1970s when the growth of private transport purportedly democratized 
issues such as pollution.25 Over the course of the 1980s, environmental 
organizations in the United States mushroomed with the development of 
computerized databases allowing for direct mail techniques and manage-
ment of membership lists. Between 1985 and 1990, membership in the 
Environmental Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Greenpeace, and the Nature Conservancy doubled, while World Wildlife 
Fund-U.S. quintupled. Transnational environmental networks increased 
from two groups in 1953 to ninety in 1993, or from 1.8 percent of total 
international NGOs to 14.3 percent.26
In Brazil, the confluence of various factors led to the growth of envi-
ronmental politics in the 1980s: the rapid increase in urban pollution 
and environmental degradation that sensitized sectors of the middle 
class; the political reintegration of the Left following defeat of the guer-
rilla movements and the democratic opening by the military in the early 
1980s; the emergence of new social movements and public debate; and 
Brazil’s role as a developing nation with strong ties to the international 
market and media amidst the worldwide proliferation of the ecologi-
cal movement.27 The 1980s also witnessed the spread of environmen-
tal NGOs in Brazil, many of which received funding from North Ameri-
can and European embassies and philanthropic organizations, and served 
as critical links in gathering and disseminating information and devel-
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oping a network of individuals and organizations concerned with Ama-
zonia.28 In the Amazon, a significant conservation unit system already 
existed by the mid- 1980s, largely due to the dogged lobbying efforts of 
a small group of Brazilian scientists and conservationists who had con-
vinced the generals of the potential importance of the region’s resources 
for the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries as well as national 
patrimony.29
Moreover, Brazil’s political elite, facing massive foreign debt, hyperin-
flation, and neoliberal restructuring following the return to democracy, 
became increasingly sensitive to foreign censure and incentives toward 
environmental policymaking in the Amazon. At the G7 Summit in Hous-
ton in 1990, for example, the Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian 
Rainforest was launched largely at the initiative of the German govern-
ment. The program consisted of a $300- million aid package administered 
through the World Bank (as trustee) and the Brazilian Ministry of the 
Environment, designed to support conservation and sustainable devel-
opment in the Amazon and the Atlantic rain forest, while strengthen-
ing institutional capacity and environmental policymaking in Brazil.30 In 
hosting the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Rio 
de Janeiro (Earth Summit) in 1992, President Fernando Collor aimed to 
showcase Brazil’s commitment to environmental protection.
If environmentalism had reconceptualized the Earth as a set of inter-
laced ecosystems, we might still speculate how saving the Amazon rain 
forest came to be one of its dearest shibboleths, a cause célèbre of over 
200 NGOs worldwide.31 As the Environmental Defense Fund affirmed in 
1989:
Deforestation of the Amazon is one of the major environmental crises 
in the world today. The Brazilian Amazon contains about a third of 
the Earth’s remaining tropical forest and a very high portion of its bio-
logical diversity. One hectare (2.47 acres) of Amazonian moist forest 
contains more plant species than all of Europe. Two thousand Amazon 
fish species have been identified—ten times more than in Europe—
and there may be another thousand species still to be discovered. . . . 
Cutting and burning, the usual way of clearing forest, disrupts not 
only the local climate; it also affects the global climate by emitting 
“greenhouse gases” that trap heat in the atmosphere. Recent satellite 
evidence shows that an area nearly the size of Kansas was burned in 
1987 alone.32
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Grounding scientific claims in quantitative data, environmentalists 
have championed the protection of the Amazon, the world’s largest re-
maining tropical forest, as a bulwark against species depletion and global 
warming. But does concern with the Amazon in the Northern Hemi-
sphere not also build upon an old tendency of its residents to view tropi-
cal landscapes as wilder, purer, and demographically emptier than their 
temperate counterparts?33 Is the very denomination of “deforestation” 
as shorthand for the multifaceted socioenvironmental changes in the 
Amazon that have been prompted by massive land enclosures reveal-
ing of Western hallowing of trees—whose size, “prehistoric” origins, 
and self- regenerating energy embody the dignity and transcendence that 
the romantic tradition cherishes in nature? Or the affirmation of life in 
death- denying, industrial cultures?34 Is it, as Bruno Latour argues, that 
political ecology claims to speak on behalf of “the Whole” but can succeed 
in shaping public opinion and altering power relations only by “focus-
ing on places, biotypes, situations, or particular events”?35 Does Ameri-
cans’ overriding focus on tropical deforestation in the Amazon, rather 
than corresponding processes in Sumatra, Borneo, Congo, and West 
Africa, reflect a penchant for policing the nation’s “backyard” in Latin 
America?36 Or perhaps in media- driven, information- saturated societies, 
the burning of the rain forest has made for a riveting news report—such 
as the five- part documentary series on Amazon deforestation, “The De-
cade of Destruction,” aired on Public Broadcasting System’s Frontline in 
1990. Fire, with its infernal associations, notes Brazilian environmen-
tal scientist Alberto Setzer, “has a strange effect on people’s minds. It 
attracts their attention.”37 Not to mention that affixing a Save the Rain 
Forest sticker to a car bumper as a badge of ecological consciousness rep-
resents far less an inconvenience than opting for public transportation. 
Environmentalists, policymakers, the media, and consumers had not in-
vented deforestation, but their representations of the forest forged new 
meanings and political battlegrounds for the Amazon.
Science and the postwar remaking of the amazon
Transformations in the Amazon also reflect the conflicting impact of sci-
ence and technology in imparting value and meaning to tropical rain 
forest. While the electrical and metallurgical industries have placed new 
demands on forest resources through the construction of hydroelectric 
dams and consumption of vegetable charcoal, the fields of conservation 
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biology and genetic engineering have advanced nature preservation.38 
And if the Brazilian military government’s aerial radar survey Projeto 
Radam of the 1970s benefited mining companies in the Amazon, it also 
provided information on the region’s geology and soils and recommenda-
tions for the creation of conservation units; the more comprehensive and 
detailed data collected through the Landsat remote- sensing satellite pro-
gram has enabled monitoring of deforestation.39 More broadly, we might 
argue, science has redefined the nature of the Amazon through new 
kinds of knowledge claims. Notably, systems ecologist Howard Odum ob-
tained significant understanding of the structures and functions of tropi-
cal forests in the 1960s by conducting radiation tests on Puerto Rican 
forests as part of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission’s investigations 
into the effects of a potential nuclear war or accident on forests. Odum’s 
coedited volume, A Tropical Rain Forest (1970), offered the first compre-
hensive analysis of tropical forest ecosystems—underscoring the ways 
in which nutrients are derived and exchanged from the forest and its lit-
ter, and held in the tissues of living organisms rather than in its shoddy 
soils—and heralded the emergence of a new professional cadre of tropical 
ecologists and ecological engineers.40
Conservation biology further served to reframe (and rename) the sig-
nificance of land use change in the Amazon. Conservation biologists, 
whose scientific discipline was formalized in the 1980s to preserve eco-
systems and habitats rather than mere species, coined the term biodiver-
sity.41 As David Takacs notes, the defense of biodiversity was less tainted 
with class or geopolitical privilege than “wilderness protection,” dissoci-
ated from the negative connotations of “nature,” uncompromised by the 
triage of the older endangered species approach, and conceptually linked 
to multiculturalism (another term popularized in the 1980s). It retained 
scientists’ goals of preserving intact ecosystems and biotic processes, 
while allowing the public to maintain emotional ties to evocative icons. 
Biodiversity did not appear as a keyword in Biological Abstracts in 1988, 
but was listed seventy- two times in 1993.42 In 1992, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity was signed by 150 government leaders at the Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro.
Climate science likewise came to reframe the Amazon in the transna-
tional arena by implicating deforestation in the process of global warming. 
The discovery of the greenhouse effect was the product of a circuitous sci-
entific and political journey. During the Cold War, the U.S. government 
increased research funding for physical geoscience and meteorology in 
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the interest of national defense, the potential waging of climatological 
warfare, and global rivalry with the Soviet Union for scientific preemi-
nence. In the 1960s, the U.S. Department of Defense began to use satel-
lites to monitor global weather; radiocarbon, which came under intense 
study in the U.S. amidst wartime efforts to build nuclear weapons and in 
postwar detection of radioactive fallout from Soviet nuclear tests, could 
be used to track the movement of carbon in the atmosphere. Collaborative 
international scientific research was also upheld by U.S. policymakers as 
intrinsic to free trade and global stability. The U.N. World Meteorologi-
cal Organization, created in 1951, promoted international cooperation 
in meteorological observations and related services, while the Interna-
tional Geophysical Year (1957–58) drew together scientists from numer-
ous nations and disciplines to collect global geophysical data with pos-
sible military and civilian applications. In 1958, scientist Charles David 
Keeling was the first to measure carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere. 
Although funded research on the effects of long- term climate change re-
mained sparse well into the 1970s, a number of scientists began to warn 
that the heating of the atmosphere caused by the emission of carbon di-
oxide and other greenhouse gases might precipitate melting of polar ice, 
rise in water levels and inundation of productive lands, changes in the 
ozone layer, and increases in ultraviolet light radiation.43
With the 1980s marked by the six hottest years then on record, talk 
of global warming migrated from arcane scientific journals to political 
forums, media reports, and everyday conversation. Anticorporate groups 
latched on to the cause as a bane of government deregulation. The envi-
ronmental movement took up global warming as a key plank, as groups 
that had other objectives—such as preserving tropical forest, reducing 
air pollution, removing fossil fuel subsidies and promoting renewable 
energy sources, or slowing population growth—could now find com-
mon cause. Most notably perhaps, as climates came to be reconceived in 
terms of planetary systems rather than regional weather patterns, people 
and politicians became informed about the problem of global warming—
even if many remained perplexed by its ramifications and unmoved by 
calls for lifestyle overhauls.44
Land use change in the Amazon has been implicated in the green-
house effect through burning and decomposition of biomass, the re-
peated burning of pasture and secondary forest, as well as through log-
ging, cattle, and hydroelectric dams.45 In 1991, the World Bank estimated 
that deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon accounted for 4 percent of 
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total carbon dioxide emissions, while the contribution of deforestation 
worldwide to global warming (primarily from the release of carbon) was 
estimated at 14 percent in 1990. As a percentage of carbon dioxide emis-
sions from fossil fuel burnings, deforestation worldwide accounted for 
27 percent in 1989–90, while the Brazilian Amazon, according to the 
Brazilian government, represented between 4.4 and 7.6 percent.46 (Dur-
ing the 1980s, advanced industrialized countries—with 26 percent of 
the world’s population—accounted for 81 percent of energy consump-
tion, while the United States ranked as the world’s single largest emitter 
of greenhouse gases in 1990.47) By the late 1980s and early 1990s, poli-
ticians and citizens in the Northern Hemisphere increasingly linked 
tropical deforestation to the problem of global warming. In 1989, for ex-
ample, the German parliament held hearings on tropical deforestation 
and climate change, while reports published by Greenpeace and Friends 
of the Earth- UK over the next two years affirmed that one of the most 
cost- effective mechanisms to counter the greenhouse effect was through 
slowing deforestation and encouraging tropical reforestation.48
“traditional peoples of the forest”:  
new Identities and forms of representation
The greening of Amazonian politics also coalesced from the mobilization 
of rubber tappers, who employed conservationist discourse to confront 
endemic violence and marginalization, as well as new- found opportuni-
ties for strategic alliance. During the 1970s and 1980s, as land enclosures 
intensified in the Amazon, thousands of rubber tappers suffered expul-
sion; in 1980 some 68,000 families or 340,000 people depended on 
latex extraction for their livelihood.49 Since Brazilian law permitted squat-
ters to obtain possession if they consistently utilized land for more than 
a year without conflicting claims from other parties, tappers brought a 
number of successful legal suits demanding title or indemnification for 
property, or mobilized for land allotments on state- sponsored coloniza-
tion projects.50 In the state of Acre, tappers also resorted to direct action 
in the form of the empate, or standoff, in which they physically impeded 
ranch workers from clearing forest for pastureland. Between 1975 and 
1988, 45 empates took place, of which one third were successful.51 The 
repression that ensued was also staggering: 400 arrests, 40 cases of tor-
ture, and several assassinations.52
Upon the promulgation of the National Plan of Agrarian Reform in 
1985, which envisioned the settlement of 1.4 million families over a 
Epilogue 223
period of five years, tappers mobilized to ensure that regional plans for 
the Amazon would accommodate the specific needs of extractivists. At 
the inaugural meeting of the National Council of Rubber Tappers (Con-
selho Nacional de Seringueiros-CNS) in Brasília in 1985—attended by 
over 100 tappers from a variety of unions and organizations (including 
former rubber “soldiers”) as well as representatives of Brazilian, U.S., 
and British nongovernmental organizations—participants endorsed the 
suspension of state- sponsored colonization projects in rubber areas; the 
involvement of extractors in all regional development plans; and the pres-
ervation of forest areas through the creation of extractive reserves on fed-
eral lands. In an effort “to establish the broadest possible alliances with 
traditional peoples in Amazonia,” the CNS subsequently joined forces 
with the Union of Indigenous Peoples to form the Amazonian Alliance 
of the Peoples of the Forest, endorsing “models of development that re-
spect the way of life, cultures and traditions of forest peoples without de-
stroying nature, and that improve the quality of life.”53
Many tappers traditionally believed that the forest was inhabited by 
“encantados,” or enchanted beings, including “mothers and fathers” re-
sponsible for its flora and fauna. The Mother of Wild Animals (“mãe da 
caça” or “Caipora”) demanded respect or even abstention from hunters 
of game, and punished violators of hunting and food taboos with pa-
nema, an incapacity to hunt caused by the failure to spot animals in the 
forest. The Mother of the Rubber Tree (“mãe da seringueira”) rewarded 
young, unmarried men with productivity in return for fair treatment, 
and was believed by some to show scars on her face and even experi-
ence pain from abuse.54 Yet tappers’ self- denomination as “traditional 
peoples of the forest” marked a noteworthy linguistic turn. Seringalistas 
referred to tappers as “customers” in light of the commercial exchanges 
that underpinned social relations, while rivers stood in as their standard 
locational references; racial phenotype, geographic origin, and length of 
stay in the Amazon were also common identity markers. Tappers most 
likely had not viewed themselves as “traditional” (or as allies of indige-
nous peoples for that matter), given that their ballads celebrate their 
distinctive contributions to the modern era: “let’s honor the tapper / 
let’s honor the nation / cause thanks to the work of these people / we 
have automobiles and aviation.”55 While anthropologists have debated 
whether “traditional peoples” instinctively practice conservationism or 
whether this notion is a myth cultivated by environmentalists in indus-
trial society, I am interested in examining the evolution of political iden-
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tities and cultural representations in the Amazon in tandem with new 
forms of mediation.56
Rendered invisible by postwar developmentalist agendas and ethno-
graphic studies, tappers faced a challenge of political legitimacy.57 Geo-
political thinkers and corporate investors portrayed vast, unoccupied 
spaces in the Amazon, while the miscegenated populations of the Ama-
zon, products of a long history of colonial rule, religious conversion, 
sexual violence, and migration, destabilized narratives of unspoiled land-
scapes dear to romantics.58 Former rubber “soldiers” did stress their war-
time service to garner government support, but they were a smaller and 
older subset of tappers with distinct historical claims and grievances. By 
embracing a new political identity as “traditional people,” whose environ-
mentalist calling to protect the forest validated their own longstanding 
beliefs and practices, tappers could stake their claims to legal rights and 
social inclusion. With backing from international environmental NGOs 
and Brazilian anthropologists, rubber tappers would gain newfound 
leverage in conflicts over resources and power in the forest.59
In the early 1980s, U.S. and British environmental organizations mo-
bilized against ecologically destructive projects funded by multilateral 
banks, which were vulnerable to U.S. congressional pressure due to 
greater American financial contributions and voting shares. Between 
1983 and 1986, the U.S. Congress held seventeen hearings related to 
multilateral development banks and the environment. One of the most 
contentious cases was the World Bank–funded Polonoroeste develop-
ment project in Rondônia, whose ecological impacts were denounced 
by the Environmental Defense Fund.60 In opposing Polonoroeste, envi-
ronmentalists established ties with Chico Mendes, the founder of the 
Xapuri rural workers union (and son of a northeastern migrant), who 
had organized rubber tappers in Acre against evictions for over a decade. 
In meetings with officials of the U.S. Congress, the World Bank, and the 
Inter- American Development Bank, Mendes lobbied against Polono-
roeste’s proposed paving of a highway linking the capitals of Rondônia 
and Acre. The alliance between rubber tappers and environmentalists 
was mutually beneficial: the former gained international supporters 
in their struggle for social and environmental justice, while the latter 
could showcase alternatives to large- scale development projects and de-
flect charges that deforestation only concerned privileged foreigners.61 
The campaign succeeded in pressuring the World Bank to suspend more 
than half of its disbursements for Polonoroeste—the first time ever that 
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the institution halted a loan for environmental concerns.62 Mendes re-
ceived a United Nations Environment Programme Global 500 Roll of 
Honor Award in 1987.
Grass roots mobilization in the Amazon sparked both violent repri-
sals and political concessions. In December 1988, a rancher assassinated 
Mendes—one of ninety rural workers killed in Brazil that year (see fig. 
Epil.1). The following year, however, an amendment to Brazil’s National 
Environmental Policy Act formally established extractive reserves as a 
distinct type of conservation unit that allows for the extraction of natu-
figure epil.1 The house of Chico Mendes, and site of his murder in 1988, in 
Xapuri, Acre. Source: Photograph by author.
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ral resources by residents. The World Bank too endorsed the reserves to 
“permit the simultaneous conservation and economic development of 
large tracts of primary forests in the Amazon region,” and to rehabili-
tate the institution’s tarnished image.63 In 1992, the U.N. Convention on 
Biological Diversity recognized the dependence of indigenous and local 
communities on biological resources, and the need to ensure the equi-
table sharing of the benefits derived from the use of traditional knowl-
edge and  practices relating to the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity.64
As of 1994, the total area of Brazil’s extractive reserves (eight of which 
were in the Amazon) encompassed 22,007 square kilometers, with a 
total population of 28,460.65 Unlike Brazil’s indigenous populations, 
whose constitutional rights to land derive from their status as original 
occupants, land rights of “traditional peoples” on extractive reserves are 
contingent upon environmental stewardship.66 On the federal conserva-
tion units, community associations receive a contract for exclusive land 
use, and may grant free concessions for sixty years to individual mem-
bers resident in the area for at least one year.67
Through expertise, perseverance, and adaptability, rubber tappers 
have mediated distinctive meanings and uses of forest resources. Alli-
ances with Brazilian and international NGOs afforded tappers landmark 
political and territorial gains. Yet the removal of federal subsidies for rub-
ber in the 1990s and lack of adequate education and health care on the 
extractive reserves have strained livelihoods and led to out- migration.68 
Indeed, rubber tappers’ ongoing struggles over resources and represen-
tations illustrate what Roger Chartier has deemed the fundamental ob-
ject of history: “tension between the inventive capacities of individuals or 
communities and the constraints, norms, and conventions that limit—
more or less forcibly according to their position in the relations of domi-
nation—what is possible for them to think, to express, to do.”69
Amidst aggressive postwar frontier expansion, the rebirth of the Bra-
zilian Amazon as global ecological sanctum was midwifed by political 
realignments, scientific and technological advances, and newly minted 
cultural vocabularies and values. Amazonian resources and populations 
have been age- old contributors to global development and scientific 
knowledge, as well as icons of Brazilian nationalism, but shifting ma-
terial demands and symbolic meanings served to reinvent the rain forest 
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in (inter)national politics. Forest dwellers had long flouted the regimens 
of bosses and bureaucrats but can now claim access to natural resources, 
and alternative futures, as “traditional peoples.” Raging from Manaus to 
Manhattan, contemporary conflicts over political ecology in the Amazon 
involve activists and extractivists, biologists and bloggers, agribusiness 
and academics, journalists and journeyers, consumers and conservation-
ists, and forests and freeways.
Yet the Brazilian Amazon’s current linkages to the global economy 
and imaginary evince well- worn historical patterns. Much as the crisis 
in industrial capitalism after Pearl Harbor precipitated U.S. intervention 
in the Amazon, its excesses stoke current concerns with tropical defor-
estation and global warming. Observers in the Northern Hemisphere 
continue to claim the scientific know- how and moral quotient to deter-
mine proper management of tropical forests. Malthusian panics that 
have threaded colonial and environmental policymaking echo in charges 
that tropical deforestation jeopardizes the Earth’s future. Or the danger 
is said to lurk in “Third World kleptocrats,” who have purportedly con-
cocted global warming to extort money from “the West.”70 Alternatively, 
visions of Amazonian bounty that uphold tropical forest carbon sinks as 
antidotes to global warming can deflect political pressure on the energy 
and automobile industries in the United States to invest in environmen-
tally friendly technologies.71
Present- day struggles over resource management in the Amazon also 
echo longstanding trends. Where seringalistas once bragged of “conquer-
ing” the forest, leaders in agribusiness, mining, and industry in the Ama-
zon now trumpet their methods of land use change as models for devel-
opment. Like Vargas- era foes of social welfare legislation, agrarian elites 
in the Amazon tar conservationism as an infringement on business pre-
rogative or national sovereignty, and use intimidation and violence to 
silence opponents. Natural resource extraction continues to lure private 
capital, state investment, and multilateral loans, while progressive labor 
and environmental laws are undermined by lack of enforcement and po-
litical will.
Contemporary accounts of the Amazon have aptly depicted endan-
gered tropical ecosystems. This study has focused, however, on varied 
mediators that have delineated the politics of nature and the nature of 
politics in the Brazilian Amazon over the course of the twentieth cen-
tury. It takes as a historical watershed the era of the Estado Novo, when 
the centralization of state power, the rise of regional planning, and the 
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consolidation of the nation’s professional class expanded the contestants 
for Amazonian resources. The Second World War, augmenting (trans)na-
tional claims on forest resources, hastened the expansion of credit mar-
kets and transportation infrastructure in the Amazon through Brazilian 
and U.S. state financing. It also revitalized long- distance migration and 
advanced technological capability and destructiveness in the region. War-
time transformations laid the ground for accelerated land enclosures, 
deforestation, population transfers, and proletarianization over subse-
quent decades. But likewise forged in the throes of global conflict were 
labor laws, health programs, and nationalistic pronouncements that re-
fashioned the Amazonian poor as working- class citizens with formal 
legal and social rights, generating new arenas for political inclusion and 
struggle.
Conjured by outsiders as a pristine realm, Amazonian landscapes have 
been embedded in social and (geo)political conflicts since the Iberian con-
quest. Bounded by maps and academic disciplines, the Brazilian Amazon 
has been molded by competing and far- flung networks of peoples, goods, 
and ideas. Indeed, because the Amazon encompasses not only distinct 
tropical ecosystems, but fundamental debates about the meanings of 
modernity, the nature of the region will stir controversy for time to come.
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